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The thesis tries to provide an answer to the problem of tax avoidance. For this purpose 
a reinterpretation of taxes as practices of mutual recognition is defended. The 
conception of taxation and tax law defended in the thesis contrast sharply to the 
merely instrumental or functional conceptions of taxation and tax law that dominates 
today’s common understanding of taxation and tax law. The thesis lays out the basis for 
a new general theory of tax law, but does not develop in detail each of the elements of 
such a theory.
The thesis first lays out the problem by analysing different definitions of tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, and tax planning, as well as their shortcomings. From that 
discussion, it emerges that the ways in which tax avoidance has been conceptualised 
are not only unclear but they also fail to produce any relevant insight into the problem 
of tax avoidance. The thesis then relates those shortcomings to what it calls the classical 
paradigm of tax law, which leads, in turn, to the contemporary general theory of tax law. A 
combination of these conceptions – of the substance (function) and form of tax law – 
explains that the structure of tax law is based on a conception of the obligation to pay 
taxes in which there is space for tax avoidance. The thesis argues that, in doing so, the 
purpose of tax law is defeated. Recent alternatives to the contemporary general theory 
are also analysed and critically evaluated.
The second part of the thesis develops the positive aspect of the argument, in 
three connected moves. First, an argument is provided to prove that both liberal 
egalitarian and luck egalitarian theories of justice are not able to offer an answer to tax 
avoidance because they consider taxes and tax law to be mere instruments for 
redistribution. Second, a substantive reinterpretation of taxation as a practice with an 
internal good is presented, in which mutual recognition is defended as taxation’s 
internal good. Finally, an argument for the thesis that the best possible understanding 
of tax law requires us to interpret it as a teleological institution is provided. With this 
positive programme, the thesis aims at providing a superior alternative to the merely 
instrumental conception of taxation and tax law that derives from the classical 
paradigm presented at the outset. Its superiority is evidenced by the fact that the 
alternative provided can offer us the conceptual resources to understand the problem 




Tax avoidance is a problem for contemporary states that depend on taxes. Not only 
because avoidance brings less revenue, but also because it threatens the very same 
concept of taxation, that is, the idea that we all have to share in the maintenance of the 
state. Tax avoidance undermines ‘the fairness and integrity of tax systems’.1 An 
example of tax avoidance that has been a major problem for G20 states consists of 
transnational companies shifting profits from ‘their home countries by pushing 
activities abroad to low or no tax jurisdictions’.2 This avoidance scheme, adopted by 
companies such as Amazon, Starbucks and Apple, led the Finance Ministers of the G20 
to request that the OECD develop an action plan in July 2013. This project is known 
as BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) and ‘is looking at whether the current rules 
allow for the allocation of taxable profits to locations different from those where the 
actual business activity takes place and if not, what could be done to change this’.3 If 
the argument of this thesis proves to be right, project BEPS will not achieve its ends 
because it still works within the classical paradigm of tax law and the contemporary 
general theory of tax law. For the classical paradigm and the contemporary general 
theory of tax law, tax avoidance is a moral and not a legal problem. In chapter one I 
argue that tax avoidance has been such an elusive problem precisely because we do not 
have any legal elements by which to assess it. In chapter two I provide elements to 
show that taxation and tax law, if conceived within the classical paradigm and the 
contemporary general theory of tax law, are unable to conceive tax avoidance as legally 
problematic and, a fortiori, to respond legally to the problem of tax avoidance. This 
inability results from the fact that they are based on assumptions within which tax 
avoidance is not a possibility.
In the second part of this thesis (chapters three to five) I offer an alternative 
conception of taxation and tax law. Against merely instrumental justifications of 
taxation that mainly revolve around public finance and the justification of 
redistribution, I argue for a conception of taxation as a practice with an internal good 
(chapter four) and a conception of tax law as a teleological institution (chapter five). 
To demonstrate the importance of these alternative conceptions of taxation and tax 
1. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm (last access 24/11/13).
2. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm (last access 24/11/13).
3. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm (last access 24/11/13).
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law I expose the shortcomings of a possible alternative, that is, liberal egalitarian and 
luck egalitarian theories of justice that try to justify redistributive taxation (chapter 
three).
To defend the argument that I advocate I will show the shortcomings of 
alternatives that have been proposed in the attempt to combat avoidance (chapters one 
and two). I also show that the possible alternatives for solving the problem have not 
moved away from the classical paradigm and that, therefore, taxation is justified as a 
mere instrument for redistribution. Moreover, alternatives that try to justify 
redistributive taxation have not been able to explain the importance of tax law 
(chapter three). So these arguments may justify the need to finance public expenditure 
and redistribution, but they cannot show the importance of taxation and tax law. These 
arguments may justify any other instrument or functional equivalent that is able to 
achieve those ends. On the contrary, I argue that taxation and tax law are important 
per se. For this purpose, my argument requires me to show that taxation is not a mere 
instrument, but that it is a practice with an internal good. I conclude that this internal 
good is mutual recognition (chapter four). I argue that the political dimension of 
distributive justice should be rescued and equality understood as a political ideal at the 
service of mutual recognition. The second step of my argument requires that I show 
that tax law can be properly understood as a teleological institution and not as an 
instrumental or functional institution (chapter five).
The basic thesis that I defend in what follows is that taxation is better 
understood as a practice with an internal good rather than as an instrument for 
redistribution. This implies the following sub-theses: (i) the internal good of taxation is 
mutual recognition, (ii) taxation and private property are co-original, (iii) we have a 
duty to pay taxes even if there is no need for redistribution, and (iv) tax law is a 
teleological, not an instrumental or functional, institution.
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CHAPTER ONE. TAX AVOIDANCE AS A LEGAL PROBLEM
I met with a financial advisor and 
he said to me ‘Do you want to pay 




To say that tax avoidance is a problem and also that it is legal is today common sense. 
More and more people are conscious of the consequences of the state having less 
revenue for public expenditure and it is widely accepted that those who do not pay 
their dues are acting unfairly toward those who do. But as Jimmy Carr explains by 
quoting his financial advisor, when discussing his tax affairs it seems to be that there 
are perfectly legal ways to pay less tax. To put it in other words, tax avoidance is widely 
accepted as legal. Or to quote Prime Minister David Cameron, the tax scheme used by 
Carr to avoid taxes is ‘quite frankly morally wrong’4 but legal. Chancellor George 
Osborne said the same in his budget speech in March 2012 when he described 
‘aggressive tax avoidance as “morally repugnant”’5 (in opposition to illegal tax evasion). 
The scheme used by Carr to reduce his tax – the K2 – is widely known in the market 
and is only one of many used around the world. The K2 scheme reduces income tax 
by splitting wages into part income and part loan. To achieve this result the employee 
resigns from his UK job and signs a contract with an offshore company (K2). K2 then 
hires out the employee to the old (or a new) UK employer and the UK employer pays 
the employee’s wages to K2. Following this, the employee receives a small portion of 
these wages as a salary from K2 and a larger sum as a loan. Ultimately, via such legal 
4. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-18521468 (last access 23/07/12).
5. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-18521468 (last access 23/07/12).
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operations the employee is able to pay income tax on the low wage and not on the 
loan, which does not count as taxable income.6
The solutions for stopping tax avoidance that have been proposed so far are 
either moral or legal. With both approaches tax avoidance is, in principle, considered 
acceptable conduct because the law does not forbid it. It is morally wrong when it is 
‘aggressive’ or ‘artificial and abusive’,7 or on the borderline of illegality, but it is 
assumed that there is a space in which the taxpayer can decide how to structure his 
activities in order to pay fewer or lower taxes. Legal solutions start from the same 
presumption, that is, that any tax obligations depend on the legal form adopted by the 
prospective taxpayer. Therefore, to stop tax avoidance it is necessary to create a rule 
according to which the legal structure in question is considered taxable. But it does 
not make sense to assume that taxable events depend on the consideration that certain 
specific structures are morally questionable (for the non-payment of taxes) but are not 
taxable, so that a new rule needs to be established in order for them to be taxable. 
How is it that perfectly legal conduct is morally objectionable for not fulfilling the 
law? Furthermore, once a new rule is created, how are we to deal with new (not 
covered by the rules) tax avoidance schemes? Should this be done by creating new 
rules to close a gap (or ‘loophole’) or by establishing a legal principle that allows 
judges to interpret the law substantively?
My claim is that the solutions to tax avoidance that have been proposed so far 
are doomed to failure. This is so because within what I call the classical paradigm8 of tax 
law tax avoidance cannot be understood as a legal problem. To fully grasp tax 
avoidance as a legal problem and offer a solution for it a teleological interpretation of 
tax law is required, and the classical paradigm does not leave any room for this. This 
explains why tax avoidance is of theoretical interest: it perspicuously shows the limits 
of available theories of tax law. However, to get to this argument we have to show the 
limits of the analytical distinctions that consider tax avoidance to be ‘perfectly legal’. 
This chapter is devoted to that task. In what follows I place in question the traditional 
categories used to describe strategic behaviour in tax law, that is, tax evasion, tax 
6. For this description I follow the explanation provided at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business-18533879 (last access 23/07/12).
7. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/tax_avoidance_gaar.htm (last access 23/07/12).
8. infra, 58.
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avoidance and tax planning, by showing their limitations for explaining the 
consequences of a legal obligation to pay taxes.
The argument within this chapter is structured in the following way. I start by 
identifying what is held in common among conducts included within the categories 
identified as ‘strategic behaviour’ within tax law (section 2). Each of these categories 
will then be analysed in particular, starting with tax evasion (section 2.1). A more 
detailed analysis is dedicated to tax avoidance (section 2.2) for the reason that tax 
avoidance is a more difficult concept to define and one that better shows the 
shortcomings of current theories of tax law. Here I develop what I consider to be two 
central elements in the available definitions of tax avoidance, namely, that it is legal 
(section 2.2.1) and that it is considered a problem (section 2.2.2). I then analyse the 
possible solutions given to avoidance and categorise them into two groups: (a) tax 
reform and (b) tax adjudication (section 2.2.3). I finish my analysis of avoidance by 
arguing that the possible solutions to tax avoidance offered so far are doomed to 
failure (section 2.2.4). For this purpose I describe and criticise some alternatives that 
try to address tax avoidance either through legal reform (section 2.2.4.1) or by 
adjudication (section 2.2.4.2). I finish this section of the argument by presenting what 
I consider to be the best alternative so far, namely, Professor Judith Freedman’s 
proposal of a general anti-avoidance principle, or GANTIP for short (section 2.2.4.3). 
After analysing tax avoidance, some time is then dedicated to tax planning or tax 
mitigation (section 2.3). The chapter concludes by showing the limits to these 
distinctions and why such categories can only be understood within the classical 
paradigm of tax law (section 2.4).
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2. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR IN TAX LAW
Tax compliance has always been a concern for governments, ever since the need for 
taxation arose.9 As long as public revenue was needed for public expenditure and 
individuals’ contributions became compulsory, with independence from the political 
and economic ideas behind the tax system in practice, those in power have tried to 
enforce this obligation. On the other hand, and at the same time, those individuals 
under an obligation to pay taxes have tried to escape from it. The historical evolution 
of taxation might then be explained as a compromise made among diverse interests. 
First, when the compulsory imposition of contributions was established the people 
replied by asking for greater political participation. Second, the distribution of this 
burden among social classes became a consequence of democratic demands for 
equality.10 Therefore, it has always been in the interests of the law enforcer to identify 
and stop any conduct oriented toward sidestepping the legal obligation to contribute.
In this scenario we can distinguish between two different groups of answers 
within this problem: the economic and the legal. First, we have the economic group. 
According to this approach, tax design should take into consideration the economic 
behaviour of individuals. What this means is that individuals will contribute by paying 
their dues so long as it is rational in economic terms for them to do so. This line of 
argument has led to public finance approaches toward tax design in which the aim is 
to determine optimal taxation.11 The purpose of optimal tax theory is to develop tools 
that will allow the ‘choice of a system of taxation that balances efficiency losses against 
the government’s desire for redistribution and the need to raise revenue’.12 I will not 
follow this approach because it is not adequate for an understanding of tax law. The 
9. For an excellent description of the historical development of taxation vid Seligman, Essays in Taxation, 
Ch1, and Schumpeter’s very interesting “The crisis of the tax state”. In this piece Schumpeter shows 
the connection between the creation (and the form) of the state and taxation. Taxation and the state 
are, for Schumpeter, the expression of the modern ‘individual economy’ and the ‘common interest’. 
ibid, 102–116.
10. Seligman, Essays in Taxation, 21. An example of this concerns the evolution of British taxation from a 
historical perspective, which can be seen in Daunton, Trusting Leviathan. The Politics of Taxation in 
Britain 1799–1914 and Daunton, Just Taxes. The Politics of Taxation in Britain 1914–1979. According 
to Seligman, income tax is the latest historical expression of this evolution, vid Seligman, The Income 
Tax. A Study of the History, Theory and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and Abroad, 3–18.
11. Good recent examples of this approach are Kocherlakota, The New Dynamic Public Finance and 
Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics. The seminal work for this area is Mirrlees, “The 
theory of optimal income taxation”.
12. Adam, Besley, et al., Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review, 36.
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economic approach is not able in itself to explain the obligation to pay taxes. It is an 
argument that tries to determine what motivates people into paying taxes by aiming 
to align the individual’s motivation with the state’s ends by putting the right incentives 
in the right places. But once the preferred tax scheme is adopted and given legal form, 
the economic approach fails to understand tax law as a particular political institution 
within which what we owe to each other is contained. When we want to provide a 
better understanding of tax law it becomes clear that the economic approach to 
taxation is only one aspect of it. In this sense, an economic understanding of taxation – 
according to which we have to explain in economic terms the compulsory transfer of 
money from private to public ends – is not enough to distinguish tax law from any 
other compulsory source of public revenue, such as fines or compulsory payments.
The second group of answers to tax avoidance are the legal ones. They are not 
interested in the reasons that an individual may have for following the law, but in 
securing his compliance with it. According to the classical paradigm of tax law,13 we 
have to distinguish between legal and illegal conduct. Following a binary 
understanding of the law, only conduct that goes against what is required is 
problematic. Only once the law is broken can there be a reaction from public power, 
either by the sanctioning or modification of the legal consequences of an action. 
However, as democratic demands for establishing a fair tax system have grown, it has 
became more and more complex to simply provide a legal form to the ability to pay 
principle.14 As a consequence, the complexity of the system has grown and it has 
become easier for taxpayers to avoid their tax liabilities by developing legal strategies, 
for example, adopting alternative legal forms in order to not fit their transactions 
within the operative facts of tax rules, or engaging in creative compliance to go against 
13. I develop the elements of what I call the classical paradigm of tax law fully in Ch2, infra 55ff. For the 
time being, it is suffice to say that the classical paradigm of tax law has the following central 
elements: (i) the individual is considered a pure rationaliser, (ii) private property is assumed to be a 
natural right as in the contractarian tradition, (iii) taxes are instruments of revenue, (iv) principles of 
justice in taxation are descriptions of positive law. These elements explain the following 
characteristics of tax law: (i) tax policy is justified according to moral and economic principles, (ii) 
tax obligations are born only once the conditions of the taxable event are verified, and (iii) legal 
reasoning in tax matters is formal reasoning.
14. Seligman, The Income Tax. A Study of the History, Theory and Practice of Income Taxation at Home and 
Abroad, Ch1. This principle, in its different versions, is understood to be the one that best expresses a 
demand for a just distribution of the tax burden.
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the spirit of the law.15 For the time being we can follow Avi-Yonah et al. and envelope 
all these different conducts under the label of ‘strategic behaviour’.16 The strategies 
underlying the different decisions taken by taxpayers ‘striv[e] toward optimising 
taxes’,17 that is, increasing income and reducing tax liabilities. That these are considered 
strategic behaviours is important because here we are not dealing with conduct that 
results from what economists call the ‘substitution effect’ of taxes. In other words, those 
who participate in strategic tax behaviour continue to generate income; they have not 
substituted their work for a non-taxable activity. This distinction is not normally 
recognised by lawyers who define strategic tax behaviours as ‘actions designed solely 
to minimise tax obligations’ (this might include non-problematic conduct, such as 
playing amateur football instead of working).18
These strategic behaviours and the answers to them have been grouped into 
three categories. These categories attempt to distinguish among and provide a clear 
account of each of these strategic behaviours in order to classify them. These are the 
familiar categories: tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax planning (or tax mitigation). In 
the following sections I analyse these categories in the same order.
2.1. Tax evasion
Of the three categories that try to define and characterise strategic behaviour in tax 
law, tax evasion seems to be the clearest and its limits the least debatable. An example 
of the traditional definition of tax evasion reads as follows: ‘[I]ntentional illegal 
behaviours, i.e., behaviour involving a direct violation of tax law, in order to escape 
payment of taxes’.19 A simple example provided by Tiley helps to illustrate the kinds of 
conduct included in this category. Tiley gives the example of a legal system in which a 
special tax treatment exists according to which married people pay lower taxes. 
15. McBarnet, “When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes in law to changes 
in attitude”, 229.
16. Avi-Yonah, Sartori, et al., Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, 101.
17. Karayan, Swenson, et al., Strategic Corporate Tax Planning, xvii. In this book the strategy is called 
SAVANT, ‘an acronym for how tax planning fits into business decisions: through Strategy, 
Anticipation, Value-Adding, Negotiating, and Transforming’.ibid, xv and Ch2.
18. Avi-Yonah, Sartori, et al., Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, 101. For the substitution effect 
vid, Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector, 108, 520ff.
19. Avi-Yonah, Sartori, et al., Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, 101.
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According to him, tax evasion occurs if two people expecting to reduce their tax 
burden ‘tell the revenue they are married when they are not’.20
This definition of tax evasion seems to be accepted unanimously in the 
literature. Therefore, there is no risk in stating that the framework that distinguishes 
and identifies tax evasion includes three elements: (i) there should be an ‘intention to 
mislead’,21 (ii) this intention should manifest itself in illegal behaviour, and (iii) as a 
result the individual escapes any obligation that he is under.
The positive intention to mislead is a requirement that restricts the application 
of the norms that sanction tax evasion. This distinguishes evasion from other cases in 
which taxes are not paid because of a mistake or negligence,22 or from administrative 
failures sanctioned as misdemeanours.23 In this sense then, ‘evasion requires more than 
the failure or omission to pay an amount which is payable’.24 An analysis of the 
problems that this requirement may create within criminal law by far exceeds the 
limits of what I am debating here. However, it is suffice to say that this is not a 
peaceful matter among criminal lawyers for whom the problems of not having a clear 
definition of tax evasion are patent.25
The second element, that is, that tax evasion implies illegal conduct, is a crucial 
characteristic that distinguishes it from other tax-related strategic behaviours. That 
evasion is illegal is repeated endlessly in the literature.26 In what has come to be a 
commonplace claim, it is frequently stated that ‘avoidance is by definition legal and 
evasion illegal’.27 However, it is not clear which illegal conduct defined as tax evasion 
is being sanctioned, as is the case with Tiley’s example above. It seems that there exists 
20. Tiley, Revenue Law, 101.
21. Angell, “Tax evasion and tax avoidance”, 85.
22. ibid, 86 and Green, “Cheating”, 170.
23. Green, “Cheating”, 170.
24. Sawyer, “Blurring the distinction between avoidance and evasion – the abusive tax position”, 487.
25. vid, Green, “Cheating”. Green justifies tax evasion as a criminally sanctioned case of cheating.
26. A few examples are Tiley, Revenue Law, 101; Avi-Yonah, Sartori, et al., Global Perspectives on Income 
Taxation Law, 101; Sawyer, “Blurring the distinction between avoidance and evasion – the abusive 
tax position”, 487; Sears, “Effective and lawful avoidance of taxes”, 78; Wheatcroft, “The attitude of 
the legislature and the courts to tax avoidance”, 210; Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in 
support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 335; and, Committee, Tax Avoidance, ix, 1.
27. Bracewell-Milnes, Tax Avoidance and Evasion: The Individual and Society, 9. What is meant by this 
avoidance being by ‘definition legal’ will be addressed infra, 29ff.
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confusion among those who understand that what is illegal is not paying taxes once 
that obligation has been established by the application of tax law – by a conduct that 
breaks tax law – and those who consider that what is sanctioned are those activities 
that make evasion possible – that are part of the ‘attempt to evade or defeat the tax, 
conceal income, or mislead the authorities’.28 The first position seems to be defended 
by tax lawyers who advocate a clear distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance 
or tax planning.29
According to the final element, the consequences of any conduct that qualifies 
or should qualify as tax evasion are relevant: the individual escapes the obligation he is 
under, namely, the payment of tax. Here, again, there are two possible interpretations 
of what tax evasion implies. The first is that tax evasion implies breaking tax law and 
the law punishes those who do not pay their taxes. This is what the majority of 
definitions of tax law include for tax evasion, as in the above example by Avi-Yonah. 
Yet the criminal law approach to tax evasion adds, or understands, that the obligation 
any individual is under is not to commit fraud or cheat. In this case what is being 
sanctioned is harmful conduct that differs from the loss of revenue (to distinguish it 
from avoidance) and the moral wrongfulness of the conduct could be, for example, 
fraud or cheating.30
2.2. Tax avoidance
Even though there are many juridical and economic definitions of tax avoidance in 
the literature, there does not seem to be any clarity or agreement as to its 
characteristics. There are, however, two aspects that are noted or referred to in all of 
them. The first is that it is legal;31 the second, that we are dealing with ‘a problem’, 
28. Green, “Cheating”, 170.
29. The underlying idea is that in cases of tax avoidance the obligation to pay taxes does not yet exist 
and in cases of tax planning the will of parliament is not broken. This point is further developed in 
what follows in this chapter.
30. Green, “Cheating”, 170–2. For UK regulation and debate, vid Tiley, Revenue Law, 86–92. When 
criminal provisions were introduced into German law there was debate about these being part of 
criminal law or administrative regulation vid, Hensel, Derecho Tributario, 396–398. A taxonomy of the 
conducts associated with tax evasion that could receive criminal punishment will depend, of course, 
on the positive law of each particular legal system.
31. See all references supra, n26 and specially Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of 
a general anti avoidance principle”, 335; Wheatcroft, “The attitude of the legislature and the courts 
to tax avoidance”, 209. In Sears, “Effective and lawful avoidance of taxes”, the author points out 
fundamental differences between methods of avoiding or reducing taxes that may safely be regarded 
27
specifically ‘because it nibbles away at the edges of the tax base so reducing 
government revenue and, in extreme cases, making government policy implementers 
look foolish’.32 Beyond this, clarity about or agreement as to what qualifies as tax 
avoidance or how to conceptualise it is absent. As Cooper states, when asking about 
what constitutes tax avoidance, ‘[o]ne might obtain a fairly easy consensus about some 
practices, but more often one will get only a political opinion’.33 The fact that all 
attempts to define tax avoidance in juridical terms have failed (we cannot say the same 
of economic approaches)34 may explain why all efforts have focused on proposing 
solutions rather than on providing a juridical definition or understanding.35 All clarity 
in the debate surrounding tax avoidance seems to derive from the fact that there are 
two interests in conflict with one another: the government’s and the taxpayer’s.36 This 
is why definitions of tax avoidance seem to be, at best, a contradiction in terms. For 
example, here is what Avi-Yonah says about tax avoidance:
Illegitimate (but not necessarily illegal) behaviours aimed at 
reducing tax liability. These behaviours do not violate the letter 
of the law but clearly violate its spirit. A typical example of tax 
avoidance is the fictitious conversion of ordinary income into 
non-taxable capital gains.37
as effective and lawful as distinguished from forbidden evasion (77).
32. Tiley, Revenue Law, 101.
33. Cooper, “The taming of the shrewd: identifying and controlling income tax avoidance”, 659. For 
some examples of the forms tax avoidance may take, vid Wheatcroft, “The attitude of the legislature 
and the courts to tax avoidance”, 210–212.
34. It is possible to say that economic approaches to tax avoidance succeed in understanding it in 
economic terms. This economic understanding of avoidance does not help us to understand why it 
is a problem in juridical terms. Moreover, economic approaches to tax avoidance depend on its 
juridical definition as the difference in economic terms between evasion and avoidance rests on the 
illegal/legal distinction. vid, Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector, 678–679. An economic definition of 
tax avoidance is provided by Goetz in “Tax avoidance, horizontal equity, and tax reform: a proposed 
synthesis”: ‘Tax avoidance can be defined as the legal reduction of tax through the use of preferential 
provisions of the tax laws. These preferential provisions of the tax system have been referred to as 
either tax loopholes, tax incentives, or tax expenditures’ (799). [Emphasis added].
35. ‘[M]uch of the discussion of tax avoidance centres on the need to draw boundaries to differentiate 
types of behaviour; evasion and avoidance; tax avoidance and tax mitigation. It is the contention 
here that it needs to be considered to what extent and in what circumstances, the failure to draw 
bright lines results in a real problem and when it may be not only inevitable but perhaps even 
helpful to steer away from any attempt to define the line categorically’. Freedman, “Defining 
taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 345. Instead, she proposes 
to search for a principle to secure non-arbitrary legal decisions in particular cases. For details infra, 
48.
36. Freedman, “Is tax avoidance “fair”?”, 87–89.
37. Avi-Yonah, Sartori, et al., Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, 101.
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The problem with Avi-Yonah’s notion of tax avoidance is that it is not helpful as a 
definition because it simply summarises the two positions in conflict. Thus, we do not 
improve our understanding of avoidance by saying that these behaviours are 
‘illegitimate (but not necessarily illegal)’ and then immediately say that they do violate 
the spirit of the law. Unless, of course, we assume that no juridical way of approaching 
the problem exists or that the law is only a form and does not contain any substance. 
Avi-Yonah’s definition seems to suggest that the legitimacy of tax avoidance should be 
discussed in broader political terms. In turn, its status would depend on the policy 
implemented by the government. Here we come to the centre of the classical 
paradigm of tax law, where avoidance represents the tension between the objectives set 
out by the government through tax law and those of the individual who aims to pay 
as little tax as possible. According to the classical paradigm, tax avoidance is a problem 
of poor legislative technique: it is legal as long as the law does not prohibit the 
conduct in question.
Another example is the definition provided by Wheatcroft:
Hence, we must define tax avoidance as a transaction which (a) 
avoids tax, (b) is entered into for the purpose of avoiding tax or 
adopts some artificial or unusual form for the same purpose, (c) 
is carried out lawfully, and (d) is not a transaction which the 
legislature has intended to encourage.38
Here again, we can see the limits of not having a juridical notion of avoidance 
independent of its consequences or independent of the reaction of the legal system. To 
put it in other words, we still do not know what it means to ‘avoid tax’, and so we 
have not moved far from the first element in Wheatcroft’s definition, namely, a 
transaction that avoids tax. So far, we only know that it is a behaviour that diminishes 
revenue as a consequence (and, therefore, it is not very different from what tax lawyers 
understand as tax evasion).
The quoted definitions of tax avoidance bring together the descriptions of the 
two elements recognised as part of the strategic behaviours characterised as avoidance 
(that is, that they are legal and bring problems for the revenue authorities) with the 
way in which the legislature and the judiciary have reacted to what they consider 
avoidance to be. It is only because of the reactions from parliament and the judiciary 
38. Wheatcroft, “The attitude of the legislature and the courts to tax avoidance”, 209.
29
to features such as the motives of taxpayers and the artificiality of behaviour, that such 
conducts not encouraged by the law have become relevant elements in what is a 
nominal definition of avoidance.39 This can easily be proved once we consider 
whether these behaviours generate problems for governments or not, and in light of 
the latter they would be legal and therefore invisible to the law (they would be cases 
of what McBarnet calls creative compliance40). In the following subsections I analyse 
what I consider to be the central elements of tax avoidance according to the classical 
paradigm of tax law: (i) that it is legal and (ii) that it is a problem. This will pave the 
way for further analysis of the solutions for tax avoidance advanced in the literature.
2.2.1. The legality of tax avoidance
That tax avoidance is legal is today common sense. This common sense forms part of 
what is referred to as the ‘culture’41 or ‘ideology of tax avoidance’.42 The legality of tax 
avoidance was declared early on in judicial decisions. In the US, for example, we find 
the oft-quoted opinions of judges Holmes and Hand. According to the former, ‘[w]e 
do not speak of evasion, because, when the law draws a line, the case is on one side of 
it or the other, and if on the safe side, it is none the worse legally that a party has 
availed himself to the full of what the law permits’.43 In Hand’s words, ‘[a]nyone may 
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to 
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty 
to increase one’s taxes’.44 When the same case came before the US Supreme Court, 
the unanimous opinion was that ‘the legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount 
39. vid infra, 104, 233ff.
40. McBarnet, “When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes in law to changes 
in attitude”. I develop this idea in more detail infra, 31.
41. Ordower, “The culture of tax avoidance”.
42. Barker, “The ideology of tax avoidance”.
43. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630–631 (1916).
44. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.(2d) 809, 810 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934); aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). To be fair 
with Hand, it is important to say that while he recognises this right, at the same time, he develops an 
interpretive theory of tax statutes that goes beyond the literal meaning of the law. vid, Chirelstein, 
“Learned Hand's contribution to the law of tax avoidance” and infra, 34.
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of what otherwise would be the amount of his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by 
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted’.45
In the UK things are not that different.46 In similar words to those used by his 
American colleagues, Lord Clyde states that, 
No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral 
or other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his 
property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest 
possible shovel in his stores. The Inland Revenue is not slow – 
and quite rightly – to take every advantage which is open to it 
under the taxing statuses for the purpose of depleting the 
taxpayer’s pocket. And the taxpayer is in like manner entitled to 
be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion of 
his means by the Revenue.47
This principle was recognised and set out by the House of Lords in the IRC v Duke of 
Westminster case: 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the 
tax attracted under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise 
would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this 
result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, 
he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.48
These decisions have received plenty of complimentary comments, mainly from those 
who recognise an ‘entitlement’ to avoid taxes. For example, referring to those who 
adopt tax avoidance schemes, Wheatcroft states that, ‘[t]here is, of course, no doubt that 
they are within their [taxpayers’] legal rights’.49 Furthermore, Sears states that tax 
avoidance is ‘an effective and legally innocent method of saving [...] [it] means a net 
profit’.50
45. Gregory v. Helvering 293 U.S. 465m, 469 (1935) quoted by Angell, “Tax evasion and tax 
avoidance”, 83. Commenting on this opinion, Angell says ‘What the law permits is the question for 
the courts to decide, and it is not the function of the judiciary in this field to determine the morals 
of the matter’ (83 fn.11).
46. For several examples in the UK vid ibid, 84 fn.15.
47. Lord Clyde, Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services and Ritchie v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1929) 
14 TC 754. Quoted by Bracewell-Milnes, Tax Avoidance and Evasion: The Individual and Society, 31.
48. [1936] A.C. at pp.19-20. For more examples, vid Wheatcroft, “The attitude of the legislature and the 
courts to tax avoidance”, 217–218.
49. ibid, 218.
50. Sears, “Effective and lawful avoidance of taxes”, 77.
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It might also be argued that the legality of tax avoidance is a consequence of 
there not being any conceptual clarity as to the concept of tax law. Because of this lack 
of conceptual clarity, parliament and government tend to assign different and 
contradictory functions to tax policy. I will analyse this in greater detail below when 
developing the elements of the classical paradigm of tax law. Suffice to say for now 
that, as Freedman argues, some of these contradictory policies, for example, those 
according to which the government prices taxpayers with tax deductions for several 
possible reasons, are some of the factors that foster the culture of avoidance.51
2.2.2. The problems of tax avoidance
Even if we accept that tax avoidance is legal and taxpayers are entitled to not pay more 
taxes than those required by the law, its consequences are a problem for governments. 
This is so because tax avoidance, as noted above following Tiley,52 endangers 
governments’ tax policies and reduces tax revenue. These are the main reasons behind 
why tax avoidance has become relevant to public debate. Indeed, it is no mere 
coincidence that this happened once policies justified under egalitarian premises were 
established, as was the case with modern income tax. At first, governments that tried to 
secure compliance with income tax by combating tax avoidance did not make much 
effort to analytically distinguish it from evasion.53 It was only because of opposition 
between those who recognised an entitlement to avoid taxes and the governments that 
intended to stop it that the problems of tax avoidance became relevant as a 
justification for governments’ claims.
This is the point from which Doreen McBarnett’s analysis of tax avoidance 
begins. Her work has been very helpful in identifying the problems of legal regulation 
in the implementation of egalitarian policies, especially in terms of analysing the way 
in which the subjects of the law ‘use and manipulate it [...] to create strategies for 
51. Freedman, “The tax avoidace culture: Who is responsible? Governmental influences and corporate 
social responsability”.
52. supra, fn.32
53. ‘To the professional mind, the phrase “tax evasion and tax avoidance” has been familiar for many 
years, for the legal problems which are implied by the phrase arose with the passage of our first 
Income Tax Act and have been with us since’. Angell, “Tax evasion and tax avoidance”, 80. Angell’s 
argument is oriented to distinguish evasion from avoidance as being ‘confused’ by US President 
Roosevelt in an address to Congress in June 1937. In this address President Roosevelt said that 
evasion and avoidance ‘are alike in that they are definitely contrary to the spirit of the law’, ibid.
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weakening the law by legally avoiding it’.54 Tax avoidance is one of the examples that 
McBarnett uses to show the way in which the use that individuals make of the law 
endangers the connection between social justice and the law.55 According to 
McBarnett, tax avoidance is a product of the ‘method of literally complying with the 
words of the law while nonetheless defeating its purpose’56 However, following 
McBarnett, not only egalitarian policies are endangered by tax avoidance; she is also 
worried that possible answers to it may be contested by those who defend an ideology 
of law (those who would consider that broad rules against tax avoidance risk the rule 
of law and democracy). As a consequence, she believes that tax avoidance is a problem 
for our understanding of the law. In her words, ‘[t]hose anxious to tackle the issue of 
whether the institutions of law [...] can foster egalitarian regulation and democracy are 
faced with the fundamental question of what is law? How far down the road to 
discretion can law go and still be law?’.57 I understand McBarnett’s concern to be one 
about the limits of the law, that is, about what is within or outside of it. This is why it 
may be understood that her answers to avoidance, and of the majority of the solutions 
that have been brought forward, constitute intents to include substance in tax law. As I 
will show later, I think we can depart from here in order to ask something more about 
the concept of law; not only in relation to its limits, but in relation to its aspirations.58
Others argue that tax avoidance is a problem because it is unfair. The standard 
of fairness used for this purpose is the principle of horizontal equity, that is, those who 
are in the same economic position (for example, the same level of income) should 
contribute in equal terms (pay the same amount of tax). There are two ways of 
understanding why it is problematic that the principal of horizontal equity is affected 
by tax avoidance. The first, which is largely defended by economists, is that tax 
avoidance as deviance from the principle of horizontal equity affects the neutrality of 
the tax system. According to this idea, tax systems should be neutral so that individual 
decisions about work or leisure are not affected by taxes. Therefore, tax avoidance is 





58. As I try to argue in this thesis, the aspiration of law endangered by tax avoidance is fraternity or 
mutual recognition. infra, 188 and Ch5.
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problematic because it presents a problem in the design of the tax system. As long as 
the tax system contemplates a differential treatment design in order to benefit or 
incentivise certain economic activities through preferential tax rates, people will try to 
adopt the preferential treatment established by the law. This approach to fairness is not 
concerned with the nature of avoidance because, as noted before, economists only 
distinguish between tax evasion and avoidance, between legal and illegal behaviours.59 
From this perspective the solution to tax avoidance is easy: tax reform.60
The second begins from a different starting point, namely, that of justice. Here, 
horizontal equity is a standard of fairness that, as such, expresses a conception of 
justice. According to this approach, when horizontal equity is violated, what suffers is 
the fairness of the system: the avoider is not paying what he should according to a 
principle of justice in taxation that informs the tax system.61 The problem then is that 
this can place in doubt the legitimacy of the tax system, or, as Wheatcroft asserts, 
avoidance brings a ‘sense of injustice and inequality [...] in the breasts of those who are 
unwilling or unable to profit by it’, thus increasing tax evasion.62 From this perspective 
the solution to tax avoidance consists of finding a way to make sure that the law is 
applied.
In the following section I will revise current solutions to tax avoidance but 
only from the position of this second perspective (tax avoidance as a problem of 
justice, that is, of the application of the law). I will not address the tax reform solution 
according to the economic approach because I think it does not help us to determine 
what tax avoidance is and, furthermore, it does not help us in our intent to determine 
why tax avoidance is problematic for tax law. It only tells us that if we are concerned 
with tax neutrality then we should design a tax system in such terms that taxes are not 
something to be taken into consideration by individuals in their decision-making 
processes when choosing between labour and leisure. In other words, it provides an 
59. vid, Goetz, “Tax avoidance, horizontal equity, and tax reform: a proposed synthesis” and supra, fn 34.
60. This is why some economists think that the solution to tax avoidance is either a flat tax or 
proportional taxation. For different proposals for tax reform within the economic approach to 
taxation vid, Adam, Besley, et al., Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review.
61. It is not necessary for this purpose to specify herein the content of the principle of justice in tax 
matters that underlies the system in question. This is, of course, a highly debatable aspect of tax law.
62. Wheatcroft, “The attitude of the legislature and the courts to tax avoidance”, 212.
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answer to our intent to distinguish between different strategic behaviours in tax law by 
sidestepping the problem.
2.2.3. Possible solutions to tax avoidance
Several solutions have been proposed by those who consider tax avoidance to be a 
problem of justice (and therefore one that implies tax law). Part of that which explains 
the variety of solutions is that they approach the issue by using different conceptions – 
most of them non-explicit – of avoidance.63 Notwithstanding the fact that conceptual 
clarity is absent in relation to what the problem is exactly, all the solutions deal with 
the enforcement of tax law. It is possible to systematise, in broad terms, all the 
alternatives into two categories: (i) those that deal with the application of the law and 
(ii) those that refer to the structure of the tax system. I analyse these alternatives below.
(i) Alternatives in the application of tax law. Initially, a formalistic approach 
dominated the interpretation and application of tax law. Accordingly, tax statutes had 
to be applied in the exact terms contained within the rules, which were interpreted in 
a literal way. It was thought that in this way the rights of taxpayers would be secured 
by limiting a government’s power to tax. Taxpayers had an obligation to pay taxes only 
according to what was ‘clearly’ included in the rules. If the letter of the law did not 
cover the economic results or the legal operations developed by individuals then tax 
was not levied. Because individuals did not have an obligation to pay taxes unless the 
law said so, if someone did not have an obligation to pay taxes it was a problem of 
poor legislation. In other words, the legislature was responsible for creating the law 
according to which individuals were taxed. Consequently, if legislators were 
responsible for the poor drafting of the law the solution therefore had to be tax 
reform. Sears provides a good example of these ideas when he states that the ‘free 
adoption of tax saving methods tends to make fair what legislators have made unfair 
and they make manifest errors in tax legislation which should be corrected’.64 Or, in 
the more recent words of Orow, ‘tax avoidance has more to do with what the 
legislature did not impose rather than what it actually imposed by way of taxation. It 
63. In the same sense, Tiley, Revenue Law, 101.
64. Sears, “Effective and lawful avoidance of taxes”, 79.
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covers instances where legislative intention and policy miscarried and failed to 
anticipate and reach the transaction under consideration’.65
The solution was to improve tax law by establishing ‘better’ rules, closing 
unwanted gaps or creating particular anti-avoidance legislation.66 But these solutions 
have proved insufficient as taxpayers and their advisors create (and continue to create) 
new legal structures or use (and continue to use) the law for purposes different from 
those intended by the legislature. As Doreen McBarnet states, compliance with tax law 
can be a problem when it constitutes creative compliance. Those who ‘have the 
resources [...] may set their lawyers to work on the legal form of their activities to 
package or repackage them in ways they can claim fall beyond the ambit of 
disadvantageous, or within the ambit of advantageous, law’.67 Formalism makes 
equivalent compliance and non-compliance by ‘[escaping] the intended impact of law’ 
by ‘undermining the policy behind the words’.68 One of the factors identified by 
McBarnet as facilitating creative compliance is formalism, that is, an identification of 
the law with rules.69 As reported by McBarnet and Whelan, the problem with 
formalism is that it permeates the legal culture, pushing against any possible legislative 
intent to bring more substance into tax law.70
According to McBarnet and Whelan, several methods where brought together 
to bring ‘anti-formalism into practice’ but none have been able to leave formalism 
behind.71 These methods include a stress on the purpose of the law, the use of broad 
65. Orow, “Structured finance and the operation of general anti avoidance rules”, 415. Orow finishes 
this paragraph by saying: ‘Reduced to its bare essentials, tax avoidance is a conceptual anomaly that 
exists in the mind of those whose sense of morality is violated by certain tax effective practices’. 
Tiley cites this same paragraph but interprets it in a different way. He asserts that Orow is defending 
a conception of tax avoidance as a ‘battle of wits’, vid, Tiley, Revenue Law, 101. What Tiley does not 
see is that Orow defends a substantive conception of tax law, what I call in Ch2 the classical 
paradigm of tax law, according to which tax avoidance is not a juridical concept within tax law and 
therefore it is not a juridical problem. Orow’s description of the elements of tax avoidance in that 
same paper, confirms my interpretation.
66. This includes, of course, the establishment of anti-evasion rules.
67. McBarnet, “When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes in law to changes 
in attitude”, 229.
68. ibid vid, McBarnet and Whelan, “The elusive spirit of the law: formalism and the struggle for legal 
control”, 848–853.
69. McBarnet, “When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes in law to changes 
in attitude”, 230. For an analysis of formalism vid, Shklar, Legalism. Law, Morals, and Political Trials.
70. McBarnet and Whelan, “The elusive spirit of the law: formalism and the struggle for legal control”.
71. ibid, 873.
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criteria, the avoidance of tight definitions, and the use of professional self-regulation.72 
Because the last of these is not relevant to what interests me here since it implies 
defeat for the project of finding a legal answer to tax avoidance, I will analyse only the 
first three methods.
Those who thought that rules or the letter of the law could not stop avoidance 
defended the first strategy. The alternative was to bring substance to the application 
and interpretation of tax law. If the law were to be more than mere form then what 
was needed was for it to be looked for and for it to be applied according to its 
purpose. In the application of the law the courts were asked to neglect the form of the 
law if this was the way in which its purpose could be achieved. Different alternatives 
were developed within this approach. The judicial approach required that objective 
and subjective factors be attended to. The first implied an evaluation of the economic 
reality of the transactions made and operations executed, thus neglecting the legal 
form adopted if it was not the expression of economic substance, mainly, under the 
notion of ‘business purposes’. The subjective element required intent to avoid taxes. Yet 
presented in this way this requirement does not of course make much sense in 
juridical terms. If we recognise that individuals have the liberty to decide what legal 
form to adopt, then the economic reality cannot be independent of the subjective 
element. The problem with the objective requirement is that no one is obliged to 
generate income from his business transactions or to adopt in them a particular legal 
form. At the same time, how can we assume that an interest in avoiding taxes should 
be problematic for the law if individuals are entitled to it? This required the 
development of theories of the statutory interpretation of tax law in which statutes 
were interpreted according to their technical meaning in line with the purposes of the 
legislator.
(ii) Solutions that deal with the structure of the tax system. These solutions try 
to surpass the interpretive ones and as alternatives they coincide with the following 
two strategies in McBarnet and Whelan’s list: the adoption of broad criteria and the 
avoidance of tight definitions. They can be brought together because they normally go 
hand in hand in some proposals. For example, both things are expected to be achieved 
by those who propose a move from the regulation of tax law based on rules to one 
72. ibid, 854–855.
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based on principles; or by those who advocate the establishment of particular or 
general anti-avoidance rules or principles. Those who propose the adoption of 
legislation based on principles rather than rules rely on one aspect of the debate about 
the concept of law that has occupied legal theorists during the last fifty years: Ronald 
Dworkin’s criticism of H. L. A. Hart’s conception of law as a system of rules is the 
locus classicus whereby the logical distinction between rules and principles is 
defended.73 According to Dworkin’s initial formulation of the distinction, the law is 
not only a system of rules but also one of principles, which are drafted in broader 
terms and pondered when applied, since they do not respond to the binary logic of 
yes and no. The idea behind bringing principles into tax law, therefore, is to make 
possible a broader interpretation and application of tax norms. These proposals have 
been strongly criticised by those who argue that 'giving arbitrary powers’ to judges is a 
menace for the rule of law.
In answer to these formalistic critics, others have suggested that the best way to 
bring together the ideology of the rule of law, the values of form in law and legislative 
purpose is to establish anti-avoidance rules or principles. Again, governments have 
adopted several different approaches to anti-avoidance rules. They all have in common 
the intent to describe in as detailed as possible a way the behaviours covered by tax 
rules. Since these alternatives have proved to be insufficient and failed to achieve their 
objective, some have proposed the establishment of anti-avoidance principles. These 
are supposed to work in two ways: they inform taxpayers that tax laws will be 
interpreted substantively and, at the same time, they authorise judges to interpret tax 
norms in broader terms considering the purpose of the law. They intend to ‘enable 
decisions to be made in individual cases fairly and within a legitimate and non-
arbitrary framework’.74
This overview helps us to see how the alternatives to formalism proposed so 
far go from extreme opposition to a more subtle integration of form and substance. As 
has happened in other areas of law, the ‘cycle of adjudication’, or the ‘pendulum of 
73. For Dworkin’s original criticism vid, Dworkin, “The model of rules”. For an overview of the debate 
vid, Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Philosophy, 
Ch6; Dworkin, Justice In Robes, Ch6; and, Coleman (ed), Hart's Postscript. Essays on the Postscript to the 
Concept of Law.
74. Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 345. 
Further details infra, 48.
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adjudication’, which swings from formalism to substance and back to formalism, has 
not been absent from tax law.75 In addition, because of the null results obtained by 
these alternatives it is also possible to say that they have all failed. For example, 
McBarnet and Whelan argue that this failure is a consequence of the necessary formal 
character of the law and the legal practice.76 This conclusion seems to be shared by 
those who have turned to social psychology and who are searching for new 
compliance techniques in order to understand taxpayer behaviour and motivate them 
into compliance with tax law.77 However, there are still those who think that the 
project should not be abandoned because a legal answer is possible. Below I will 
analyse in more detail the best alternative available so far, namely, Judith Freedman’s 
argument for a ‘general anti-avoidance principle’ (GANTIP).78
In what follows are some examples of the possible alternatives to formalism so 
far proposed, each of which will be analysed. The idea is to further explore the 
viability of these possibilities as solutions to tax avoidance. As I argue, all these 
solutions fail because they do not address the main problem of tax law, namely, that 
there is not any clarity of concept or any justification.
2.2.4. Why are the possible solutions doomed to failure?
In this section I analyse in some detail three examples of possible alternative answers 
to tax avoidance. I have chosen these examples because they aim to understand tax 
avoidance as a legal, and not only as an economical or ethical problem. However, I 
believe that all of them fail because they do not work with a juridical definition of tax 
avoidance as an aspect of a theory of tax law. In other words, they aim to improve 
legislative techniques against avoidance or are purposive interpretations absent of 
clarity regarding the purpose of tax law; they leave us without any possible juridical 
understanding of tax avoidance. In the best case, they might help us to acknowledge 
that there is not one purpose in tax law but many different policies. Yet they cannot 
75. vid, Atria, “Adjudication and the particular” and Postema, Bentham and the Common Law tradition, 
279–280.
76. McBarnet and Whelan, “The elusive spirit of the law: formalism and the struggle for legal control”, 
873.
77. vid, Braithwaite, “Dancing with tax authorities: motivational postures and non-compliant actions, 
and Taylor, “Understanding taxpayer attitudes through understanding taxpayer identities”.
78. infra, 48.
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provide a better understanding of the juridical structure of the legal obligation to pay 
taxes.
2.2.4.1. An expanded analysis of avoidance
In The taming of the shrewd: identifying and controlling income tax avoidance, George 
Cooper offers a defence of what he calls an ‘expanded analysis’79 of tax avoidance. In 
his approach, Cooper expects to improve the results of the legal reform approach to 
tax avoidance by analysing the relationship between the structure of the tax in 
question (in this case, income tax) and those behaviours characterised as avoidance. 
Using several examples, mainly from the US, Cooper shows the enduring nature of 
avoidance.80 He considers that this is the result of ineffective tax reform,81 which is 
incorrectly based on an understanding of tax avoidance as a series of unrelated, ad-hoc, 
activities that are ‘manifestations of a single wrong’.82 Thus, tax reform has provided 
only particular answers to particular transactions or operations considered as avoidance. 
This indicates that ‘much of the traditional liberal reform approach is misdirected and 
unproductive’.83 Alternatively, Cooper proposes a broader approach in order to 
establish what might be considered ‘abuse’. What is needed is a starting point that 
stems from a consistent method that would secure constancy in what is being done or 
what is trying to be prevented.84 In Cooper’s own words, ‘[t]his alternative, expanded 
approach seeks to identify the true “avoidance” in any situation, and to design a 
reform that addresses the fundamental sources of that avoidance’.85 On the contrary, as 
long as we do not know what qualifies as avoidance, we will ‘not know what our anti-
avoidance policy should be’. However, he considers that it is not possible to achieve a 
‘pervasive agreement on what constitutes tax avoidance [...] because so much depends 
on political values and judgements’. The alternative, he argues, is to build consensus on 
a ‘relatively neutral principle’ that would work as a ‘guide for anti-avoidance reforms 
79. Cooper, “The taming of the shrewd: identifying and controlling income tax avoidance”, 718.
80. ibid, 663–666.






and [would] give those reforms some precision and coherence’.86 He then adds that 
the ‘key to defining tax avoidance, and to structuring a consistent tax avoidance policy, 
is to sort out the desired and the undesired’.87
The expanded approach to tax avoidance has three elements or perspectives: 
(a) efficiency, (b) equity and (c) practicality.
(a) In his definition of the efficiency perspective,88 Cooper departs from the 
ideal economic definition of an efficient tax system. He does so to acknowledge that 
what is efficient for tax law purposes is not necessarily an ideal but that which is 
defined according to a particular tax policy. Or, as he puts it, ‘What is “inefficient” in 
the classical economic sense becomes “efficient” in a larger social and economic policy 
sense, and its occurrence is not tax avoidance from this broader efficiency perspective’. 
Avoidance is only relevant then, when there is a result that differs from the one 
intended by the law, when there are ‘instances of excessive effects’.89
(b) Within the expanded approach equity is relevant only when ‘a taxpayer is 
able to secure an effective after-tax rate of return more favourable than that generally 
available’.90 Coherent with his approach, Cooper does not defend an ideal concept of 
equity, but the one that is contained within the tax system. Therefore, the equity 
problem does not exist if the tax system contains some benefits or privileges for 
certain activities and those who benefit from acting accordingly with what is intended 
by parliament.
(c) The third element introduced by Cooper is the practical aspect. According 
to Cooper, regardless of how inefficient or inequitable a practice is it should be 
changed only if there is good reason to believe that the situation will improve.91 The 
relevant criterion for justifying reform is ‘whether the situation of the society and the 
taxpayer will be substantially modified by the proposed reform’ and not ‘whether the 









tax system and its structure because the draftsman will have to consider whether his 
decisions will open or close new alternatives for the taxpayer. In other words, there is 
no point in reforming the law to stop a particular behaviour if this will not solve the 
source of avoidance.
Cooper tests his expanded approach by applying it to an analysis of tax shelters 
in the US and concludes that these are not problematic per se.93 Tax shelters can 
become inefficient and inequitable only when leverage ‘moves transactions from the 
intended exempt-equivalent stage to the better-than-exempt situation’ or when it 
helps to create ‘non-market controlled tax advantages’.94 A possible reform, therefore, 
should focus on leverage rather than on any particular tax shelter. Once the expanded 
approach identifies a ‘generic problem such as this, tax reformers ought to be pursuing 
a generic solution, not the ad hoc set of reforms that have been adopted 
periodically’.95 In more general terms, Cooper identifies four sources from which tax 
avoidance has traditionally derived: (i) ‘any possibility of getting write-offs for capital 
investment at a pace significantly faster than actual decline in value’, (ii) ‘income taxed 
more favourably when earned by a controlled artificial entity’, (iii) ‘income is taxed 
more favourably when shifted to close family members’ and, (iv) if ‘accrued gains on 
assets are taxed more favourably’.96 
The expanded approach developed by Cooper is no doubt a step forward for 
those who see a solution to tax avoidance in law reform; it is not, however, exempt 
from problems. On the positive side, the expanded approach represents a sophisticated 
systematic approach that can help drafters in their aim to improve existing statutory 
legislation or when drafting new statutes. However, it does not move very far from 
this. 
The main problem of the expanded approach is that it does not provide an 
operative understanding of avoidance for those who have to apply tax law, more 
precisely, in those cases in which clarity does not exist as to whether the case is 
covered by the legal disposition. In this sense, tax avoidance is not only an entitlement 






tax law is reformed (even if in the broad terms proposed by Cooper). Within Cooper’s 
expanded approach tax avoidance is incoherently treated as a behaviour that should be 
sanctioned.
It is incoherent to sanction tax avoidance in these terms if the solution to the 
problem can only come from tax reform (because of poor drafting that does not 
identify the ‘sources of abuse’). This means that before the reform such conduct was 
‘legal’, and Cooper states nothing to deny this. How then are judges to apply the 
expanded approach in particular cases if the conduct is not prohibited or does not go 
against the law? Are they supposed to become drafters rather than adjudicators? And if 
tax avoidance includes conduct that goes against the intended or defined conceptions 
of efficiency and equity within the system in question, is the intent to avoid relevant 
to declaring taxpayers as having ‘responsibility’?
All these problems derive from not having a clear conception of avoidance that 
is able to explain the way in which it plays a juridical role within tax law. Cooper is 
still working with the traditional conceptions of avoidance,97 particularly when he 
asserts that ‘[a]s long as there are income taxes, there will be income tax avoidance, the 
process of detecting and preventing tax avoidance is an ongoing one. There will never 
be a single, simple solution’.98 It does not help much to state that tax avoidance will 
always be company to income tax. It can mean too many things for it to become an 
operative legal concept; it may refer to behaviour, to an entitlement to avoid, to 
problems within the tax law structure that impedes the imputing of avoidance to 
taxpayers, and so on. That so many solutions are needed may be explained by the fact 
that there are many conceptions of avoidance under discussion.
But the problem is that we cannot have a definition of avoidance that is 
applicable to each legal actor, that is, legal advisers, taxpayers, judges, administrative 
officials and so on, and dependent upon variable criteria for defining tax avoidance. 
There are different ways in which the solution to a problem might require different 
actions from different institutional roles depending on their functions, but they should 
all work around one concept or notion of avoidance (and not merely ex post ‘abuse’). 
We should leave behind the substantive content of the elements in Cooper’s expanded 
97. vid supra, 29 and 31.
98. Cooper, “The taming of the shrewd: identifying and controlling income tax avoidance”, 718.
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approach and only adopt it as procedural guidance for reasoning in the process of law 
reform. At the end of the day, even if we adopt Cooper’s expanded approach we will 
still not understand why tax avoidance is problematic in juridical terms.
2.2.4.2. Purposive interpretation in tax law
Even if we abandon Cooper’s expanded approach there is an important aspect of his 
method that needs to be rescued. His approach is concerned with establishing the 
ways in which legislation drafters might ensure that the efficiency and equity elements 
of tax law are respected by taxpayers. In this sense, Cooper assumes that the law is 
supposed to express a purpose or intent. The problem is that he is working with a 
concept of avoidance that is operative from the perspective of the legislature, but not 
from the point of view of those who apply the law. As a result, we do not have any 
better a grasp of tax avoidance but instead a technique for developing better 
legislation. Nevertheless, there are those who have tried to develop this task from the 
perspective of adjudication; they are promoters of the substantive interpretation of tax 
law. In general terms, and in the best terms possible, those who approach the problem 
from this perspective try to bring together form and substance in tax law. The 
underlying idea is to show how a substantive interpretation of tax law does not 
endanger certainty or the rule of law. The debate among those who advocate for this 
approach delves further into determining the criterion or standards to which 
substantive interpretation should be subjected.
One of the most popular substantive criteria argued for in the literature is the 
economic substance doctrine. This doctrine, which has its origins in several decisions 
made by US courts, looks at two elements: (i) ‘whether the taxpayer had a business 
purpose for the transaction’ and (ii) ‘whether the transaction objectively had economic 
substance (essentially a prospect of profit before taxes)’.99 As Lederman argues, the 
problem with the economic substance doctrine is that it is incompatible with the 
content of tax systems. With a description that could easily be applied to almost all 
Western tax systems, she says that ‘identifying abusive transactions is so difficult largely 
99. Lederman, “W(h)ither economic substance?”, 391. This is the way in which the doctrine has been 
understood in the US. For the judicial approach to tax avoidance in the UK, vid Tiley, Revenue Law, 
111–128. Among the common law doctrines of substantive interpretations, Geier notes: ‘substance 
over form, sham transactions, business purposes, and assignment of income’, in “Interpreting tax 
legislation: the role of purpose”.
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because some tax provisions merely try to measure income while others try to provide 
an incentive for particular behaviours’.100 If this is so, ‘[a] tax-avoidance motive on the 
part of the taxpayer undermines the measurement function, but not the incentive 
function’.101 Therefore, Lederman argues, the subjective element in the economic 
substance doctrine cannot explain that sometimes the tax system expects taxpayers to 
behave so as to minimise their tax liability. Regarding the objective element, and after 
analysing all its possible interpretations,102 she concludes that it ‘does little to 
distinguish abuse cases from legitimate activity’103 where profits could not be obtained. 
Lederman’s aim is to warn the American Congress of the problems of the economic 
substance doctrine in case they decide to codify it.104 She tries to show that to get to 
‘the real question of whether the claimed tax results are abusive’, what is needed is that 
the courts ‘address the heart of the matter – Congress’s intent’.105 Therefore, the final 
question should always be, did Congress intend to provide the tax benefit in question 
or not?106
So, as Lederman states, her approach tries to find a test that asks ‘a question of 
tax law: whether the claimed tax results are consistent with the statutory or regulatory 
scheme in question’.107 Questions about a taxpayer’s subjective purposes or about the 
objective business purpose would only be relevant in cases in which they are required 
by law.108 This does not differ much from any approach to statutory interpretation in 
other areas of law. What is needed is to ‘undertake a purposive inquiry [...] to any 
relevant legislative history, surrounding statutes, and general tax principles’.109 
Lederman is interested in showing the importance of adopting a purposive approach 
in the interpretation of tax law, but she is not concerned with how best to achieve it.
100. Lederman, “W(h)ither economic substance?”, 392–393 and vid, 394–398. vid, Gunn, “Tax 
avoidance”, 749 fn.751.
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One of the best examples as to how courts might develop this purposive 
inquiry is presented by Geier’s Interpreting tax legislation: the role of purpose. Differing 
from traditional approaches to the topic, she believes that purposive interpretation can 
be compatible with a textualist approach, a substantive non-literal interpretation, cases 
in which purpose informs language to cover new cases without going against the 
statutory text, cases in which there is not any debate about the meaning of words but 
where the transaction does not ‘fit within the purpose’, and, finally, an ‘evolving 
purpose or an apparent absence of purpose’ can help to better understand its role in 
the interpretation of tax legislation.110 In this way, Geier separates a purposive 
interpretation of the law alongside its form, or lack of it, particularly in relation to the 
dichotomy between rules and principles or between formalism and substantivism, thus 
bringing new insights into the debate. Her argument is based on the work developed 
by Summers and Marshall, for whom purposive interpretation should not abandon the 
formal values embedded in the law.111 Geier develops this approach by posing the 
requirements of purpose not at the level of a particular rule, but at a different level, 
namely, in the ‘structure of the income tax’.112 This is where she considers the purpose 
of tax law to be found while, at the same time, the formal values of law can be 
respected. The ‘fundamental structure of the income tax (though it surely is premised 
on prior social choices regarding the best way to finance government) is a larger 
constraint, a larger purpose, that must inform the interpretation of those provisions 
that implicate it’.113 As a consequence, as long as the letter of the law does not go 
against the structural value(s) of the system, courts should not deviate from it. 
Congress’s policy has primacy over any possible evaluation of that policy that the 
courts may have. If the substantive application of norms according to the structural 
values of the tax system leads ‘to results inconsistent with the intended policy’ it is 
congress, and not the courts, that is forced to amend the statute(s).114
However, purpose is not only to be found in the structure of the law but also 
in the ‘history of a provision’, including the context, debates and a comparison with 
110. Geier, “Interpreting tax legislation: the role of purpose”, 496–497.
111. ibid, 514ff. She refers to Summers, “The formal character of law” and Summers and Marshall, “The 
argument from ordinary meaning in statutory interpretation”.




the valid law at the moment.115 Even more so, in cases in which purpose ‘cannot be 
identified’ courts should not be restrained from creating new laws; on the contrary, 
they should collaborate with congress to bring into practice the statutory scheme. 
According to Geier, the help of lawyers is also necessary in this process of the 
application of tax law because they should not rely exclusively on language to 
interpret the law. The same can be said for judges, specifically that the adoption of a 
literal or substantive interpretation by lawyers will also depend on the structure of tax 
law and its history.116
Even if we follow Lederman and Geier and adopt a purposive interpretation of 
tax law by attending to its structure, we still have to address the question, how are we 
to identify abusive behaviour? What they provide us with are reasons for purposive 
interpretation and a method for finding that purpose. Indeed, we can agree with them 
on this. However, we still do not have a juridical mechanism by which we might 
distinguish conducts that comply with the law from those that do not before the 
moment of adjudication. Therefore, if form has primacy from the perspective of the 
taxpayer, we cannot address cases of creative compliance. In light of this criticism, I 
venture that Lederman and Geier may develop the answer that there is not any 
difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance. If what is relevant is congress's 
purpose, then the only alternatives a taxpayer would have would be either to follow 
the law or to not follow it. If he follows the law he will pay in any case what is due. 
Indeed, he would be paying what is due even if he were benefitting from a tax saving 
policy, in case this is what the law permits him. We would be back to the binary 
structure of the law, but yet abandoning formalism by adding purpose to the form of 
the law. Avoidance would be, according to this understanding of tax law, nothing but a 
putative problem. There would be only two possible behaviours that a taxpayer could 
develop: compliance or tax evasion.
This way of understanding tax law rests on an important previous idea about 
its purpose that, at the same time, has consequences for the way in which we 
understand tax liability. Lederman believes that ‘identifying abusive transactions is so 




others try to provide an incentive for particular behaviour’.117 So, according to her, tax 
law has two purposes: measuring income and incentivising particular behaviours. The 
difficulty then is that taxpayers might develop either purpose. Consequently, she 
suggests that courts should attend to the purpose of law so that they can determine if 
taxpayers are doing either and following the law. If they do follow the law, there would 
be no abusive behaviour. Lederman seems to be following a widely supported opinion 
according to which ‘tax avoidance [...] cannot mean simply “tax reduction”. If it 
means more than that, and if it does not describe tax-motivated conduct, it must mean 
the reduction of taxes in circumstances where taxes should not be reduced’.118 This is a 
sound conclusion for the argument if we accept that the purpose of tax law is that 
described by Lederman. But is it?
At the same time, Lederman’s approach changes our understanding of tax 
liability because it stops being an obligation to contribute according to a determinate 
notion of justice in taxation to become an obligation to ‘measure income’. This would 
require some further clarification.
The only clarity that we can derive from such an argument for a purposive 
interpretation in tax law is that we need to address the issue of the purpose of tax law 
in a deeper way. Only once we have a clear and justified idea of the purpose of tax law 
might we improve our understanding of tax avoidance. Or, in more general terms, 
only once we know the purpose of tax law can we define what it means to comply 
with it and how that purpose becomes operative through legal form. Therefore, we 
cannot opt for one method of purposive interpretation in tax law without first 
developing an enquiry into the purpose of tax law and how tax is charged through 
law. But as this thesis constitutes a philosophical enquiry into taxation and tax law, we 
are led to ask not only about the particular content of positive tax law, but also about 
the best justification of taxation as a legal institution. So we have the same lack of 
justification for tax law as the one found previously in Cooper's expanded analysis.119
By bringing together all that can be rescued from the approaches analysed so 
far, is there an alternative that supplements them? In what follows I will analyse what I 
117. Lederman, “W(h)ither economic substance?”, 392.
118. Gunn, “Tax avoidance”, 759.
119. supra, 39.
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consider to be the best alternative so far: Judith Freedman’s proposal of a general anti-
avoidance principle.
2.2.4.3. General anti-avoidance principle
So far, I have reviewed and shown the limits of those approaches that try to address tax 
avoidance exclusively, either from the perspective of institutions that develop legislative 
functions or those that perform adjudicative functions. In the first case, the main 
problem is that we lack an idea of how to apply the law in particular cases of 
avoidance. In the second, even in cases in which purpose is invoked for the application 
of tax law, we cannot progress very far since the purpose of tax law is still open to 
discussion. The result is that in both cases we cannot have a legal idea of what 
avoidance is: it is either a very broad idea of ‘abuse’120 or it is conceptually reduced to 
tax evasion.121 Here I will analyse a third alternative that tries to build a bridge 
between both approaches in order to move forward: to include in the tax system a 
general anti-avoidance principle (GANTIP). Such a general provision would refer to 
the general principles of tax law to help courts ascertain the intentions of the 
legislature. This alternative has been defended in the United Kingdom by Professor 
Judith Freedman in different works, but mainly in Defining taxpayer responsibility: in 
support of a general anti avoidance principle and Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the 
intention of Parliament. Freedman’s project is particularly interesting because it implies a 
redefinition of both the way in which taxes are levied and tax law by changing 
normative elements. In this sense, she is clearly trying to answer Doreen McBarnett's 
concern about tax avoidance never having had a legal answer.122 In general terms, her 
approach implies changing our understanding of tax law structures in order to move 
from rules to principles, without compromising certainty. This intent has been called 
‘principles-based legislation’,123 the details of which will be analysed and criticised in a 
120. As for Cooper, vid supra, 39.
121. As for Lederman, vid supra, 43.
122. supra, 31.
123. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”. According to 
Freedman, previous examples of this intent are Avery Jones, “Tax law: rules or principles?”, 
Braithwaite, “Making tax law more certain: A theory” and Weisbach, “Formalism in tax law”.
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different place.124 Here I am only interested in explaining one aspect of that proposal, 
the GANTIP.
According to Freedman, it is almost impossible to draw a clear line between 
tax avoidance and tax planning or tax mitigation.125 Even if many have tried to 
provide a legal definition of avoidance, she believes that these have been unsatisfactory 
because a definition can be ‘helpful [...] only where there is a clear underlying 
concept’ and this has not been the case because avoidance depends on ‘one’s 
philosophical starting point’.126 Part of the problem derives from the ‘lack of a 
conceptual and principled framework’, which is needed to develop policies against 
avoidance. This is the product of too many functions being attached to the tax system, 
namely, ‘raise revenue [...], redistribute income and wealth [...], mould behaviour and 
influence the economy’.127 In her earlier work she even thought of defining tax 
avoidance as quite an unproductive and unnecessary task,128 because even without a 
proper definition there are ways to combat avoidance while at the same time 
maintaining legitimacy, the rule of law, clarity and a relatively high level of certainty in 
the tax system. She reached this conclusion after showing how judicial aims to develop 
anti-avoidance principles in the UK proved not only to be unsuccessful but also 
contradictory.129 At the same time, she argues, the creation of specific anti-avoidance 
provisions or more detailed legislation would open the door for more creative 
compliance and less certainty because of the difficulties associated with purposive 
interpretation in tax law.130
Freedman's analysis starts by asserting the two main judicial principles 
associated with tax avoidance in the UK. These are the Westminster and the Ramsay 
124. infra, 98.
125. She does not think the same for the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance, vid 
Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 
347–348. In this she follows what has been described in previous sections of this chapter.
126. Freedman, “Is tax avoidance “fair”?”, 86–87.
127. ibid, 87.
128. Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 345 
and Freedman, “The tax avoidace culture: Who is responsible? Governmental influences and 
corporate social responsability”, 365.
129. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 53, 85–56, 90.
130. ibid, 54.
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principles.131 According to the first principle, avoidance is legal and taxpayers are 
entitled to it by arranging their business so as to legally pay the least amount of tax 
possible. The second principle was developed at the beginning of the eighties and was 
considered the ‘new approach’ for countering tax avoidance. As stated by Lord 
Wilberforce, this principle does not go against other established principles, especially 
the Westminster principle. Therefore, subjects were to be taxed according to the words 
of an Act and not on ‘intendment’ or ‘equity’, while at the same time taxpayers’ 
motivations were irrelevant unless a particular provision prescribed the contrary.132 The 
judicial doctrine initially recognised in Ramsay suggests that this is ‘a judicially-created 
rule of construction that require[s] the analysis of the transaction as an indivisible 
whole in given circumstances’.133 However, as Freedman argues, in later cases the 
House of Lords defended an alternative view according to which there never was a 
judicial doctrine in Ramsay, but only ‘an application of the normal rules of statutory 
construction’.134 The point defended by the courts was that there could not be the 
creation of legislation in an area where parliament had not legislated. However, the 
very same day that this decision was reached (arguably, according to Freedman) the 
Ramsay principle was defended as a judicial doctrine in a different case.135 As the 
courts put the problem, what is needed is a way in which the intentions of parliament 
can be easily identified and applied to a particular case.
Some propose the creation of detailed rules in which the intentions of 
parliament are clearly stated. This may or may not be combined with a general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR). A GAAR contains a general provision with a detailed 
description of economic substance or interpreting tests to be used in the application of 
specific legislation. Freedman opposes these intents since they would only replicate the 
problems of existing tax systems. They would provide opportunities for more creative 
compliance, the system would become more complex because of ‘hyperlexis’, 
uncertainty would increase because of additional litigation and detailed rules will 
131. vid supra, 29.
132. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 56.
133. ibid, 57–58.
134. ibid, 58.
135. ibid, 65–70. vid also, Hoffmann, “Tax avoidance”.
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never close all the possible gaps in the system.136 Without referring to principles or 
content, and only referring to broad interpretive principles, a statutory GAAR would 
replicate the logic of statutory construction: ‘A broad GAAR that merely applies a 
purpose test and refers to abusive and impermissible actions will simply be read by the 
court as an instruction to look at what is impermissible or abusive under the normal 
rules of statutory construction’.137 
Contrary to these approaches, Freedman believes that ‘what is needed are fewer 
detailed rules backed up by principles in accordance with which the rules can be 
interpreted in a purposive way’.138 So her solution implies the creation of a GANTIP 
by parliament. Initially, a GANTIP would permit the courts to fill in gaps in the law 
under the terms established by parliament;139 these would be broader than ordinary 
statutory interpretation, and would allow the courts to build an ‘anti-avoidance 
strategy which would be based on statutory interpretation in a broader sense’.140 In 
the way in which she uses the term, a principle does not have any moral content and 
does not derive from case law.141 A principle, according to Freedman’s use of the term, 
is a broadly drafted statute that works as a guide to interpret a rule. ‘In this context, the 
legislative principle would be a method of signposting; a parliamentary indication that 
it was its intention that certain types of gap in its rule making should be filled by 
judicial decision based on the principles set out’.142 According to Freedman, we should 
not be worried about a GANTIP bringing uncertainty to the tax system. She 
understands that certainty is only relevant for the purposes of the evasion/avoidance 
divide as criminal penalties could be involved. The real concern when determining 
which conducts qualify as avoidance should be a different one: ‘producing a practical 
system with a fair test which is workable for the compliant majority but not as 
136. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 73-74 and 
Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 353.
137. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 75.
138. Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 346.
139. ‘Initially’ because the aim of a fully established principles-based legislation (PBL) project is that 
there are no gaps in tax law. vid infra, 98.
140. Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 352.
141. Freedman, “A GANTIP: Was it really such a bad idea?”, 8–9. These principles are, therefore, 
different from Dworkinian principles. The implications of this definition from the perspective of 
legal theory will be dealt with infra, 98ff.
142. Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 354.
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susceptible to manipulation as would be an entirely certain test, even assuming such a 
test could be devised’.143
Freedman advocates a GANTIP as she believes that this is the best juridical 
solution to the moral and political demands against tax avoidance. Compared with 
other alternatives, a GANTIP appears to be an integral solution to tax avoidance in 
substantive and formal terms. It is an integral solution because it does not focus on 
one aspect of tax avoidance but tries to show how by bringing together the functions 
of parliament, the courts and the law it can be solved. In substantive terms a GANTIP 
respects the ideals of the rule of law; in formal terms, it is a substantive solution that 
respects the values of the form of law. At the same time, to become operative, and 
because it constitutes a structural approach, the GANTIP implies and requires a 
redefinition of tax law through principles-based legislation (PBL). All of these reasons 
make Freedman’s GANTIP a serious candidate for the best possible approach to 
solving tax avoidance within a legal framework. I do think, however, that it is not free 
of problems. But because a critique of the GANTIP can only be developed after 
analysing PBL in tax law, I will focus on the shortcomings of this alternative later in 
chapter two.144
However, let me say for the time being, even if not in detail, why I think this is 
the best approach for combating tax avoidance so far. After analysing and criticising 
Cooper’s expanded approach and Lederman and Geier’s arguments for purposive 
interpretation in tax law, in Freedman’s GANTIP we find an alternative in which 
building in these intents overcomes their difficulties. But in these three approaches we 
see how there is a relevant underlying question that has not yet been tackled: what is 
the relationship between tax law and the function of taxes? This question is important 
because it would allow us to take one step back and revise the justification that 
underlies the different approaches of the theories in question. We cannot answer the 
problem of avoidance with a poor theory of tax law that according to which whatever 
parliament labels a tax is considered so. A theory of tax law is supposed to improve our 
understanding of tax law and not only restrict its scope to the limits posed by the 
posited law. Unless, of course, we limit ourselves to observing and describing the 
existing law, a case in which we would not be able to offer a solution to tax avoidance. 
143. ibid, 355.
144. vid infra, 98ff.
53
However, even if it does not directly discuss this topic, Freedman’s GANTIP moves in 
the right direction because, as she argues, it ‘would become a counterbalance to the 
principle in the Duke of Westminster’s case and to that of profit maximisation’.145 This 
is a change that should bring consequences for the interpretation of tax law, but it goes 
even further because it changes the purpose of tax law, or at least shows a different 
understanding of tax law from the predominating one. But, as said before, a detailed 
analysis of Freedman’s proposal will have to wait.
2.3. Tax planning
The third category that has been used to describe strategic behaviour in tax law is tax 
planning or tax mitigation. Here the analysis starts again with a definition provided by 
Avi-Yonah:
Licit tax savings can be defined as commonly accepted forms of 
tax behaviours that contradict neither the law nor its spirit and 
are intended to reduce the tax burden. This category can also be 
referred to as ‘legitimate tax planning’.146
Tax planning is the extreme opposite of tax evasion. First, because tax minimisation 
obtained by tax planning does not constitute illegal behaviour. Second, because tax 
planning is not considered a problem for governments; on the contrary, it is 
understood that those engaged in tax planning are following an alternative offered to 
them by the law. In other words, when involved in tax planning taxpayers obtain a 
reduction in their tax liability because they follow the law and not because they go 
against it. If to obtain that very same tax benefit they go against the law, they either fall 
into the category of tax evasion or tax avoidance. But if they do not contradict ‘the 
law nor its spirit’ then they can legitimately claim the consequences of the rules that 
reduce their tax liability.
But there is a less clear line between tax planning and tax avoidance. How are 
we to draw the line between behaviours that go together with or against the law? Are 
we to contrast the facts only with the word of the law or also with its substance? Here 
is where determining the difference between avoidance and evasion – that is to say, the 
importance of having a concept of avoidance – becomes relevant again. Is that line to 
145. Freedman, “Defining taxpayer responsibility: in support of a general anti avoidance principle”, 357. 
vid also, Freedman, “A GANTIP: Was it really such a bad idea?”, 9.
146. Avi-Yonah, Sartori, et al., Global Perspectives on Income Taxation Law, 102.
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be drawn according to the intent of parliament? Or are we to consider the intentions, 
namely the intention to mitigate or to avoid taxes, of those individuals who engage in 
the questioned transactions?
Tax mitigation is understood as a ‘benefit’ given by the state to its citizens 
whenever a particular government decides to incentivise or prize a conduct. As 
discussed above, this is one of the possible consequences of one of the several functions 
assigned to modern tax systems. There is not much clarity in the legal literature 
regarding the many ways in which this might be done. So, for example, tax mitigation 
might be achieved by adopting a particular activity that is exempt from or charged 
with lower taxes, or through ‘benefits’ given to subjects under certain conditions. For 
those who have an economic approach to taxes, even progressive taxation might be 
understood as an incentive scheme: if you receive a lower income then you pay fewer 
taxes. This is known as the ‘substitution effect’ of taxes. Therefore, any rule in the tax 
system that is not neutral from an economic perspective might be considered 
mitigation. 
Here we see once more, just as happened with the analysis of tax evasion and 
avoidance, that if we want to have a clear idea as to what qualifies as tax mitigation (or 
evasion or avoidance) we need to have a clearer idea of the purpose of tax law. Only 
then can we develop a standard for distinguishing among strategic behaviours. To 
define such a standard we also need to revise the criteria according to which its 
content will be determined. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that unless we want 
to have a descriptive taxonomy of what qualifies as tax planning (or evasion or 
avoidance), a discussion about the telos of tax law and the tax system becomes urgent. 
To reach this debate we first need to analyse what I call the classical paradigm of tax 
law. The following chapter is dedicated to this task. This paradigm forms the 
underlying justification of tax law as we know it and explains the actual legal form of 
the obligation to pay taxes. Tax avoidance is so difficult to define, and it brings so 
many problems to the legal status of the obligation to pay taxes, because there exists a 
tension between the legal structure of the classical paradigm of tax law and the 
political justification of taxes, or in other words, between private property and 
taxation.
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CHAPTER TWO. THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM OF TAX LAW
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I analyse why tax avoidance is a problem and how it cannot be 
understood using the traditional categories in which strategic behaviour in tax law has 
been classified and studied. I also argue that aims to provide a legal solution for tax 
avoidance have failed systematically due to a lack of a legal understanding of tax 
avoidance; in other words, contemporary tax law theory is unable to explain tax 
avoidance. I hypothesise that this situation might be explained in light of underlying 
presuppositions that typify contemporary theories of tax law, namely, what I call the 
classical paradigm of tax law. 
In the present chapter I expound the classical paradigm of tax law by depicting 
its elements and limitations. To provide clarity I divide the argument into two parts. In 
the first part of the chapter I briefly describe the evolution of tax law, its relationship 
with public finance, the main elements of the classical paradigm of tax law, and the 
general theory of tax law that stands today with its distinctive mode of legal reasoning. 
In the second part of the chapter I dedicate some time to analysing in detail Professor 
Judith Freedman’s principles-based legislation proposal as an alternative to the classical 
paradigm. The problems evident in Freedman’s alternative show why a complete 
revision of the elements of the classical paradigm is needed. To that task I will dedicate 
the second part of this thesis (Chs. 3-5).
2. PUBLIC FINANCE, TAXATION AND TAX LAW
In comparison with other areas of law, especially private and criminal law, tax law 
represents a recent historical development. This ‘unwelcome child of the law’, as 
Johannes Popitz calls it,147 became an independent legal field in the early twentieth 
century. In Germany, for example, tax law was only taught independently from finance 
law by Ludwig Waldecker at the University of Berlin from 1915.148 According to 
Michael Stolleis, three factors contributed to its founding as a scholarly discipline of 
public law in Germany. First, tax law was only possible once Germany became a 
unitary and ‘self-contained’ nation state in 1871. Second, tax law could only exist once 
147. Quoted in Stolleis and Dunlap, A History of Public Law in Germany, 1914-1945, 224.
148. ibid, 219.
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the state was funded primarily from taxes, and this happened after the second half of 
the nineteenth century.149 The third factor was ‘the establishment of the Rechtsstaat, 
which created the preconditions for a scholarly treatment of tax law within the 
procedure and reservation given to the law, the introduction of administrative 
jurisdiction, and a corresponding more sharply outlined conceptualisation of legal 
doctrine’.150 After the First World War, when new sources of revenue were required, 
the Reich went for its first big tax reform between 1919 and 1920. A new 
administrative organisation was created, the jurisdiction between the Reich and the 
Länder was allocated and the financial adjustment of taxes was regulated.151 The 
decisive impulse for the creation of tax law was the Reich Tax Code of 1919. This 
reform elucidates the future development of tax law and, in particular, the interest in 
and the scientific-systematic development of a general theory of tax law. This general 
theory of tax law was aimed at explaining and bringing together all the common 
elements of tax law.152 The man responsible for this development was Albert Hensel, 
whose work on the general theory of tax law will be analysed later in this chapter.153 
A similar development to that which occurred in Germany also took place in Italy 
and Austria.154 In the UK, the evolution of tax law was not that different. According to 
Freedman, tax law ‘is a relative newcomer to the UK law degree curriculum’. It was 
taught as an independent legal discipline only in the 1950s when Wheatcroft started 
teaching and publishing in his role at the London School of Economics.155
Tax law is important not because it was constitutive of the financial and 
economic practices used by monarchs in need of funds – there is no doubt that public 
funds were needed before tax law was recognised as a field of law and institutional 
practices were created for that need. Throughout history public needs have been 
financed by public funds – most notably, peace and security – before there was any 
unity in tax law. But tax law heralded an important change in the way in which these 
practices developed and in our understanding of them. The legal aspect of these 
149. vid, Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Ch2.
150. Stolleis and Dunlap, A History of Public Law in Germany, 1914-1945, 218.
151. ibid, 219.
152. ibid, 219–220.
153. ibid, 220–221. vid infra, 93.
154. ibid, 218.
155. Freedman, “Taxation research as legal research”, 15.
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practices added something to the pure financial need and brought both new terms and 
new institutions to support those terms. Bringing the law to these practices had 
important institutional consequences: national revenue replaced the monarch’s 
patrimony and taxes replaced exactions, while public expenditure was also subject to 
legal constraints and requirements. Revenue had to be legitimately obtained, which 
meant that individuals had to have good reasons to accept the legal obligation to 
contribute and the state had to have good reason to ask for money. In a sense, the 
iteration of the financial needs and institutional changes shows how taxes and the 
concept of the state have evolved hand in hand. It is the ‘concept of the independent 
state which should be recognised as the basis for the historical and organisational 
evolution of taxes into constitutional tax systems – so much so, that in fact the labour 
of millennia was needed before taxation could begin in the nineteenth century, to 
reach its full development’.156 Public finance became the arch that covered all these 
different practices.
Historically, public finance has therefore been understood as a theory for 
studying public revenue and expenditure, and tax law is concerned with the former. As 
Richard Musgrave explains, the ‘classical question’ of public finance was ‘when and 
where resources should be put to public rather than private use, and who should bear 
that cost’.157 It was only after the Great Depression that the theory of public finance 
was dominated ‘by the study of the effects of fiscal policy upon the levels of income, 
employment and prices’,158 an attitude that dominates the economic approach to 
taxation to this day.
The question of how to determine who should contribute to financing public 
resources, and with how much, is an important aspect of tax law. As we will see later,159 
many of the debates surrounding tax law focus on the determination of a principle of 
justice in taxation that should inform fiscal policy, legislation and the sorts of taxes that 
should be established by a government.
156. von Stein, “On taxation”, 30. Here von Stein argues that it is the concept of the state and not that 
of the natural community of men that explains taxation.
157. Musgrave and Peacock, “Introduction”, ix.
158. ibid.
159. vid infra, 85.
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However, things tend to get more complicated once the dependency of public 
finance on a theory of the state is acknowledged. We cannot have a clear idea of public 
finance if we do not revise its justification in light of the justification of the state, 
which, at the same time, rests on a particular notion of man. In the formation and 
justification of the modern state, for example, the importance given to the (natural) 
rights of man explains not only contractarian theories of the state but also that its 
function is to protect those rights.160 Or, in C. B. Macpherson’s words,
Every political theory which sets out to justify or advocate a 
particular system of government, or a limited or unlimited 
degree of obligation of the citizen to the state, must rest on an 
explicit or implicit theory of human nature. The theorist must 
show, or assume, that the human beings who will have to submit 
to and operate the desired system do need it and are capable of 
running it.161
To summarise then, the field of law we know today as tax law is a very recent 
development, that is, the legal form of the historical evolution that led to the modern 
state as a public economic agent was only very recently adopted. Furthermore, this 
phenomenon was not exclusively based on economic concerns but it also had an 
important element of justice. At the same time, the legitimacy of the state’s power to 
tax depended on the justification of the state and public expenditure, so much so that 
taxes are explained because of public expenditure. The crucial question was, then, how 
to determine the criterion by which each individual should contribute to these 
expenses.
In what follows I analyse the underlying elements of what I call the classical 
paradigm of tax law.
3. THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM OF TAX LAW
The classical paradigm of tax law is built around various iterations of different 
historical conceptions of man in society and his interactions with the state. These 
interactions include debates about the function assigned to the state, the private-public 
allocation of goods, and the right to private property and public expenditure, among 
others. As said before, the evolution of this iteration was systematised around a theory 
160. vid, Locke, Second Treatise of Government.
161. Macpherson, “Editor's Introduction”, x.
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of public finance, the function of which was to determine the relationship between 
revenue and public expenditure under a criteria of justice applicable to it. It is 
important to analyse the elements of the classical paradigm of tax law because these 
are the elements that still justify and explain the legal categories of contemporary tax 
law systems and their shortfalls (including the inability to understand tax avoidance). 
These elements are not to be found in one particular political theory or one theory of 
tax law, but they can be found in several. They are common elements that can help us 
to better understand the underlying assumptions of tax law. In what follows I 
distinguish between and analyse four elements in which the classical paradigm of tax 
law lies. These elements are:
I. The individual as pure rationaliser (section 3.1).
II. Private property as a natural right (section 3.2).
III. Taxes as instruments of revenue (section 3.3).
IV. Blindness to aspirational principles of justice in taxation (section 3.4.).
3.1. The individual as pure rationaliser
The first element of the classical paradigm of tax law concerns an idea of the 
individual that underlies the contemporary approach to taxation. Of course, this 
notion of the individual is not exclusive to taxation, but my own interest lies in 
showing how this notion forms the basis of contemporary tax policy and tax law. Also, 
I am not interested here in producing – and I am not trying to produce – an 
exhaustive philosophical history of the evolution, interpretations and importance of 
this notion of man both within and for modernity. I simply want to make explicit a 
notion of the individual that pervades the justification of taxation and the structure of 
tax law, as we know it today. For the time being, let me say that this notion of the 
individual has been particularly influential in taxation because of the consequences it 
presents, that is, a tendency to understand taxes through the achievement of economic 
ends. I will show the influence and consequences of this notion of the individual after 
I develop the remaining elements of the classical paradigm of tax law. Thus, in this 
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section, I focus on delineating the pervading notion of the individual to which I am 
referring.
A central characteristic of this individual is the seventeenth-century idea that 
the individual is a pure rationaliser who acts according to self-interest.162 In trying to 
move deeper into this idea we must begin by providing a better account of what I 
mean by individuals. In a relevant sense for the argument herein, individuals are 
persons or beings ‘with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights’. This moral status 
requires or presupposes ‘certain capacities’, in particular, that this being ‘adopt life 
plans’ and that his decisions are ‘attributable to him’. Or, as Charles Taylor asserts, ‘[a] 
person is a being who can be addressed, and who can reply [...] a “respondent”.’163
Therefore, the notion of a respondent that has dominated the institutional 
design available to us today finds its origin in the seventeenth century, namely, and 
following Taylor, in an ‘epistemologically grounded notion of the subject. A person is a 
being with consciousness [...] as a power to frame representations of things’.164 These 
persons act as respondents because their resources to reply come from the way in 
which they have a representation of the world and of their situation.165 This capacity 
to represent the world allows agents to plan and rationally decide what to do, thus 
giving them the possibility to understand complex relations between things in the 
world. This is an essential capacity for those who see the ability to engage in strategic 
behaviour as a defining character of responding agents – in contrast with animals, for 
example.166 From this conception a notion of agency flows, this being the possibility 
of acting as one wishes. Or, in Taylor’s words, ‘[a]n agent is a being who acts, hence 
who has certain goals and endeavours to fulfil them’.167 Finally, this definition makes 
the ends of respondents unproblematic: they can be chosen according to their capacity 
to plan. The authority of my decisions, and consequently the respect that my decisions 
demand, depends on their being rationally understood in these terms.
162. There are many different approaches that I could adopt in order to build on the argument I am 
trying to make here. I have opted to follow the work of Charles Taylor.






It is because of the ideas described above that for this conception of a person 
‘[r]eason is and ought to be primarily instrumental’ and therefore ‘[h]is world is one of 
potential means, which he understands with a view to control’.168 Taylor is right when 
he says that under this conception of an individual freedom consists of subjecting the 
world to (the respondent’s) desires or purposes.169 In one possible variant of this 
conception, perhaps the most successful in terms of its persistence in modernity, 
persons are concerned with maximising their individual utility. 
This conception of a person and the consequences that follow are supposed to 
present a more realistic or naturalistic account of human rationality than the one 
belonging to a religious or premodern world. This has consequences for the argument 
developed in this thesis since under this idea of an individual the authority of norms 
(moral or legal) depends on their acting in accordance with rationality in the terms 
explained: norms are to be followed only when it is rational for the person to do so.170 
This explains why, for some theorists, policies and laws are to be designed according to 
outlines that any rational individual would accept. Or, if we want to obtain allegiance 
from them, this makes evident the way in which these policies and laws act in their 
self-interest.171
In tax matters this model of a person leads to an understanding of the 
relationship between the government and citizen-taxpayers as one in which each 
struggles to set up a tax system in the terms that most benefit it or him from an 
economic point of view. A very good example of the application of these ideas can be 
found in Brennan and Buchanan’s The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal 
Constitution.172
Brennan and Buchanan begin their analysis with the following epigraph, taken 
from Stuart Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government (1861): ‘The interest of 
the government is to tax heavily: that of the community is, to be as little taxed as the 
168. ibid, 112.
169. ibid.
170. For a similar reading vid, Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 15–19. For a different idea of what 
rationality implies regarding reasons and morality vid, Gardner, “Nearly natural law”.
171. vid, Wenzel, “Tax compliance and the psychology of justice: mapping the field”.
172. Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution.
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necessary expenses of good government permit’.173 Before going deeper into Brennan 
and Buchanan’s ideas I would like to start by analysing one of their premises as derived 
from their understanding of Mill. As will be shown later, Brennan and Buchanan use 
Mill’s above assertion by way of a literal interpretation, that is to say, that the power to 
tax should be limited because governments always heavily tax individuals, whose 
interest is indeed to the contrary. This is what they call the ‘[m]odel of Leviathan’ as 
‘revenue maximisation’.174 But Mill does not mean to say that government is 
interested in taxing community heavily per se. Mill is actually referring to the 
problems of excessive power in monarchic or aristocratic governments, both of which 
only look to their own interests and not to the ‘general good’. In his words, ‘evils 
arising from the prevalence of modes of action in the representative body, dictated by 
[...] interests conflicting more or less with the general good of the community’,175 that 
is, ‘endless privileges without censure’ in the cases of monarchy and aristocracy. This 
interpretation should be confirmed if Mill’s analysis is followed. A few lines after this 
epigraph, Mill shows how democracy may have similar problems: this happens if 
people act according to the selfish interests of class and put excessive burdens on the 
rich.176 In more general terms, Mill is interested in showing how good government 
requires representation for the interests of all classes and group identities within a 
nation and what is required to achieve this. In other words, he is interested in 
exploring the relationship between political representation and general (non-sinister) 
interest(s).177 Mill maintains that forms of government were a matter of choice within 
the limits set by the customs and particular characteristics of the society in question.178 
Although forms of government constitute human creations they are not machines 
(that is, they are not only questions of ‘means and end’ or ‘expedients for the 
173. Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government”, 441.
174. Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, 33.
175. Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government”, 441. All this should be clear when reading 
the following lines from Mill: ‘One of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other 
forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of class 
legislation; of government intended for [...] the immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the 
lasting detriment of the whole. And one of the most important questions demanding 
consideration, in determining the best constitution of a representative government, is how to 
provide efficacious securities against evil’. (ibid, 446).
176. ibid, 442–443.
177. I come back to these ideas in Ch5 where I analyse the importance of representation for the idea of 
the law as the will of the people, vid infra, 220ff.
178. Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government”, Chs1 and 2.
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attainment of human objects’) or ‘a sort of spontaneous product’.179 Limitations on 
this choice mainly derive from ‘three conditions’ that Mill identifies as necessary for 
the created ‘political machinery’ to ‘act’. These are: (i) the people must be willing to 
accept the form of government, (ii) they ‘must be willing and able to do what is 
necessary to keep it standing’, and (iii) ‘they must be willing and able to do what it 
requires for them to enable it to fulfil its purposes’. Any form of government will be 
‘unsuitable for the particular case’ if it fails in any of these three conditions.180 These, of 
course, are not necessary conditions because, as Mill says, people can learn the benefits 
of having new institutions so long as they desire them.181 Keeping this in mind forms 
an important part of the work of those who want to create and establish new 
institutions. At the same time, Mill thought that good forms of government could not 
be defined according to a list of particular ends. What ‘causes and conditions good 
government’ is, on the contrary, the ‘qualities of the human beings composing the 
society over which government is exercised’.182 So good governments should ‘increase 
the good qualities [moral, intellectual and active] in the governed, collectively and 
individually’.183 This is the way in which, according to Mill, the interests of the 
government, namely the well-being of the individual members of the political 
community, and the moving force of the machine, namely the good qualities of the 
individuals, are put to work together. This allows him to state that ‘[t]he ideally perfect 
constitution of a public office is that in which the interest of the functionary is 
entirely coincident with his duty’.184
The last sentence of a superbly written paragraph, in which Mill sums up his 
ideas on the matter, may also be of use to us here: 
Government is at once a great influence acting on the human 
mind, and a set of organised arrangements for public business: in 
the first capacity its beneficial action is chiefly indirect, but not 
therefore less vital, while its mischievous action may be direct.185
179. ibid, 374.
180. ibid, 376 and 413.






All of the above elements to be considered in the determination of a good form of 
government led Mill to defend representative government. But there is one more 
element that we should consider in order to refute Brennan and Buchanan’s 
interpretation of Mill. Mill considers there to be two principles upon which ‘any 
general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs’ rest. These are: 
(i) ‘that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being 
disregarded, when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to 
stand up for them’, and (ii) ‘that the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is 
more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal 
energies enlisted in promoting it’. He labels these principles by stating that they 
explain men as ‘self-protecting’ and ‘self-dependent’.
Mill explicitly states that the ‘self-protecting’ principle is not the same as a 
‘doctrine of universal selfishness’, but is instead based on the idea that ‘mankind, as a 
rule, prefer themselves to others’.186 Yet at the same time as he sees that those who 
have an interest in their own issues prefer their well-being over that of others, or 
precisely because of this, Mill defends the idea that each individual should participate 
in government decisions.187 So now we are able to better make sense of Mill’s sentence 
that is quoted as an epigraph by Buchanan and Brennan. What worries Mill – and 
taxation is nothing more than an example of that worry – is the tendency of those in 
power to use (abuse) it in their exclusive interest. The reason why this might happen is 
largely because of the first principle stated above, namely, that of the tendency of men 
to promote their self-interests. To this it should be added that when thinking of their 
self-interests men tend to see only their immediate interests and not those of others or 
‘distant or unobvious interests’. According to Mill, the way in which this last element 
might be achieved is by directing the minds of a person to distant and unobvious 
interests by ‘disinterested regard for others, and especially for what comes after them, 
for the idea of posterity, of their country, or of mankind, whether grounded on 
sympathy or on a conscientious feeling’.188 So, as stated before, the problem here is 





defends representative government as the best form of government. Another summary 
by Mill is needed here:
The representative system ought to be so constituted as to 
maintain this state of things: it ought not to allow any of the 
various sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of 
prevailing against truth and justice and the other sectional 
interests combined. There ought always to be such a balance 
preserved among personal interests, as may render any one of 
them dependent for its successes, on carrying with it at least a 
large proportion of those who act on higher motives, and more 
comprehensive and distant views.189
This long detour on the right exegesis of Mill’s work is justified for two reasons. The 
first shows Mill’s conception of the individual as a pure rationaliser principally 
concerned about his self-interest and how this might be tamed by determining the 
right form of government. Mill’s is a good example of how a moral theory like 
utilitarianism, despite starting from a point of self-interest, aspires to follow one 
abstract and general standard that is applicable to all. This explains the resistance and 
endurance of utilitarianism according to MacIntyre.190 Mill’s Considerations on 
Representative Government is a theory in which – after starting from a point at which 
the individual is a pure rationaliser – self-interest is the main explanation for individual 
action, and individual or group (sectorial) interests can be put to the service of the 
general interest. The second reason derives from the first then: it allows us to expose 
Buchanan and Brennan’s ideas as an extreme form of individualism.
Brennan and Buchanan introduce their work by stating that they will analyse 
taxation from a ‘positive’ perspective regarding government and from a normative 
perspective concerning taxpayers or citizens.191 The positive analysis of government 
requires them to consider how governments behave or might be expected to behave 
in reality. As with many available economic analyses, they do not want to provide 
advice to government decision makers on equitable and efficient tax systems.192 Their 
normative concern for taxpayers derives from their analysis of a ‘taxpayer’s 
constitutional choice calculus’ as the only ‘legitimate basis for the derivation of 
189. ibid, 447.
190. MacIntyre, After Virtue, Ch6.
191. Brennan and Buchanan, The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, 3.
192. ibid.
66
possible norms for tax reform’.193 In this sense, the central question that Brennan and 
Buchanan try to answer is ‘what sort of tax institutions would [...] the rational citizen-
taxpayer [...] select as elements in the constitution?’.194 For this purpose they aim to 
think ‘radically’ in order to reach the ‘nature of taxation’ and what is ‘involved in the 
power to tax’.195 Their analysis combines a Hobbesian starting point, in which the 
enforcement of ‘basic property right[s]’ and ‘rules by which those property rights 
might be exchanged’ help us to leave behind the state of nature, with the ‘notion of 
social contract’.196 In this scheme constitutional limits are put in place to ensure that 
governments do not go against the interests of individual citizens, as originally decided 
and defined by them behind a veil of ignorance (equivalent to that proposed by John 
Rawls in A Theory of Justice). Constitutional tax limits are the solution that they 
propose for ensuring that individuals in government will not hurt individual citizens’ 
interests. The assumption (‘both empirically reasonable and analytically necessary’) that 
any rational individual should make is that those in government ‘will exploit’ the 
power to tax ‘for their own purposes, whatever these may be’.197 This leads them to 
start from a ‘model of Leviathan’ as revenue maximiser. In-period governments, not 
limited by electoral considerations, tend to maximise their own utilities. In its simplest 
version, the model ‘presumes that governments maximise revenues from whatever 
sources of taxation are made available to them constitutionally’.198
They give three arguments to show why an unlimited government would not 
present an efficient decision in a pre-constitutional setting.199 The first argument they 
provide is that individuals are not indifferent regarding the distribution of benefits. As 
individuals are risk averse they prefer a restricted government rather than the 
distribution of large benefits for few individuals. The second argument is that the 
transfer of money from citizen-taxpayers to politician-bureaucrats has its costs. This is 
always the case so long as these transfers impose an excess burden above the revenue 
released to the government, something that, according to the authors, always happens. 
193. ibid, 14.







The third and final reason is that an unrestricted government would generate a ‘rent-
seeking’ effect, that is to say, everyone will try to reach a position of power since they 
will secure profits from being there. Therefore, a restricted government ensures that 
there will not be any efficiency losses in the competition to obtain a position in 
government. They conclude:
[A]ll rational individuals, behind a veil of ignorance, would seek 
to constrain exploitation by revenue-maximising government to 
the maximum possible extent.200
So Brennan and Buchanan assume that a rational person has an interest in protecting 
himself from government. The assertion that each person is looking out for his self-
interests is similar to Mill’s first principle of self-interest, but Brennan and Buchanan 
do not recognise the importance of Mill’s second principle, that of self-dependency. 
This is a crucial difference because, for Mill, protection is not something that is against 
government as a form of political organisation. Conversely, according to Brennan and 
Buchanan we have to protect against government (any and not only that which 
defends sinister interests). They consider government to be dangerous per se, with 
independence from the interests of those in power. It will always be in the interests of 
any (form of) government to tax people heavily. Governments always tend to be 
revenue-maximisers against which people are vulnerable. In this sense, Brennan and 
Buchanan’s The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution present a very 
good example of a fully developed idea of the individual as pure rationaliser.
3.2. Private property as a natural right
The second element of the classical paradigm of tax law is, today, familiar and is that of 
the idea of private property as a natural right. Again, the origin of this idea is to be 
found in seventeenth-century contractarian theories of the state that justify its 
existence by assigning to it the function of protecting a person’s natural rights. There 
are also contemporary applications of this idea, the most notable being Nozick’s 
libertarian argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. This is, perhaps, the most 
200. ibid, 41.
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characteristic element of the classical paradigm and is one that requires taxation to be 
justified, because otherwise it is equivalent to ‘stealing’ people’s money.201
There are two aspects that need to be addressed here. The first deals with the 
justification of private property and the second with it being a natural right. Both 
aspects are not only related but also, in the terms explored here, the justification of the 
right to private property explains it in terms of being considered a natural right, and 
vice versa. I am not concerned here with other debates surrounding the right to 
private property, including that which deals with the determination of its content (the 
idea that private property is a bundle of rights).202 The reason for not addressing the 
debates surrounding this last point is due to its logical subordination to the first in 
relation to what interests me here.
There are two theories that originate from seventeenth-century England that 
are relevant to this discussion, namely, those developed by Hobbes and Locke. 
Although these theories share a vocabulary and a structure, they differ substantially in 
various aspects. But before getting into the details of these theories and some of their 
differences, let me first confirm that in what follows I am guided by what I think is 
the best interpretation of these contractarian theories developed so far, more 
specifically, the interpretation developed by C. B. Macpherson. Macpherson’s main 
work on this topic aims to historically situate Hobbes and Locke’s political 
philosophies as the central elements of what he calls the ‘political theory of possessive 
individualism’.203 Macpherson’s claim is that Hobbes and Locke’s works have more 
similarities than differences since they represent an effort to leave behind the political 
structures of the Middle Ages by setting out the theoretical aspects of the new 
bourgeois (Hobbes) and capitalist (Locke) political (and economic) organisation(s).
In Leviathan, Hobbes provides the justification for sovereign power by deriving 
it from the ‘logical abstraction’204 of the state of nature. If we follow Macpherson’s 
interpretation, this implies that Hobbes starts from ‘[t]he natural condition of mankind’ 
201. The need for justification will connect the argument presented in this section with the third 
element of the classical paradigm, that is, taxes as instruments of revenue and public expenditure, 
vid infra, 77.
202. vid, Honoré, “Ownership” and Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, Ch4–6.
203. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.
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as he knew it in seventeenth-century English civil society and took from it common 
power.205 So Hobbes shows what would happen if there were not any common power 
to restrict the ‘natural condition of mankind’. The natural condition of mankind, 
according to Hobbes, is one of ‘natural equality, competition, diffidence, and vanity’.206 
He expounds that under natural conditions man would fall into a state of permanent 
war of all against all: fear would dominate passions and lead to the accumulation of all 
kinds of power (as ‘defensive and offensive strength against others’).207 But because 
man has a passion for living a better life, with advancement being made possible by 
peaceful and secure living,208 they renounce their initial liberties (the same liberties 
that allowed them to secure their lives). Men agree to do this as a way of making 
liberties unnecessary: these would be transferred to a superior force that would secure 
that valued state of peace and security for each of them. Only after this does mankind 
posses the rights that allow individuals to develop their lives, industries, the arts, 
commerce, and so on. Because these rights are now recognised justice is possible, since 
not everything is permitted. These rights, argues Hobbes, provide a definition of right 
and wrong and this is only possible when there is a superior authority that establishes 
the law.209
In this scheme the right to private property depends on it being constituted by 
the sovereign power.210 The right of private property, that is, ‘the constitution of Mine, 
and Thine, and His’, is required to be enforced by the ‘Sovereign Power’; otherwise it 
could only be kept by force. If not, says Hobbes, then it is not property but 
‘uncertainty’. Certainty requires laws, and such laws can only be established by the one 
(monarch or assembly) that holds the ‘Sovereign Power’. This implies that the initial 
distribution of property is to be made by the sovereign, who is not excluded from the 
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answer the ends of the commonwealth, namely, peace and security.211 At the same 
time, he is not excluded by individuals’ private property when the purposes of the 
commonwealth so require it, that is to say, whenever peace and security are at risk. 
This is how we understand, according to Hobbes, the contrary doctrine, ‘[t]hat every 
private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods’, which is a doctrine that ‘tendeth 
to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth’.212 But after this initial distribution, and 
having confirmed that private property is to be secured, its distribution is given to the 
operation of the market. This is the reason why Hobbes is dismissive of ancient 
conceptions of corrective and distributive justice. He replaces these with corrective 
justice as the ‘justice of a contractor’: that of just value given by those who exchange, 
that is, ‘that which they be contented to give’,213 and distributive justice as not having 
to do with merit, but with defining what is just, namely, the ‘justice of an arbitrator’ 
distributing ‘to every man his own’.214
What about Hobbes’ conception of private property as a natural right? Here 
we can follow Macpherson’s definition of natural rights: ‘rights which by the nature of 
things entail an obligation of other men to respect them’.215 Connected with this 
understanding of natural rights is Hobbes’s principal contribution to this debate, 
namely, the idea that natural rights are not dependent on the ‘old [n]atural [l]aw 
tradition, in which natural rights had been derived from natural law or divine law or 
sociability, and in which there had been a strong element of hierarchy’.216 This modern 
interpretation of natural rights is based on the idea that all men are equal. It is an 
important shift from previous justifications of political obligation because the thought 
is derived from the fact that there is an ‘equal need of continued motion’.217 The 
source of political obligation is to be found in the nature of man as he is situated in 




215. Macpherson, “Natural rights in Hobbes and Locke”, 225.
216. ibid, 226.
217. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 76–77, 265 and Macpherson, “Natural 
rights in Hobbes and Locke”, 226.
71
possessive market societies. Or, as Macpherson has put it, ‘men in possessive market 
society [...] are all irretrievably subject to the determination of the market’.218
Locke’s political theory can be read as a correction of Hobbes’ where he aims 
to limit the power of the unlimited sovereign that Hobbes’ theory leads to.219 But 
these changes require the introduction of some inequalities among the people that are 
incompatible with Hobbes’ theory of equality. These inequalities derive from Locke’s 
theory of property, as it allows us to distinguish between those who own and can 
accumulate more than their self-ownership from those who cannot and who only 
own their self. In this sense, Locke’s theory can be read as a combination of modern 
ideas regarding the nature of men and private property, while allowing some space for 
traditional (non-Hobbesian) ideas of natural rights as part of natural law regarding the 
justification of political obligation.220 According to Macpherson, the combination of 
these ideas, although problematic, was very accommodating for the society that Locke 
lived in.221
The limitation to sovereign power in Locke’s theory is a consequence of the 
way in which he delineates the right to property. The right to private property is an 
individual natural right and its protection, its ‘preservation’, explains the constitution 
of government.222 Thus, a property right exists prior to the constitution of 
government. In other words, a property right as such exists in the state of nature; the 
problem is that in this state it becomes uncertain. For this purpose, Locke provides a 
broad definition of what he means by the right to property. According to this 
definition, included in the ‘general name [...] property’ are men’s ‘lives, liberties and 
estates’.223 The uncertainty of its preservation in the state of nature comes from the 
fact that everyone is equally the ‘absolute lord of his own person and possessions’ and 
therefore exposed to the ‘invasion of others’.224 Even though everyone has the right to 
218. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 106.
219. vid, Locke’s argument against absolute monarchy as ‘inconsistent with civil society’ in Locke, Second 
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enforce their rights, since they are judges of their own case,225 nothing secures the 
revenge (excessive zeal in the defence of rights) that leads to never-ending revenge. 
The war of all against all is a possibility that every rational man wants to avoid and this 
is why they renounce not their rights, but to the exercise of those rights in the state of 
nature. Man puts himself ‘into [...] a common-wealth, by setting a judge on earth, with 
authority to determine all controversies’.226
Locke’s argument in favour of private property (‘a part of him, that another 
can no longer have any right to’, as Locke says of the venison if it is to be of any use 
to the wild Indian hunter)227 starts as an argument about how to justify how someone 
can have private property over the common. This is his big contribution: the idea that 
‘every man has a property in his own person’ which nobody ‘has a right to but himself ’ 
and from which derives the fact that everyone has property to the ‘labour of his body, 
and the work of his hands’.228 Locke’s theory is known as the ‘labour theory of 
property’. According to this theory, everything that has been produced by man and 
anything to which he adds his labour is his property. Other men are excluded from 
this product because it is omitted from the commons by the labour added by 
whomever has property over it (‘labour put a distinction between them and common 
[...] and so they became his private right’229 and ‘[t]hus labour, in the beginning, gave a 
right of property wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was 
common’).230 In these ‘natural’ conditions – before civil society was constituted and 
before ‘the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of 
things’231 – everyone could have property over that which was of use to him. There 
was a natural limit to that which someone could own: nobody could accumulate more 
than that which he needed because this would cause prejudice and ‘intrench upon the 
right of another’.232 In other words, accumulation without use would go against 
original common property. But, according to Locke, there are different historical and 
225. ibid, 48, §90 and 66–67, §127.
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(what we would now call) economic factors that transform the conditions of the first 
stage of development of the natural right to private property where ‘labour could at 
first begin a title of property’.233 Locke goes on:
[I]n some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and 
stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of 
some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their 
distinct territories, and by laws within themselves regulated the 
properties of the private men of their society, and so by compact 
and agreement, settled the property which labour and industry 
began.234
Here Locke makes a two-step argument to explain the conditions under which he was 
living in England at that time.235 His first step takes it as a given that some 
transformations – an increase in people and stock, the use of money, scarcity and the 
creation of new value deriving from scarcity (value not only of the use of things) – 
happened at some moment in history and that he does not need to justify them 
(precisely because they were evident for those living in the same place and time as 
him). The second step of his argument is that these transformations explain in part the 
need to settle property by agreement in civil society following the conditions that 
justified private property in the state of nature.236
The right to private property is a natural right for Locke, but it has a different 
justification from the one given by Hobbes since it combines both modern and 
traditional elements. Or, to put in another way, Locke justifies this natural right 
according to the nature of man and according to natural law. Accordingly, private 
property is justified either by ‘natural reason’ or by ‘revelation’.237 Natural reason 
explains that property is a product of each man’s right to preservation and revelation 
‘gives us an account’ as to how the world and its fruits were given to mankind in 
233. ibid, 30, §51.
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common. Locke solves the tension between these two explanations through the labour 
theory of property. Here, the property given in common to all men by God requires ‘a 
means to appropriate’ part of it so that it is of any use to men.238 This is the notion 
from which Locke derives the idea that if men have property over their own person 
then they have the right to appropriate the produce of their labour (and they need no 
‘assignation or consent of any body’ because it was given by God to all).239 The main 
consequence of this combination for the justification of private property is that it 
creates the conditions that allow Locke to justify the unequal distribution of property 
within civil society. In other words, from the very origins of the justification for 
private property in the state of nature, Locke does not follow the radical equality of 
Hobbes’ justification.
In this scheme in which a natural right to private property is included in the 
state of nature – justified according to the labour theory of property and deriving 
from natural reason and natural law – and recognised as such in the constitution of 
civil society into which men entered for the protection of that right, it is almost 
evident that taxation will be a problem. I am not concerned here with giving the 
justification for taxation within the classical paradigm of tax law; this I will do in the 
next section of this chapter. What interests me here is an expansion of the idea that 
under this justification of private property there is no possible way of justifying an 
obligation to pay taxes independent of the consent of the individual. This is an idea 
that has pervaded public debate on taxation until today.
Therefore, Locke presents us with the third limitation that he imposes on the 
legislative power (‘the supreme power’ constituted by the ‘first and fundamental positive 
law of all common-wealths’).240 According to this limitation government ‘cannot take 
from any man any part of his property without his own consent’.241 Were it not for this 
limitation then there would not be any reason for men to enter into civil society. If 
property could be taken from them without their consent then it would mean that 
238. ibid, 18–19, 20, §25–27, §30.
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they did not have any property at all. This, Locke explains, would happen in states in 
which an absolute monarch has the power, because his interests would go against the 
interests of all.242 On the contrary, there is no such risk where the legislative is in an 
assembly of people with the same interests.
There is something important that needs to be rescued from the theories of 
Hobbes and Locke regarding their notion of natural rights. In both cases, their 
conceptions of natural rights were revolutionary. They were able to place in question 
the traditional hierarchies of authority and power as they were known according to 
custom; both transformed the source of political authority. They left behind the idea 
that authority could be imposed on a society from the ‘outside’, that is, by God or a 
certain natural order. Hobbes and Locke were able to show that in their societies 
authority came from the nature of man and society as expressed in the justification of 
natural rights. The dark side of this is that we have inherited the idea that man owes 
nothing to society and that the inequalities produced by market relations are justified. 
This is a problem for those of us who live in the twenty first century. Or as 
Macpherson states, this is our dilemma and the dilemma of modern liberal democracy: 
[I]t must continue to use the assumptions of possessive 
individualism, at a time when the structure of market society no 
longer provides the necessary condition for deducing a valid 
theory of political obligation from those assumptions.243
Contemporary liberal theories of justice can be understood as attempts to answer this 
dilemma. But, as Robert Nozick shows, if these liberal political theories start from the 
premise of natural rights then their answer does not follow logically. This is the main 
argument of his Anarchy, State, and Utopia which goes against theories of justice that 
defend ‘patterned principles of justice’.244
Nozick presents his argument for the minimal state as the logical consequence 
of a political theory that starts from the idea of rights or, in his words, an ‘entitlement 
conception of justice’.245 This explains his famous argument against those who defend 
theories of distributive justice in which a patterned notion of justice revises – in order 
242. For a discussion of Brennan and Buchanan’s interpretation of Mill, vid supra 59.
243. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, 275.
244. vid, Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Ch7. For a critique vid, Psarras, “A critique of Robert 
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to correct – the distribution of goods that is a result of individuals’ voluntary 
exchanges.246 On the contrary, Nozick defends a theory of historical justice in 
holdings. According to Nozick, a distribution is just if it obtains by legitimate means. 
This means that the final distribution should be the result of the logical application of 
the three principles of justice identified in his theory: (i) the principle of justice in 
acquisition, (ii) the principle of justice in transfer, and (iii) the principle of justice in 
holdings.247 Therefore, a just distribution derives from the logical application of these 
principles. If this is so then the only way that we can justify the actual distributions of 
property is according to Nozick’s ‘complete principle of distributive justice’. This 
means that ‘a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess 
under the distribution’.248 There are two ways in which we can explain the final 
distribution. The first is that it obtains by the logical application of the first two 
principles. Nozick’s theory of historical justice in holdings implies that as long as the 
acquisition of property is just and is justly transferred then any final distribution will 
be just. The second alternative is that the operation of the third principle, in 
accordance with the first two, brings a distribution that constitutes the rectification of 
an injustice. Justice is logically derived from the justice of each person’s holdings.249 
The unequal distribution of property cannot be but a logical conclusion if one starts 
from these premises and rational and self-interested individuals would not accept any 
‘redistributive’ reason for an institutional design. 
More importantly for the arguments in this section, Nozick needs to recognise, 
just as Hobbes and Locke did, that there cannot be taxation without consent from the 
individual right holder. Moreover, according to Nozick the ‘taxation of earnings from 
labour is on a par with forced labour’.250 Nozick does not state that the taxation of 
earnings is equivalent but, instead, that it is very similar. According to his example, 
there appears to not be any difference between saying that ‘taking the earnings of n 







work n hours for another’s purpose’.251 If this is so, his argument continues, then this is 
a big problem for theories of self-ownership apropos Locke. Obliging me to work for 
others implies that I am no longer the owner of my own self and that someone else 
can decide for me what I have to do. Taxation implies giving others property over 
myself; I stop having self-ownership to become a ‘part-owner’ of myself.252
So we can say that Nozick cannot answer Macpherson’s challenge because the 
kind of revolutionary function fulfilled by Hobbes and Locke’s theories of natural 
rights was simply a step on the path toward modernity that could not continue along 
the same line of development since market-based equality cannot be but unequal. So 
political equality has not achieved social and economic equality (as a principle for 
authority, not as material equality). For the time being, let me state that Nozick’s 
defence of the entitlement conception of justice is a strong argument against taxation 
and a very good example of a contemporary theory of justice in which property is 
understood as a natural right within the seventeenth-century contractarian tradition, 
particularly in its Lockean form. I will return to this idea later when discussing 
distributive justice and at this point I will deal with Nozick’s argument in more detail.
With this I close the analysis of the second element of the classical paradigm of 
tax law, that is, the idea that private property is a natural right and what it means for a 
theory of taxes. Even if initially no justification for taxation, except that of an 
individual’s consent, can be seen, we still have to analyse these justifications. In what 
follows I argue that such a justification cannot be but an instrumental one: taxes are 
instruments of revenue for public expenditure. The way in which this analysis 
influences doctrinal law and judicial decisions in tax law will be developed later.253 
Suffice to say for now that this conception of property requires strict legality in tax 
law and this makes tax avoidance easier.
3.3. Taxes as instruments of revenue and public expenditure
We have so far designated considerable time to analysing the first two elements of the 
classical paradigm of tax law, that is to say, the conception according to which the 
251. ibid, 169. I will not address this issue here, but vid infra, 160.
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individual is a pure rationaliser and private property is a natural right.254 Taking stock 
of this analysis we can say that, according to the classical paradigm, taxes will only be 
justified if they go in the interests of individuals and if, consequently, these individuals 
consent to them. In this sense, taxes should be a means to an end for civil society.
One of the first to provide a definition of taxes, which would eventually 
become a traditional definition, was Professor Seligman. According to his definition, 
taxes are a ‘compulsory contribution from the person to the government to defray the 
expenses incurred in the common interest of all, without reference to special benefits 
conferred’.255 Following this definition, taxes are the means according to which 
government can compulsorily obtain part of the public revenue necessary to finance 
its activities.256 For the purposes of this section this definition will not be contested. I 
will adopt it not only because it still is an accepted definition, but also because it is the 
best expression of the classical paradigm. It is also a definition general enough to be 
independent of any particular tax policy and, therefore, any particular kind of tax.257
The first important thing that we can say of this definition is that it is coherent 
with the idea that taxes are to be accepted by rational individuals so that their private 
property is respected and, as thus, taxes are understood as contributions; people 
contribute and so ‘they give to help achieve’258 something. So even if taxes are 
compulsory, they are a compulsory contribution (they are not something to be taken 
and are not another form of obtaining economic resources). Therefore, what 
distinguishes taxes from other compulsory sources of revenue is that they are 
‘contributions’ and not payments, fees or fines. This is reinforced by the final part of 
the definition in which we are informed that there is not any direct benefit from this 
contribution. But then, we have to know why we are contributing and this is what the 
second part of the definition aims to explain. Taxes have a function and this function is 
the funding of ‘expenses incurred in the common interest of all’.
254. vid supra, 59 and 67, respectively.
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Whereas other compulsory payments or fees are justified by a direct benefit for 
an individual, or because the payment expresses a sanction for an unwanted conduct, 
taxes are characterised by a function that is set to ‘defray the expenses incurred in the 
common interest of all’. So taxes cannot be understood as a sanction because the 
obligation to pay them does not depend on the occurrence of any prohibited conduct. 
Taxes can also not be understood as a price, quasi-private prices, public prices, fees or 
special assessments.259
Because taxes are ‘contributions from the person to the government’ they are 
also different from exactions. The difference is that taxes respond to a conception of 
justice and fairness and the requirement that they are established through law (that is, 
the principle of legality) ensures that this is so. In other words, taxes should be 
legitimate; individuals should be given reasons that explain why they have an 
obligation to pay them. This is perhaps one of the most important advances obtained 
as a result of the evolution of tax law according to the classical paradigm, more 
specifically, the idea that those in power can only require compulsory contributions 
with the support of a law authorising them to do so.260 This requirement is the 
institutional expression of two other elements of the classical paradigm so far 
acknowledged, that is, a particular conception of the person and the idea that private 
property is a natural right.261 But the legitimation of taxes in the classical paradigm 
also depends on what they are destined or used for; in other words, the reasons why 
the rational individual has to contribute. This is the third element of the classical 
paradigm in which taxes are instruments for revenue and public expenditure.
The mutual dependency of taxation and expenditure informs an important 
part of the debate about tax justice and tax policy. The justification or the 
determination of the content of what are or should be the ‘expenses incurred in the 
common interest of all’ has worried almost everyone who has discussed the modern 
state and its institutions. Before the formation of the modern state an idea of the 
259. Seligman, Essays in Taxation. Of course, not everyone would agree with this. For example, 
economic justifications of taxation understand them as economic incentives. They would make 
synonymous public prices, fees and fines because of their effects as economic incentives for 
individuals. Thus, under a standard of economic efficiency and incentives there is no difference 
between taxes, excise duties and ‘green taxes’, as it is argued in any public finance book.
260. von Stein, “On taxation”, 30.
261. vid supra, 59 and 67 for details of the argument.
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‘common interest of all’ did not exist, and neither did the provision of public goods.262 
As stated previously, and following Hobbes and Locke’s contractarian theories of the 
modern state, these public goods were peace and security so that (natural) rights could 
be preserved. The justification of the authority and power of the sovereign depended 
upon the provision of these goods. Furthermore, since all those (equals) who lived 
under the authority of the sovereign benefited from the protection of their rights, all 
had to provide the economic means for this end. This justification of taxes, highly 
dependent on their economic use, is what I call the ‘instrumental justification’ of 
taxation. According to this instrumental justification taxes are instruments of revenue 
for public expenditure. In other words, taxes are a mechanism by which to ensure the 
provision of economic means for the state to develop its functions. This instrumental 
justification of taxes is given whenever the legitimacy of taxes is questioned, even 
today.263 A few examples will be enough to illustrate the instrumental justification of 
taxation.
Two good examples of the instrumental justification of taxation in the 
contractarian tradition are to be found in Hobbes and Locke. In ChXXX of Leviathan, 
Hobbes refers directly to taxes when discussing the office of the sovereign 
representative, highlighting ‘the end, for which he was trusted with the Sovereign 
Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people’.264 Even if it is true that 
Hobbes does not fully develop any sort of economic theory,265 since he is mainly 
concerned with the justification of the sovereign power and the function of the 
commonwealth, this does not imply that he does not have a justification for 
taxation.266 In Leviathan taxes have a clear justification: they are to provide the 
necessary economic means that will allow the sovereign representative to fulfil its 
functions. It is interesting to note, however, that taxes are necessary here because other 
means that might provide funding would be a problem for Hobbes’s conception of 
authority. According to Hobbes, if it were not for the nature of men then property 
262. Schumpeter, “The crisis of the tax state”.
263. vid, Adam, Besley, et al., Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review, Ch1; and the discussion infra Ch3.
264. Hobbes, Leviathan, 201.
265. Levy, “Economic views of Thomas Hobbes”.
266. Jackson, “Thomas Hobbes’ Theory of Taxation”. In this paper Jackson summarises all the references 
to taxes in Hobbes’ works and quotes De Corpore Politico Or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politic; 
De Cive and Leviathan.
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(‘distribution of land’) could be assigned to the representative of the commonwealth 
so that ‘such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine [sic] the whole expense of the 
common Peace, and defence necessarily required’. However, as representatives are not 
‘free from human passions, and infirmities’ the land apportioned may either not be 
enough or badly administered.267 Thus, if the representative of the commonwealth 
cannot hold all property and fulfil its function then taxes are needed.268 According to 
Dudley Jackson, this explains that the right to charge people with taxes can be justified 
‘in substance [with the same] answer still given today: taxes pay for the necessary 
expenditure of the sovereign power (the government)’.269 As Jackson interprets the 
situation, the justification for taxing individuals has as 'corollary [...] that the obligation 
to pay falls on every citizen’.270 Yet here Jackson moves too quickly, for the correct 
interpretation of Hobbes’ idea is that we have to distinguish between the ‘equal 
imposition’ of taxes and the ‘obligation to pay’ taxes. Hobbes argues that taxes should 
be equally imposed.271 However, at the same time he affirms that some (‘the rich’) 
‘may be debtors not only for their own persons, but for many more’.272 Taxes should 
be equally imposed because of a demand for equal justice upon which the ‘safety of 
the People’273 depends and, therefore, the sovereign fulfils its duty of maintaining peace 
and security. According to Hobbes, equal justice does not depend on ‘the riches, but 
on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his 
defence’. So everyone has an obligation to pay taxes since everyone benefits from the 
defence provided by the commonwealth. Taxes are ‘nothing else but the Wages, due to 
them that hold the publique [sic] Sword, to defend private men in the exercise of 
severall [sic] Trades, and Callings’.274 However, this does not mean that everyone has to 
pay taxes. In principle, everyone has the same debt because everyone benefits from the 
enjoyment of life, but some may owe more than others. The rich, Hobbes says, ‘may be 
debtors not only for their own persons, but for many more’: for all the poor that serve 
267. Hobbes, Leviathan, 150.
268. So here we find another argument against Brennan and Buchanan’s interpretation of a Leviathan 
state in The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. vid supra, 59.
269. Jackson, “Thomas Hobbes’ Theory of Taxation”, 178.
270. ibid.





the rich. But I do not want to go any further into the details of Hobbes’ conception of 
taxation and its consequences for tax policy (which lead him to advocate a 
consumption tax).275 What interests me here is showing how in Hobbes’ theory taxes 
are justified as the best means for obtaining public revenue in order to finance public 
expenditure.
We find the same instrumental justification of taxation in Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Government. Taxes are to be paid so that the government can protect 
individuals’ natural rights: ‘every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should 
pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it’.276 There are, of course, 
differences in the ways in which Hobbes and Locke justify the contractarian state as a 
way to leave the state of nature. Relative to the topics discussed herein, these 
differences have their consequences for the justification and protection of natural 
rights. However, beyond these differences both defend an instrumental justification of 
taxation.
Beyond the historical examples in Hobbes and Locke’s contractarian theories, 
the instrumental justification of taxation is still the main justification for taxes. It 
persists in theories of public finance and in recent theories of justice. The language has 
changed, but taxes continue to be understood primarily as instruments of revenue and 
public expenditure. They are the mechanism according to which individuals 
contribute to the financing of public goods.277
The key question that public finance theorists try to answer is how to bring 
together the public and private economies. In particular, how should the cost of public 
expenditure be distributed among individuals?278 Indeed, there are many different 
approaches to providing an answer to it. Some argue that the cost should be 
distributed as if it were a price in a private market,279 while others state that different 
275. ibid, 207–208.
276. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch11, § 139.
277. Of course, this does not mean that all these theories agree on the level of public expenditure or the 
level at which the public-private distribution of goods should be established. But this is a different 
discussion. More or less with public expenditure, and more or less with redistribution, the 
justification for taxation is still an instrumental one. vid infra, Ch3, 123ff.
278. Musgrave and Peacock, “Introduction”, ix and Ritschl, “Communal economy and market 
economy”, 240.
279. Sax, “The valuation theory of taxation”, 187.
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principles should be applied at the same time, that is, those of finances, economics, 
justice and administration, as a ‘standard for the tax system’280 since it has, ‘besides its 
“purely financial”, immediate purpose [...] a second purpose, which belongs to the 
realm of social policy’.281 But again, even if public finance theorists recognise that 
taxation may have secondary purposes or purposes different from those that are ‘purely 
financial’, these are consequences or effects of the instrumental conception of tax law. 
They do not stand as core arguments for taxation, but as the more or less acceptable 
consequences of decisions concerning the finances of public expenditure. This debate 
in public finance represents an antecedent for the discussion about the determination 
of the principles of justice that should guide the contribution of each citizen; I will 
return to this later in the chapter.282 Perhaps the best summary of the public finance 
approach to taxation is to be found in Knut Wicksell’s concise statement: taxes should 
be ‘regarded as what they really should be [...] means to procure the community as a 
whole and to each of its classes particular benefits which could not be obtained in 
other ways’.283
It should not come as a surprise then, that in the contemporary debate 
concerning political philosophy, as contained in the theories of justice advocated by 
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia, we find 
different versions of the instrumental justification of taxes. This is not the same as 
saying that they have the same taxation policies, because they do not. But even if they 
disagree as to the extent and justification of taxation – Rawls justifies more 
redistribution than that which Nozick would accept as the necessary justified 
redistribution of the minimal state – both understand taxes as economic instruments.
Rawls’ instrumental justification of taxation is one according to which taxes 
form background institutions for his conception of distributive justice. Not wanting to 
go deeper into Rawls’ theory of distributive justice,284 here it is suffice to say that he 
assigns to taxes two functions a corrective and a purely redistributive one.285 According 
280. Wagner, “Three extracts on public finance”, 10–12.
281. ibid, 8. [Emphasis added].
282. vid infra, 85.
283. Wicksell, “A new principle of just taxation”, 97. [Emphasis added].
284. For a detailed discussion, vid infra, 131.
285. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
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to his categorisation of state activities, he considers that taxation is a good instrument 
for correct market distributions aiming to achieve efficiency (in what he calls the 
‘allocative’ branch of government). Furthermore, they are the best mechanism for 
achieving a certain justice in distributive shares within society (according to the 
‘distribution’ branch of government) by correcting distribution and by raising the 
revenue required to develop exactly that which justice requires.286 Perhaps what makes 
Rawls’ instrumental approach to taxation more clear is the fact that he considers that 
in a well-ordered society the exclusive function of taxes is to obtain revenue.287 Thus, 
even if Rawls states that decisions on different tax policies are not part of a theory of 
justice, but instead they are questions of political judgement, he has a very clear idea 
that at the level of the theory of justice taxes are economic instruments.
The same can be said when analysing Nozick’s theory of justice. So much so 
that, for Nozick, taxes are payments for funding the activities assigned by individuals to 
the minimal state. This is important because the justification of taxes as instruments of 
revenue and public expenditure is a common understanding for all theories of justice, 
independent of the level of redistribution or the property regime they advocate. The 
difference is that those who defend the minimal state will only accept the level of 
redistribution that is morally justified for the defence of the natural rights of 
individuals, while those who advocate for more redistribution will look for more 
revenue.
Another example of how the instrumental justification of taxes has permeated 
all possible arguments in favour of taxes can be found in Holmes and Sunstein’s The 
Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes. Holmes and Sunstein argue that every 
right (negative or positive) implies that the state should invest some money in their 
protection; or, as they put it, ‘rights cost money’.288 Therefore, every right is a positive 
right if it requires some action from someone for its protection and enforceability.289 
The argument, then, is that taxes are needed to cover the expenses that this protection 
of rights implies. Hence, taxes are the instruments for protecting and financing rights. 
In other words, without taxes there would be no individual rights. This argument does 
286. ibid, 245–246.
287. ibid, 246.
288. Holmes and Sunstein, The Cost of Rights. Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, 15.
289. ibid, Ch1.
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not transform taxes in prices, they say, because what are being financed are public 
goods, that is, rights.290 But my argument is not that prices only are instruments for 
obtaining a good produced by someone else. The argument is that taxes are justified 
and legitimised because of what can be done with revenue, and one possible use that 
might be given to revenue is that of financing rights. So, even if taxes can be related to 
the existence and enforceability of rights then the kind of argument defended by 
Holmes and Sunstein is an economical one, according to which taxes are the means 
for achieving a particular end.291
I think that I have provided enough arguments and examples to make my 
point that the main justification, which is understood as legitimising taxation,292 is that 
taxes are instruments of revenue for funding public expenditure. In what follows, I 
analyse the final element of the classical paradigm of tax law: the function and content 
of principles of justice in taxation.
3.4. Principles of justice in taxation
Few things could be discussed from such different perspectives as those regarding 
principles of justice in general. The debate about principles of justice in tax matters is 
no different. This is one of the features that explains the complexity of this topic in 
taxation. This complexity increases even further as the debate surrounding tax issues 
normally brings together ethical, economic and political factors. The traditional 
approach – as we have seen in the analysis of the classical paradigm of tax law – 
understands that taxes are economic means for the realisation of the ends of the state 
according to a certain conception of man. Within this tradition the debate about 
principles of justice in taxation implies a determination of the criteria that explain 
these relations and an emphasis upon these different factors. So justice in taxation 
supposes the determination of the principles according to which the burden of 
taxation is to be distributed among members of a political society.
290. ibid, 48.
291. As I argue infra Ch3, 123ff, this intention of maintaining the distinction between taxes and 
payments does not obtain when there exists a price for the public provision of certain goods, as 
argued by Dworkin in Sovereign Virtue.
292. For an argument in which this problem (the justification of taxes as a means for economic ends) is 
mainly posed in the language of legitimacy, vid, Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a 
new political debate, Ch4. I will come back to Dworkin’s arguments on taxation infra, 135ff.
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An alternative for those who have an interest in dealing with this issue is to 
face the complexity of categorising the relations between these different approaches in 
order to decide which, if any, have a prevalent role.293 Under this approach, and as 
developed for example by Stephen Francis Weston, the determination of the principles 
of justice would follow the determination of that order.294 This means that the 
different principles within each area should be ranked according to this relevance 
grading (so first, principles of justice, and then economic and political principles). But 
this procedure has an important caveat: it requires that at least an idea of what taxes are 
exists and, even more so, that a definition of taxes exists.295 This would not be a 
problem if we were trying to determine what the principles of justice that justify taxes, 
as we know them, are – and this Weston is not trying to do. Yet this begs the important 
question that the debate about principles of justice in taxation should help us to solve: 
how to determine the form that taxation should adopt? So, if I may state this in other 
terms, the debate about principles of justice in taxation should suspend our knowledge 
of tax law and tax policy as we know them in order to help us in our debate about the 
grounding ideas of taxation, that is to say, of the conditions that would explain and 
justify the form of tax law and particular taxes.
There is another problem in this debate that is similar to the one identified 
above in Weston’s analysis and which plays a very important role in Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel’s arguments. According to Murphy and Nagel, the traditional approach 
to this debate has two problems: (i) it is myopic and, (ii) it assumes a certain 
‘“everyday” libertarianism’.296 What they mean is that there are certain assumptions 
within the traditional debate that have not been questioned and that hinder the debate 
concerning justice in taxation. If, in the case of  Weston, the problem is that he 
assumes a particular definition of taxes according to their valid legal form, Murphy 
and Nagel identify moral and political assumptions in the traditional debate about 
principles of justice in taxation. They show, for example, that the traditional criteria of 
vertical equity are myopic because they assume that the debate in tax justice is an 
293. For example, this is suggested by Weston in Principles of Justice in Taxation, passim. He argues that the 
ethical aspect of taxation should be prevalent because taxes’ ends are dependent on a conception of 
the state and the individual. But his argument is not clear as he always insists on the inseparable 
importance and relations of the three aspects mentioned, vid ibid, Ch2, 69-72.
294. ibid
295. ibid, 43–54.
296. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 14–15 and passim.
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isolated political issue.297 On the contrary, Murphy and Nagel advocate a whole view 
of the picture. One of the main arguments they develop in their book is that ‘justice in 
taxation cannot be determined without considering how government allocates its 
resources’.298 The second problem that they identify also has consequences for this 
debate. The traditional criteria of vertical (and hence horizontal) equity implicitly 
assume that taxation changes what is originally a fair distribution of property rights 
according to a ‘laissez-faire capitalist market economy’. The problem then is that the 
distribution of property that is the result of market exchange becomes the baseline 
from which the ‘fair sharing out of tax burdens [is] assessed’.299 Murphy and Nagel 
advocate a comprehensive debate: justice in taxation cannot be understood separately 
from or independent of a theory of justice in which private property is not a natural 
right but a social convention. I devote some time to a critical debate of their ideas 
below in chapter three.
These two criticisms are difficult to answer by those who defend the 
traditional approach to the debate on justice in taxation and I do not know of any 
attempt to answer it so far. Therefore, in my understanding there is no point in 
progressing deeper into an analysis of the particular principles of tax justice that have 
been defended within the classical paradigm by several authors for the purposes of the 
argument that I am trying to develop here.300 For the point that I am trying to make it 
is suffice to say that there is another way of approaching the debate. The ideas 
surrounding the debate on the principles of justice in taxation can be distinguished 
from a different perspective. Therefore, I will attempt to distinguish, in the debate to 
which I have been referring, two different approaches: the first being inductive and 
the second being a descriptive process for identifying the principles of tax law within a 
valid legal system. I will call the first kinds of principles aspirational or ideal principles, 
297. Traditional criteria for tax equity assume that in determining how the burden of taxation will be 
distributed it is important to distinguish between those who are in different position (vertical 
equity) and those who are in the same position (horizontal equity).
298. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 14 and passim.
299. ibid. I believe that Murphy and Nagel’s reference to a ‘laissez-faire capitalist market economy’ is a 
too much of a demanding requirement. I would say that it is suffice to state in this regard that this 
is the assumption of anyone who starts from any economy based on the market system and what it 
implies. For the market system economy and its requirements see, Lindblom, The Market System. 
What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It.
300. Details can be found in Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, Chs2 and 3, or 
in Weston, Principles of Justice in Taxation, passim.
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and the second the legal principles of tax law. In the former, all principles that aspire to 
define the tax system according to a particular political ideal are included. In the latter, 
all those principles that can be deduced from existing tax systems that are usually used 
by legal actors (judges, practitioners and legal academics) are included. Both kinds of 
principle are understood to have a normative force, that is, they work as standards. 
However, the normative force of legal principles has, regretfully, been understood as 
independent and beyond the debate concerning aspirational principles; it is as if there 
is just one conception of taxes and tax law possible, that is, the one that logically 
follows from the classical paradigm of tax law that I analyse in the next section. If the 
aspirational approach characterises the Anglo-American debate, then the legal one is 
characteristic of the Continental legal tradition.
The Continental legal tradition’s approach to the legal principles of tax justice 
is particularly problematic when trying to argue in favour of or against different 
criteria of justice in taxation as it leaves no space for debate. Its consequences have 
been perverse for the consolidation of the idea that taxes affect property and liberty. 
Their main effect has been to reinforce the now common-sense idea that the only 
concept of taxes is that which is founded upon the classical paradigm. This conclusion 
can be obtained from the influence and importance given to the principle of legality 
over the principle of equality.301 According to the interpretation given to the first of 
these principles, the requirement of legality has been understood as a limitation on the 
taxing power of the state and as stringent as the principle of legality as applied to 
criminal law. This means that taxes cannot be established if not established by law and 
that the law should fully specify all the conditions that make taxes applicable. The 
democratic interpretation, in which the principle of legality implies that the law 
according to which a tax is created is our law and not imposed upon us, is not 
normally applied in tax matters. At the same time, the principle of equality has been 
completely subordinated to the principle of legality; equality does not go much 
further than formal equality before the law (even if constitutions such as those of 
Spain and Italy can be read as including substantive views of equality in tax law).
301. For a general introduction to the common principles of constitutional tax law, vid Uckmar, 
Principios Comunes del Derecho Constitucional Tributario. vid also, Menéndez, Justifying Taxes. Some 
Elements for a General Theory of Democratic Tax Law, Ch8.
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To summarise, aspirational and legal principles of justice in taxation have been 
understood as broader rules of thumb within the different elements of the classical 
paradigm of tax law. In the following section I analyse the legal form adopted by the 
classical paradigm of tax law, that is, what I call the contemporary general theory of tax law.
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4. THE CONTEMPORARY GENERAL THEORY OF TAX LAW
So far, I have analysed the elements of what I have called the classical paradigm of tax 
law. According to the characterisation of the classical paradigm that I delineate herein 
there are four elements that underlie our contemporary understanding of taxation. 
These elements are: (i) a conception of the individual as a pure rationaliser, (ii) a 
conception of private property as a natural right, (iii) a conception of taxes as 
instruments of revenue and public expenditure and, (iv) blindness to the aspirational 
principles of justice in taxation that justify the tax system. But how do all these 
elements relate to tax law? The answer to this question can be found in the 
contemporary general theory of tax law. Or, put in other terms, the contemporary 
general theory of tax law is the legal form that the elements of the classical paradigm 
have adopted over time. The contemporary general theory of tax law tries to explain 
the nature and structure of the legal obligation to pay taxes that each individual 
taxpayer has. It is not an explanation of the different tax policies that a particular 
government may adopt over time; that is the job of political philosophy or of an 
economic theory of taxation. Here, I am not interested in this justificatory or policy 
discussion. What interests me is explaining the contemporary general theory of tax law, 
its presuppositions, structure and the way in which it explains the legal obligation to 
pay taxes. My argument aims to show that the legal form adopted by tax law is one of 
the main reasons why tax avoidance is problematic. Tax avoidance is invisible for the 
contemporary general theory of tax law. This will clarify my statement that all the 
alternatives that try to solve tax avoidance are doomed to failure as long as they 
continue to work within the classical paradigm of tax law and its legal expression.302 
The argument within this section is the last one to show the limitations of available 
tax law theories and, therefore, the last before my starting to build a new paradigm of 
tax law better able to give legal form to the duty to pay taxes.
4.1. The duty to pay taxes
302. For a particular analysis of the different attempts made to solve tax avoidance vid supra, 38.
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There is a trivial sense in which the duty to pay taxes depends on the existence of a 
legal norm that specifies the conditions under which a particular taxpayer (T) is under 
the obligation to pay a certain tax (P). This triviality comes from the fact that even if 
there are good reasons for justifying taxes as an institution, these reasons are not 
enough to determine why T has to pay P. As we have seen so far, there may be good 
instrumental reasons for the state to set up a system of taxes and, even more so, there 
may be good political reasons or an accepted theory of distributive justice that justifies 
a particular policy or distribution of taxes. For example, within the classical paradigm 
of tax law, a government may decide that the best way to finance a national health 
system is through redistributive progressive income tax. Let us assume that in abstract 
terms there are good reasons for individuals to accept this redistributive progressive 
income tax; the system has a clear financial scheme. Let us also assume that they all 
accept that a universal health system should be paid by and for all in a redistributive 
manner. Yet who is going to pay how much? How are we going to determine the way 
in which T has to pay P? This is where tax law comes to the fore.
I am not interested here in determining the sorts of reasons that an authority 
may give or hold in consideration when establishing a legal duty to pay taxes, as would 
be the case with Joseph Raz’s dependence thesis, for example.303 Neither am I 
concerned with the moral reasons that may justify the (moral) obligation to pay taxes 
but that require or depend on the legal structure to become proper duties, as Tony 
Honoré argues.304 No doubt these are all very interesting and important aspects of the 
legal duty to pay taxes. However, what interests me here is what the previously made 
trivial point implies and what it does not imply. To make this point clear I distinguish 
between a thin and a thick understanding of how the law makes possible the legal 
duty to pay taxes. According to the thin interpretation of this relationship, there is a 
necessary dependency of morality or political reason in law. There are many political 
or moral ideals that are too abstract to have consequences in practical reason or to 
coordinate our conduct in complex social enterprises (as is the case with taxation).305 
Applying these ideas to tax law, the conclusion is that without legal determination 
there is no duty to pay taxes. A thick interpretation would reach the same conclusion 
303. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 47.
304. vid, Honoré, “The dependence of morality on law”.
305. vid, Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Honoré, “The dependence of morality on law”; and, Menéndez, 
Justifying Taxes. Some Elements for a General Theory of Democratic Tax Law, 120ff, particularly 126–127.
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but through more demanding requirements. It would require a stronger legal 
specification of all the elements that would permit us to determine in detail how 
much and under what conditions T has to pay P. In the absence of any of these 
elements, or where clarity in the terms used in the law is absent, those who defend the 
thick interpretation will conclude that T has no obligation at all (not that T has to not 
pay P).
The thinner interpretation shows that there can be no duty without law; the 
thicker, that there is no duty if the law does not fully and clearly establish how much P 
has to be paid by T under conditions C. As may be clear because of the analysis 
developed so far (in Ch1 and the previous sections of this chapter) the thick 
interpretation prevails within the classical paradigm of tax law. This explains, as stated 
above,306 that tax avoidance is considered either a moral problem or a problem of poor 
drafting; if T is not under C then he has no obligation P. But the problem with tax 
avoidance is that T organises his business so that he decides not to be under C in order 
to not have obligation P. So now we cannot distinguish between P or ¬P according to 
the law, but rather it is T who decides when he is under P because he decided to C.307 
As stated before, we are in this situation because of the particular way in which the 
classical paradigm of tax law has influenced the legal form of tax law, in particular, 
because of the way in which the obligation to pay taxes has been transformed into a 
duty (as in the thin interpretation). In what follows, I analyse the elements of the 
contemporary general theory of tax law.
4.2. The contemporary general theory of tax law
The general theory of tax law specifies the conditions and elements according to 
which the state imposes the duty to pay taxes on individual taxpayers; because of this it 
has both normative and descriptive elements. The normative elements derive from the 
fact that the decisions adopted in order to give form to the duty to pay will determine 
the way in which individuals should behave. It also has descriptive elements because it 
constitutes an account of those elements of the classical paradigm analysed earlier in 
this chapter. The generality of the theory comes from the fact that it does not refer to 
306. vid supra, 26ff.
307. I will come back to this later when discussing Judith Freedman’s argument for ‘principles-based 
legislation’ in tax law. She defends the thick interpretation and so she considers that there is no 
duty to P in cases where T is not clearly under C. vid infra, 98.
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any tax in particular, but to those conditions that explain the duty to pay and which 
are common to different taxes. So, for example, beyond the differences between 
income tax and VAT regarding the particularities of the tax base, the person 
responsible for the payment of the tax, the tax rate and so on, both kinds of tax share 
these categories as elements that may explain the duty to pay taxes. In more abstract 
terms, the general theory of tax law sets up the legal conditions under which the state 
can impose a duty on individuals.
Contrary to the situation for the Continental tradition, there is not much 
literature available on this topic in relation to the Anglo-American situation. The latter 
mainly focuses on the debate concerning aspirational principles of justice, while it 
leaves the specification of these principles to the courts. The former has dedicated 
some time to the debate, particularly when taxes were initially instituted (or given 
legal form). Today, all of the work has been left to economists who, based on purely 
instrumental arguments for tax law, use ‘rules’ to apply their policies but cannot see 
what the importance of institutionalisation through law is. The original debate was, or 
at least had to be, more sophisticated since new institutions were being created. These 
introductory notes are helpful in explaining why in the analysis that follows I focus 
chiefly on the Continental approach.
4.3. The legal relationship between the state and the taxpayer
The legal duty to pay taxes has a correlative right, namely, the state's enforceable right 
to claim for the payment of the tax. This relationship between the state and the 
taxpayer locates the tax duty in a statesructure in which there is a legal relationship 
under the logic of public law. According to the contemporary general theory of tax 
law, in this legal relationship the taxable event represents the will of the state. The 
taxable event (TE) contains the description of the relevant facts and operative 
conditions (C) according to which the taxpayer (T) will have a determinate legal 
obligation to pay (P) a certain amount of tax. This is the way in which the duty to P 
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by T, referred to above, is expressed and specified in tax law.308 Therefore, P becomes a 
duty in relation to T only once C gives way to TE.309
The particularities of each of these elements, and the way in which they relate 
to one another, varies depending on the justification of the obligation to pay taxes. 
Indeed, some authors assign more or less relevance to the fact that it is an obligation 
funded in solidarity, or that it is merely an instrumental obligation. Therefore, the 
specification of the TE may strongly depend on the economic expression of a 
particular principle of justice in taxation,310 or in its legal form since the TE will only 
be able to detect legal structures of private law.311 Certainly, this has important 
consequences for a theory of legal reasoning in tax matters. In the former case a 
substantive interpretation of tax law based on economic criteria will be acceptable. In 
the latter, the TE and P will depend heavily on the options taken by a prospective T 
under the conditions of private law. Once the conditions of TE correspond in a 
particular case, T will be under P. T will then become a ‘debtor’ of the state, which in 
turn becomes a ‘creditor’.312 This explains the way in which the substantive elements 
that protect the individual from arbitrary actions by the state have a legal form. The 
state’s claim to be able to demand P is subordinated to the law (and, therefore, to the 
principles of legality or the rule of law).313 So the tax law relationship is given an 
equivalent form to the obligations of private law. The important difference, however, is 
that in tax law the will of the individual is, in principle, irrelevant. If in private law the 
terms, conditions and content of the obligation is left to the parts engaging in that 
legal relation, this does not happen in tax law. In tax law the source of the duty is the 
law and in it we find the content and particular terms of the duty.
308. For a description of how different substantive elements may be taken into consideration in this 
process vid, Menéndez, Justifying Taxes. Some Elements for a General Theory of Democratic Tax Law, 127–
132.
309. According to Hensel, the legal duty to pay taxes is ‘born with the realisation of the taxable event’ 
Derecho Tributario, 154.
310. vid, Jarach, El Hecho Imponible. Teoría General del Derecho Tributario Sustantivo, 91–103.
311. vid, Taveira Torres, Derecho Tributario y Derecho Privado. Autonomía Privada, Simulación y Elusión 
Tributaria, Ch3.
312. Hensel, Derecho Tributario, 153.
313. vid, ibid, 85, 137ff. The way in which the administration executes this claim is not our concern here. 
According to the contemporary general theory of tax law this is the work of administrative tax 
law.
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But even when a T is under P according to TE, we still need an objective 
criterion according to which the amount of P is determined. This is the function of 
the tax base (TB). The determination of the TB is also dependent on the substantive 
elements of the tax, for example, if the tax is either progressive or calculated on certain 
quantitative measures in light of a particular principle of justice in taxation.
To summarise, the elements of the contemporary general theory of tax law are: 
an active (the state) and a passive subject (the taxpayer), the taxable event and the tax 
base.314 Therefore, a person (A) will become T if some juridical acts can be subsumed 
under TE. The amount of P that T will have a duty to discharge is determined 
according to TB.
There have been many attempts made to explain that the source of the legal 
tax relation is the law. Some argue that the state’s right to tax is based on its sovereign 
power. From this perspective, tax law is part of administrative law and this implies that 
the state can demand the payment of taxes from individuals according to its needs. The 
legal tax relation is, in this case, an abstract relation according to which citizens have a 
duty to contribute according to what the administrative officials determine. Others 
argue that the power to tax derives from the law, normally at the constitutional level. 
This power entitles the state to create the laws according to which it exercises tax. 
Only when the conditions established in that law are fulfilled is the state entitled to 
demand the payment of the tax. The latter has been the majoritarian position in the 
literature and is the one that predominates today. It is said that the structure of legal 
tax relations is not different from private law relations. Indeed, it is said that the only 
way in which the tax duty in itself (that is, independent from other formal or 
administrative duties) can be correctly explained is according to the structure of 
private law obligations. The only difference is that the public character of the 
obligation is given because one of the parts involved is the state and because it is 
destined to satisfy public needs. One of the main arguments given by the advocates of 
this position is that the duty to P is a personal relationship between the taxpayer and 
the state.315
314. vid, Jarach, El Hecho Imponible. Teoría General del Derecho Tributario Sustantivo, 65–72.
315. For details of the different positions and the defence of the private law relations structure as 
equivalent to the tax law relations structure, vid ibid, 47–63.
96
This reading of tax law relations is reinforced by the interpretation given to 
the principle of legality in tax matters. This principle is understood as an argument for 
the justification of the structure of a tax law’s legal relations as equivalent to a private 
law relation. Through the application of this principle the administration cannot 
demand P from T whenever it pleases. It is only according to substantive law that P 
can be demanded from someone. From this requirement derives another substantive 
one. If it is only according to the law that someone can have a duty to P, then the law 
must clearly specify all the conditions of the legal relations (T, TE and TB). In this 
sense, it is said that the principle of legality in tax matters is equivalent to the principle 
of legality in criminal law: ‘nullum tributum sine lege’. According to this requirement, 
there ‘must be a corpus of legal norms destined to foresee the facts that give origin to 
tax duties and the amount and the subjects under that duty’.316
So a correspondence exists between the structure of tax law relations and the 
structure of private law obligations and criminal law. This is no doubt problematic and, 
as I have argued, this is one of the reasons why tax law is not able to solve or to grasp 
what tax avoidance is. If the structure of tax law is understood to be equivalent to 
private law relations, then there are evidently some problems. In what sense can we say 
that there is a relationship between the moral obligation and the legal duty to pay 
taxes as required by the trivial demand (or the thin interpretation according to which 
morality depends on law)? It seems to be that the duty to pay taxes according to the 
contemporary general theory of tax law is completely separate from the moral 
obligation at the level of the structure of the law. I am not arguing that this split exists 
at the justificatory level because there is an attempt to make the ends of tax law and its 
structure coherent, but this is not successfully reflected at the structural level. 
Something is lost when we give the obligation to pay taxes the same structure as that 
of private law relations. We win a certain level of democratic participation, so to speak, 
because it is assumed that the individual is not under any duty unless this is established 
according to the law. But this is also achieved by the trivial requirement of the duty to 
pay taxes to be established by law (as defined before). It seems as if the only way in 
which the will of the individual is represented is as that of a contractor. Would it be 
better to recognise that in public law the individual’s will concurs with the law 
316. ibid, 27. [Personal translation].
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through law creation processes in which the individual takes parts as a citizen?317 This 
problem only increases once the principle of legality in tax law is interpreted as 
equivalent to the (allegedly heuristic) criminal law interpretation of it. Why should tax 
law require the same level of detail and specification as criminal law? Is it that paying 
tax should be equivalent to the imposition of a sanction? However, if this is the case 
then which conduct is to be prohibited?318 And which goods are we protecting from 
the infliction of a sanction? (Freedom and private property?) Of course, there is a 
sense in which certainty is required so that people can decide and organise their lives 
in advance. Yet is it not enough for someone to know that he will have to pay, at the 
end of a period, a certain amount of tax that will be determined according to certain 
formula? Do we need a high level of specification such as that for each TE the 
moment at which the duty is born is detailed and previously determined?319
The worst problem with the combination of these two approaches is that we 
have been left with a formalistic interpretation of tax law that goes along with the 
contemporary general theory of tax law. Indeed, we have already seen the problems 
that derive from substantive intents to overcome it.320 For the issue that I am dealing 
with here, the problems and limitations of the contemporary general theory of tax law 
are crucial. This shows how tax law is unable to comprehend tax avoidance because 
there is not any legal structure that demands the fulfilment of a moral or political 
obligation to pay taxes.321 
Let me summarise the argument and provide some conclusions for this part of 
the thesis. In spite of a majoritarian adherence to a traditional understanding of the 
contemporary general theory, we should do away with this because it lacks explicatory 
force. If we apply it then we will have trouble understanding some of the most 
relevant characteristics of tax law as a particular area of law. Furthermore, we will not 
be able to explain one of its main problems, namely tax avoidance. The legal structure 
given to the contemporary general theory of tax law renders incoherent the legal duty 
317. vid infra, 220.
318. ‘A punishment for a crime, such as a fine, is not the same as a tax on a course of conduct, though 
both involve directions to officials to inflict the same money loss’ (Hart, The Concept of Law, 39). vid 
also, Feinberg, “The expressive function of punishment”, 96–98.
319. vid, Fuller, The Morality of Law, 59–62.
320. vid supra, 34ff.
321. Here I am not defending any political or moral justification for this obligation, but vid infra, 167ff.
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to pay taxes with the justification for the obligation to pay taxes, as well as with the 
substantive elements that inform it. In other words, something is lost if we understand 
that the taxpayer as a debtor of the state (and it is not difficult to concede to Nozick’s 
argument against taxation, namely that it is forced labour). The only way out that gives 
a lot of leeway to tax avoidance is to assume that the legal duty to pay taxes depends 
on the citizen’s will to become a taxpayer (debtor) under the conditions of the TE 
(which becomes the terms of the contract). All these lead us to the conclusion that the 
contemporary general theory of tax law is the reflection or embodiment of the 
elements of the classical paradigm of tax law. In this sense, the individualistic 
comprehension of life and the respect of private property as a natural right explains 
the duty to pay taxes and its limitations. In other words, the legal structure of tax law 
(and its underlying political and moral justifications) has not been updated to 
accommodate contemporary political and moral demands. Thus, we lack a true 
contemporary general theory of tax law. The contemporary general theory of tax law 
is directed mainly toward creating the largest possible space for strategic behaviour, 
thus allowing individuals to reach their ends regardless of the interests of the political 
community.
But before starting the argument for the new general theory of tax law I will 
revise a recent alternative suggested by Judith Freedman, namely principles-based 
legislation. We have had to wait until this moment for this analysis because only now 
do we have enough elements for a proper analysis of it as an alternative. However, I 
can already advance to my conclusion: this alternative cannot solve the problems that 
it aims to because there is not any relationship between its justification and its legal 
structure.
4.4. An alternative? Freedman's principles-based legislation
So far we have seen the difficulties involved in defining and understanding tax 
avoidance within the structure of the contemporary general theory of tax law. The 
main argument I have been trying to develop so far is that this difficulty is a 
consequence of the classical paradigm of tax law. To be more precise, the argument 
asserts that no solution for tax avoidance can be found within the contemporary 
general theory as it both derives from and is based on the classical paradigm of tax law. 
However, as explained above, when analysing possible solutions to tax avoidance there 
99
is one proposal that should be analysed in detail since it seems to provide a feasible 
alternative to the contemporary general theory of tax law.322 This alternative is Judith 
Freedman’s principles-based legislation (PBL). As I argue here,323 Freedman’s PBL is 
not an alternative to the contemporary general theory of tax law because it is still 
based on the classical paradigm. In this sense, it is not possible to adopt the legal form 
of PBL if the classical paradigm is its underlying substance. If my argument is correct 
then two conclusions will follow: (i) there is a relationship of dependency between the 
contemporary general theory of tax law and the classical paradigm, and (ii) we cannot 
solve the problems of the first without addressing the content of the second. By the 
end of this chapter, and once Freedman’s PBL has been abandoned, the field will be 
settled in order for me to start building a new alternative to the classical paradigm of 
taxes and its related contemporary general theory of tax law; one in which a solution 
to tax avoidance may be found.
4.4.1. Principles-based legislation and tax avoidance
Freedman’s version of PBL presents an alternative theory of tax legislation thought to 
better grasp legislative intent in tax law.324 PBL is based on the idea that there is a 
difference between legislative intent and the abstract notion of the ‘will of the law’. 
The difference is that the former is part of the law dictated by parliament while the 
latter is imposed on the law from ‘outside’, thus going beyond what parliament has 
established in the law. According to Freedman, this distinction is easily forgotten; yet its 
importance cannot be disregarded so easily since in tax legislation there is always a 
tension or ‘clash between economic substance and legal reality’.325 This tension is the 
element that requires the legislature to better express its intention. Therefore, following 
Freedman, whatever the intention of parliament is – focusing on economic substance 
or legal concepts – it has to be clearly established. Or, if this is not possible, they (the 
legislators) should bear this in mind and provide courts with the proper guidance for 
implementing their intention (whatever its content).
322. vid supra, 48.
323. vid infra, 104.
324. According to Freedman, her conception of PBL derives from the work of John Avery Jones “Tax 
law: rules or principles?” and Greg Pinder’s work for the Australian Taxation office. vid, Freedman, 
“Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 725.
325. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 73.
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The approach in PBL seems to provide a good answer to one of the main 
problems faced by those who defend substantive interpretations in tax law, that is, how 
to determine the intention of the legislator. This is especially important for those who 
are concerned with respecting formal and substantive values associated with law, such 
as democracy, the rule of law and the separation of powers,326 while also interpreting 
tax law beyond mere literalism. From this perspective the question to be addressed is 
how judges should apply the law while respecting the intentions of parliament. There 
are, therefore, two different areas that PBL tries to cover: (i) providing a clear criterion 
for the determination of the intention of parliament in tax law, and (ii) creating a 
guideline for judges, which aims to identify and apply that intention. 
Before moving deeper into PBL, we should remember that what explains the 
importance given to the determination of parliament’s intention is its relevance to (the 
definition or solution for) tax avoidance. The underlying premise under the assertion 
according to which tax avoidance is legal – that is, the one defended within the 
classical paradigm – is that the letter of tax law statutes does not consider certain acts 
(those that form part of the avoidance scheme) as part of taxable events. On the 
contrary, those who defend a substantive interpretation of tax law will try to show that 
those same acts should be taxable according to the intention of parliament. Thus, tax 
avoidance can be problematic only once the legislator’s intention is clearly established. 
Only then can tax avoidance be considered as resting ‘outside’ of the law or closer to 
illegal acts. The expectation is that we will have a clearer idea as to which activities 
carry a tax and who is responsible for its payment only once we know the legislator’s 
intention. Before this (here Freedman would say following Honoré) there is not any 
duty to pay taxes since tax law obligations are not moral obligations.327 In the same 
way, so long as taxpayers do not go against the legislator’s intention then the way in 
which they organise their business – even if exclusively for the purpose of reducing 
their taxes – should be irrelevant. We have already seen above that the judicial and 
legislative alternatives developed to make this approach operative have failed to 
achieve any success in identifying legislative intent and stopping tax avoidance.328 
Moreover, Freedman has argued that so long as ‘transactions are successfully structured 
326. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 717.
327. vid, Honoré, “The dependence of morality on law”.
328. vid supra, 26ff for the definition, problems and possible solutions to tax avoidance.
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to avoid a tax’ then tax avoidance is nothing but ‘a contradiction in terms’.329 This is 
because ‘any scheme that is held by the supreme tribunal to be effective is, by 
definition, not avoidance’.330
As proposed by Freedman, PBL seems to be a good alternative for solving this 
conundrum from the various new approaches that have been explored.331 It appears to 
be the best since it directly aims at making explicit legislative intent by asking the 
legislature to better express its intention (whatever it may be), that is to say, leading 
either to economic substance or legal reality.332 Freedman also suggests that if there is 
no clear intention in tax law, then the legislature should acknowledge this decision and 
provide the courts with the proper guidance for implementing that will. As this might 
be a paradigmatic case, since parliament may not have any clarity on policy or because 
a particular policy might be argued on different grounds, or even because particular 
cases might be problematic due to not having been thought of in advance,333 
Freedman argues in favour of a new kind of tax legislation in which rules are replaced 
by principles. One particular example of this kind of legislation is a general anti-
avoidance principle (GANTIP).334 But this is not enough. The general argument is 
that any particular principle should be accompanied by ‘more detailed drafting but 
policy-based, principles-based drafting’.335 If this is the kind of tax legislation created 
by parliament, Freedman argues, purposive interpretation by the courts would not 
create ‘new’ laws beyond the intention of parliament, but would only be a concreting 
of that intention.
Once PBL is adopted, that which changes is the way in which the legislature 
expresses its will. It goes from a detailed and ‘rule like’ expression to a ‘principles’ one. 
This principles expression would permit legislators to make sure that its ends are 
329. Hoffmann, “Tax avoidance”, 203, quoted in Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and 
the intention of Parliament”, 71.
330. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 71.
331. vid supra, 34ff.
332. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 73.
333. This is similar to what Hart calls the open texture of law, particularly what he says about legislation 
through general norms, vid Hart, The Concept of Law, 128–130.
334. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 74.
335. ibid.
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achieved and, at the same time, that courts have some leeway in order to overcome the 
problems presented by the particular cases in question. In Freedman’s words,
[P]arliamentary intention can [...] be expressed at a number of 
levels. A general anti-avoidance principle or set of principles 
could set out references to economic substance, to the manner 
of creation and implementation of the scheme in question and 
to other objective factors that would reveal the motive for the 
scheme and whether it was consistent with the legislation.336
Under PBL, tax legislation would be structured in different layers – starting from very 
general principles, with other layers of more detailed secondary legislation being 
added as needed.337 With this kind of drafting in mind, Freedman argues, tax 
legislation would improve because legislators would have to have a very clear idea of 
the policy that they are trying to achieve in order to express it in general principles. At 
the same time, judges would not be creating policy when applying these principles; in 
this sense, PBL is different from purposive interpretation.338 The principles of PBL 
would not be ‘a broad instruction to look at whether the purpose of the legislation has 
been abused, or merely at the motive of the taxpayer’, instead they would be set so as 
to express clear ‘principles and criteria’.339 Therefore, the content of the particular 
rules of a statute would be subject to the broader purposes contained in the principles. 
Freedman is careful to argue that PBL does not imply that the obligation to pay tax 
would be justified only in morality or that this obligation ‘should be based on the 
“spirit of the law”’.340 On the contrary, if the legislature explicitly provides the 
overarching policy, the judiciary would have a clear guide for application and would 
not contravene its function.341 A particular and concrete duty to pay taxes would be 
the application of these principles to a particular case.
336. ibid, 74–75.
337. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 719.
338. ibid, 721–723.
339. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 75, 87.
340. Freedman, “A GANTIP: Was it really such a bad idea?”, 8.
341. Freedman, “Interpreting tax statutes: tax avoidance and the intention of Parliament”, 87. According 
to Freedman, the only restrictions that would apply in this case are those deriving from the 
exercise of judicial function. Parliament should not expect the courts to develop policies when 
they do not have the ability to do so. ibid, 88–89.
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A principle within PBL is to be understood as ‘a statement about the essence 
of all intended outcomes in a general field and not just a less-specific rule’.342 All this 
makes PBL different from purposive interpretation. The former implies that principles 
are operative provisions that would not contradict or go against the rules, but that they 
would make explicit their background, that is, legislative intent. On the other hand, 
the latter may produce contradictions between the rules and the purpose of the law if 
the courts interpret that the letter of the rule is not able to express (in any specific 
way) its purpose. PBL, according to Freedman, is expected to eliminate the need for 
purposive interpretation.343 In other words, Freedman’s PBL proposal implies a change 
in our understanding of tax legislation and tax avoidance: from the determination and 
identification of conduct that goes against the law to a broader structural definition of 
what is included in tax law (or for the same purpose, in the law). Therefore, PBL 
implies a change of the actual onus in tax law: from the revenue authority 
demonstrating ‘that something is included in the charging provision, to the taxpayer, 
who must now show that a case is specifically excluded’.344 So, PBL is an indirect 
solution to tax avoidance. Because it redefines the way in which the duty to pay taxes 
is determined it reduces the space open to it by the absence of law. In other words, the 
possibility of developing possible conduct that might configure cases of tax avoidance 
is limited by redefining the way in which tax law is a given form. This redefinition is a 
consequence of the way in which tax law is understood as contained in particular legal 
dispositions: because after PBL is adopted judges will have a clearer notion of those 
cases in which a particular transaction is covered by a legislator’s intent.345
Freedman’s PBL proposal is apparently promising. To summarise, she opens up 
the possibility of a new understanding of tax law in which taxpayers cannot shield 
themselves behind the letter of the law. This is achieved by modifying the structure of 
tax law, moving from ‘strict rules’ to ‘broader principles’ containing policy directives 
for the judiciary. At the same time, she seems to safeguard the traditional values 
associated with the rule of law, such as clarity, certainty and generality. Furthermore, 
she does not need to rest on moral arguments to justify the legal duty to pay taxes 





since it suffices for PBL that the legislature’s intention to do so is contained within the 
law (whichever particular structure it adopts). Her defence of PBL rests on the idea 
that so long as there is legislation, namely a universal norm containing an authoritative 
decision, a particular duty would follow by application of the norm.
However, as promising as it may seem Freedman’s proposal of PBL is 
problematic on two fronts: (i) under PBL tax law becomes a vacuum category in 
which there is no substantive content (a ‘nominal kind’), and (ii) it jeopardises the 
distinction between legislation and adjudication. The consequences of these problems 
are (a) that tax law lacks any legitimation since PBL creates a hiatus between form and 
substance, and (b) there is no tax law to be applied in a particular case but simply 
particular legislation. In other words, PBL simplifies tax law at the level that it 
becomes the command of the sovereign, just as law was understood in earlier versions 
of legal positivism as defended by Austin or Bentham. Consequently, PBL lacks 
explicatory force since it cannot explain the difference between tax law and exactions 
or punishment.346 One feature that explains the failure of PBL is that it still works 
within the classical paradigm of tax law. The way to move forward is to offer a 
substantive interpretation of taxation and only then offer the different legal forms that 
it may adopt. This will bring together form and substance in tax law by overcoming 
the problems and limitations of the different alternatives so far analysed.347 In what 
follows I provide arguments to show how Freedman’s PBL is problematic in terms of 
the two aforementioned aspects.
4.4.2. According to PBL, tax law is a nominal kind
Freedman proposes that tax law should adopt a new form, that is, move towards 
principles-based legislation rather than strict rules-based drafting. This approach to tax 
law aims to solve application problems and, in particular, tax avoidance. But applicative 
efficiency cannot be the only evaluative standard for PBL (or for any other particular 
area of law). We should also evaluate what PBL means for tax law. Does it transform its 
nature? Does it become form without substance? Should we assume that tax law is 
simply (the legislator’s) will without any particular content? What I am suggesting is 
346. Therefore, the historical evolution of tax law in political and legal terms cannot be coherently 
integrated. vid, Taylor, “Explanation and practical reason”. vid supra, fn.318.
347. vid supra, 19ff.
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that in order to evaluate PBL we should broaden the analysis to consider whether tax 
law is something more than an instrument (a legal one) for legislators’ purposes. We 
should analyse what PBL means for the nature of tax law. For this purpose I draw 
upon analytical tools from legal theory; in particular, from some conceptual elements 
surrounding the debate about the nature of law. To put it in different words, PBL 
should be evaluated under the standards set by conceptual and analytical developments 
in legal theory. Two reasons explain this decision: (a) tax law is part of the law and (b) 
what distinguishes it from other areas of law are its particular concepts and legal 
structure.348 Showing the limitations of PBL should help to achieve a proper 
understanding of what tax law is about (its substance), while at the same time it will 
show the limits of contemporary general theories of tax law. Once this work has been 
done we will be in a better position to not only look for a new form for tax law, but 
also to better grasp its substance, something I propose in the following chapters.
According to Freedman, one of the main advantages of PBL is that it is 
‘designed to eliminate the need for’ purposive interpretation.349 This is achieved by 
creating overarching principles that contain guidelines for second-tier or lower 
regulations that would make tax law gapless. Judges will not need to exercise 
discretion, in a strong sense,350 in particular cases because they will be applying the law. 
As part of PBL, principles would be operative in the sense that they give ‘the courts 
the tools they need to find the answers provided by parliament’.351 This is important 
for Freedman because she is interested in showing that PBL does not increase 
uncertainty. This is why she tries to show that the principles of PBL are different from 
Dworkin’s conception of principles.352 According to Freedman’s conception, the 
principles of PBL are: (i) not abstruse descriptions of the informative principles 
348. One of the main achievements of tax law was for it to become an autonomous area of law, that is 
to say, an area of law with its particular theories and a particular structure. For more information 
about tax law as an autonomous area of the law vid, Jarach, El Hecho Imponible. Teoría General del 
Derecho Tributario Sustantivo, passim. The problem was that this structure and conceptual 
independence failed since they were built around the classical paradigm. In other words, the 
classical paradigm was never able to overcome the limitations of a structure adopted from private 
law relations.
349. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 725.
350. For the distinction between weak and strong discretion vid, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 31–
39.
351. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 729.
352. For Dworkin’s characterisation of principles vid, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch2.
106
contained but not specified within legislation, and (ii) they are ‘not intended to imply 
any introduction of morality onto tax law’.353 Freedman argues that principles in tax 
law are there to provide the necessary context in order to avoid interpretative 
mediation.354 By providing context, and following Andrei Marmor’s ideas on legal 
interpretation, Freedman argues that principles provide certainty because participants 
will have a clear idea of what tax law is about, or at least have a clearer idea than when 
there exists too much detailed legislation. Thus, principles as ‘operative provisions’ 
should provide ‘all the intended outcomes’, thus appealing to ‘the way in which the 
tax system works’ by leaving no space for strong judicial discretion and providing 
‘legislative guidance’ to fill any gap.355 Principles should be ‘comprehensive’ and rest at 
the ‘top’ of a ‘pyramid’ structure, as if they are a statement ‘of all intended outcomes’.356 
Or, as Freedman puts it, when referring to a GANTIP as part of PBL, ‘it would be 
more than purposive interpretation because it would look beyond the language of the 
statute at the surrounding facts’.357 Therefore, ‘the judiciary could apply [the principle] 
and develop it with full legitimacy’.358 This is part of Freedman’s argument for tax 
minimisation. PBL combined with a GANTIP would contain the parameters for tax 
minimisation while administrators and courts would ‘have to flesh out the provisions 
and make them workable’. A GANTIP based on PBL would provide these institutions 
with ‘a legitimate framework within which to develop the law’.359
If we follow Freedman’s ideas then there are two possible readings of PBL.360 
According to the first, PBL might form part of a structure of delegated powers from 
legislators to judges so that the latter can create law (an idea found in Joseph Raz and 
Andrei Marmor’s work). In the second reading, PBL may represent a case of a practice 
structured on first principles (a schema similar to that which distinguishes 
353. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 729–730.
354. ibid, 730.
355. ibid, 725, 731.
356. ibid, 725. vid, Freedman, “GAAR: Challenging assumptions”, 14.
357. Freedman, “A GANTIP: Was it really such a bad idea?”, 9.
358. ibid, 10.
359. Freedman, “Is tax avoidance “fair”?”, 90. vid, Freedman, “The tax avoidance culture: Who is 
responsible? Governmental influences and corporate social responsibility”, 388.
360. There is a third alternative here that should be disregarded since Freedman disregards it herself, 
namely a Dworkinian interpretation of PBL. We should also add that the kinds of principles to 
which PBL appeals are different from those principles described supra as principles of justice in tax 
law, vid, 85.
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epistemology within MacIntyre’s reading of Aristotle and Aquinas’ conception of first 
principles).361 In what follows I develop these possible readings and show that PBL 
fails to explain tax law or justify a normative ideal for tax law.
One of the core ideas of PBL is that the judiciary should create tax law. What 
kinds of legal power do judges need for this? An important debate in legal theory 
addresses the possibility of judges creating law. Some oppose this idea because it would 
make impossible, or at least endanger, adjudication. Judges should apply the law to 
particular cases and not create universal norms when adjudicating since the latter 
approach does not consider the particular case in question in its own terms. When 
judges create laws there is the risk that they might treat persons as means and not as 
ends. This is a central issue in legal theory because it relates to identifying the law and 
its limits, thus questioning two main claims within contemporary legal positivism. 
Whenever judges have to decide a particular case and there is a gap in the law, should 
they create laws by exercising their discretion? This would imply that judges decide 
cases by creating and not applying law. Are they applying morality when deciding 
those cases? Some have suggested this and Ronald Dworkin’s argument has been 
particularly strong on this point. Those who defend positivist conceptions of the law 
reply that morality can be part of the law so long as the law refers to or includes it 
within a legal system. Others reply that law can only be that which can be identified 
according to the sources thesis, that is, law that can be identified according to a social 
source. The latter is the position defended by exclusive or hard legal positivists, of 
whom the most prominent torchbearers are Joseph Raz and Andrei Marmor. Because 
Freedman suggests that she is following Marmor’s ideas when justifying PBL,362 I will 
continue the analysis with the answer given by Raz and Marmor to explain how 
judges can create laws while at the same time not endangering the positivist 
conception of law. 
So, can tax law be developed and created by judges? To answer affirmatively, 
Freedman follows Raz and Marmor: yes, they can and there is no risk for a positivist 
conception of the law if they do so. How can they justify this answer? Here they state 
that judges have these powers to create laws in line with the idea of ‘directed 
361. MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues.
362. Freedman, “Improving (not perfecting) tax legislation: rules and principles revisited”, 719 fn.13.
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powers’.363 Therefore, positivism explains that judges can create laws as long as the 
power to create a law is established by binding social sources.364
Legal positivists who adhere to the strong version of the social thesis or, as Raz 
calls it, the sources thesis,365 are committed to the view that the law is that which can 
be identified as established by binding social sources,366 or ‘if its existence and content 
can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative 
argument’.367 The sources thesis, argues Raz, is the best explanation for the authority 
claimed by those who create laws because it is of its essence that they can ‘identify 
those rulings without engaging in a justificatory argument’.368 Thus, the sources thesis 
makes possible a law’s ‘claim to authority’;369 only because it is source-based can the 
law fulfil or perform its ‘mediating role’370 ‘between ultimate reasons and people’s 
decisions and actions’.371 This, Raz says, allows us to clearly distinguish between courts 
applying the law and courts creating laws. In the first case, courts apply legal standards 
that form part of the law according to the sources thesis; in the second, they create 
new standards that become part of the law because they are created by a social 
source.372 According to the sources thesis, the function of law is to guide conduct or 
human behaviour. Or as Raz puts it, ‘[l]aws guide human behaviour, help people in 
planning and deciding on their future course of action, and provide standards for 
363. Raz, “The inner logic of the law”, 244.
364. Raz, “Legal positivism and the sources of law”.
365. ibid, 46–47. Raz states that according to the sources thesis, ‘[a]ll law is source-based’  in his 
“Authority, law, and morality”, 210. Raz distinguishes between a narrow and a wide thesis for the 
source thesis: ‘The narrow thesis concerns the truth conditions of pure legal statements only’, while 
‘[t]he wide thesis concerns the truth conditions of all legal statements, including applied ones’, 
231.
366. Raz, “Legal positivism and the sources of law”.
367. Raz, “Authority, law, and morality”, 211.
368. Raz, “Legal positivism and the sources of law”, 52. Raz develops his conception of authority in 
Raz, “Authority, law, and morality”, 214. Here he explains that his conception of authority implies 
three theses: the dependence thesis, the normal justification thesis and the pre-emption thesis. vid, 
Raz, The Morality of Freedom.
369. Raz, “Authority, law, and morality”, 216.
370. ibid, 234.
371. ibid, 231. This is what Raz calls the ‘service conception of authority’. For this idea vid, ibid, 214–
215. For the argument vid, ibid, 216–220. Raz argues in this text that neither the ‘coherence thesis’ 
nor the ‘incorporation thesis’ are able to explain a law’s claim to authority ibid, 220–30.
372. Raz, “Legal positivism and the sources of law”, 48–52.
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evaluating past or planned actions’.373 Is this function of law questioned or endangered 
when judges create law? Raz answers this question negatively. A legal system 
containing legal norms that authorises judges to create laws would not go against his 
conception of law. Law created by judges would be part of the wider sources thesis.374 
He argues that there are two different types of law that determine the identification of 
legal norms. These two types of ‘ultimate laws’ are ‘laws of recognition’ and ‘laws of 
discretion’.375 Law’s of discretion determine the ways in which judges can create laws. 
In a more developed version of this argument, Raz refers to these rules as those that 
contain ‘[t]he directed powers of courts’.376 Because of its close connection with and 
importance for Freedman’s justification of PBL, let me develop this point further.
According to Raz, ‘judicial decisions are a source of law’ in ‘all legal systems’.377 
This means that in judicial decisions judges can not only refer to existing laws, but also 
they can create new ones. He argues that judicial decisions not only repeat existing 
laws but they also modify them.378 This modification changes the law by creating a 
new law. Judicial decisions that create laws will be part of the law so long as they can 
be identified (as part of it) according to the sources thesis. It is the law that establishes 
that courts are under an obligation to create laws. This is the way in which the ‘law 
provides (operative) reasons for its own development’. Raz develops this idea by 
analogy with ‘directed legislative powers’ as the way in which the law develops by 
delegation. This is especially applicable in cases of subordinate legislation contained in 
statutes. The case for ‘directed judicial law-making powers’ is a bit different. These are 
more pervasive as ‘[t]hey exist in all cases in which judicial decisions are a source of 
law and in which the courts are legally required to apply certain moral consideration 
to the determination of the case’.379 But Raz also argues that ‘legal doctrines which 
call for the exercise of moral judgement in their application [...] also address 
373. Raz, “The identity of legal systems”, 86.
374. vid supra, 365 and Raz, “Authority, law, and morality”, 234–235, also Raz, “The problem about the 
nature of law”, 205–208.
375. Raz, “The identity of legal systems”, 96.





themselves to the public’.380 This implies that these legal doctrines are ‘defeasible to a 
particularly high degree’381 because they provide the law’s subjects with access to the 
courts.382 So Raz has no problem with recognising that judges can create laws and that 
they can even appeal to moral and political considerations for this whenever the law 
directs them to do so.383
What about Marmor? Marmor also advocates an exclusivist conception of law. 
He defends it not on the grounds of authority, as Raz does, but due to the 
conventional character of the law. For Marmor, law is ‘founded on constitutive 
conventions, namely, a set of conventions which determine what the practice is and how 
one goes about engaging in it’.384 Therefore, the sources thesis is the way in which law, 
conventionally constituted, can be identified. In other words, without the sources 
thesis we would not be able to distinguish the constitutive convention that creates law 
from that of other normative systems. He introduces a similar idea to Raz’s ‘directed 
judicial law-making powers’ when he provides an argument that shows how to 
interpret legal norms that refer to morality. Marmor’s idea is that those ‘[l]egal rules 
which prescribe that the validity of other legal rules depend on certain moral or 
political considerations actually function as power-conferring rules, granting to the 
judiciary limited and guided legislative power’.385 It is not necessary to go deeper into 
Marmor’s argument here. It is enough for the argument developed in this part of the 
chapter to show the close connection with Raz’s ideas and how both serve as a 
foundation for Freedman’s PBL. Marmor’s ideas are more helpful for this purpose 
because he further develops the consequences of the conceptual points made by Raz 
when analysing ‘directed judicial law-making powers’. In particular, his description of 
these powers as restricted by its ‘legally prescribed aims and reasons’, and the fact that 
they are ‘a kind of power which the norm subjects (i.e. Judges or other officials) have a 





384. Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values, 51.
385. ibid, 67.
386. ibid, 67.
387. See also Marmor’s application of these ideas to constitutional interpretation in Interpretation and 
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These ideas help Freedman in her aim to show that PBL works in accordance with 
positivist ideas about the law (tax duties do not rest in morality but they are 
established by law), and at the same time they provide certainty about the content of 
tax law (we know that judges have a duty to create tax law within the certain limits 
established in it).
Does PBL benefit from the ideas developed by exclusive legal positivism? My 
impression is that it does not. As Fernando Atria shows,388 one of the main problems of 
Raz and Marmor’s judicial directed powers is that they pay too high a price by trying 
to show that the sources thesis is able to explain the way in which judges create law. As 
there are so many references to morality or abstract concepts in the law of 
contemporary legal systems, we would arrive at the absurd conclusion that we could 
not identify a valid law (and its content) until there is a judicial decision against which 
no appeal proceeds. This is of course, as Atria states, ironic for those who defend a 
conception of law according to which law is only that which can be identified as such 
according to the sources thesis. So this is a first criticism that would also apply to PBL. 
How can it bring more certainty to tax law if its content will depend on laws 
developed by judges? We would only know what law is once a judicial decision has 
declared what law is and this provides certainty, but one which is not relevant as 
guidance for an individual behaviour.
Moreover, what Freedman achieves through PBL is, as Hart has famously said, 
a case in which ‘distortion [is] the price of uniformity’.389 Just as Hart said of those 
theories that reduced all laws to laws establishing a sanction,390 PBL distorts tax law by 
making its content dependent on laws created by judges following whatever legislators 
establish as tax policy. Those who reduce all laws to sanctions distort the law because 
they cannot explain the differences between orders and rules, the key being that the 
latter are general,391 that is to say, they contain general types of conduct and apply to a 
general class of people.392 PBL, on the other hand, distorts tax law because it cannot 
Legal Theory, 160ff.
388. Atria, “La ironía del positivismo jurídico”.





tell us anything about it. PBL makes it impossible to distinguish between ‘[a] 
punishment for a crime, such as a fine, [and] a tax on a course of conduct, though 
both involve directions to officials to inflict the same money loss’.393
So we must analyse one last possible reading of PBL. Can PBL be read as one 
of those practices the content of which can be derived from a ‘first principle’?394 The 
analysis that follows is short because it is quite clear that the answer to this question 
must be negative. The reason that justifies the negative answer is that PBL does not 
have any telos since it is whatever tax policy legislators might hold.
According to Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘[g]enuinely first principles [...] can have a 
place only within a universe characterised in terms of certain determinate, fixed, and 
unalterable ends, ends which provide a standard by reference to which our individual 
purposes, desires, interests and decisions can be evaluated as well or badly directed’.395 
In this sense then a principle is in a dependency relationship with a final end, or with 
a particular telos. It is only because there is a final end, a telos, that a first principle can 
be explained. MacIntyre’s argument in First principles, final ends, and contemporary 
philosophical writing is that there is no place for this idea in the ‘contemporary universe 
of discourse’ because it is a discourse in which there is no place for fixed ends but only 
for principles that are ‘decided upon or invented’.396 I will not develop the 
consequences that MacIntyre’s genealogical work might have for philosophical 
enquiries in general, but this insight will be important to show that the language used 
by PBL is not based on the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition. Furthermore, because it 
is a form adopted for the mere expression of parliament’s policies, it cannot provide a 
better understanding of tax law.
The point that I am making is that we should avoid any possible confusion 
derived from the use of the notion principles in PBL. Principles as used by Freedman 
in PBL are mere tools for stating that judges have the legal power to develop tax law 
according to certain general directions given by parliament. The content of these 
principles depends exclusively on whatever policy parliament wants to implement 
393. ibid, 39.
394. For the analysis developed here I follow Alasdair MacIntyre First Principles, Final Ends, and 
Contemporary Philosophical Issues and “First principles, final ends, and contemporary philosophical 
writing”. References are made to the latter since it is a revised version of the argument.
395. MacIntyre, “First principles, final ends, and contemporary philosophical writing”, 146.
396. ibid, 146.
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through (tax) law. So there is not any substantive content according to which we can 
identify tax law (or those principles) but only what positivist theorists identify as a 
source of law. In PBL, tax law does not have a telos: no ‘end internal to activity of 
[this] specific kind, for the sake of which and in the direction of which activity of 
[this] kind is carried forward’.397 Therefore, PBL cannot fulfil its promise of making 
possible the development of tax law by judges respecting those values traditionally 
associated with legislation, such as certainty, because there is no substantive content to 
which to appeal;398 this is not even the case for those values that, according to 
positivist theories of law, are fulfilled by posited legislation.399 Principles in PBL 
cannot ‘provide premises for demonstrative arguments’ and cannot ‘specify the ultimate 
causal agencies, material, formal, efficient, and final for’400 tax law. In this sense, our 
understanding of tax law is not improved by PBL. It does not move us forward to 
better grasp our knowledge of what tax law is about. According to PBL, any tax policy 
defined by parliament and contained in abstract ‘principles’ is enough for tax law (until 
it is further specified by judges?). What is missing here is a substantive approach to tax 
law for which a particular legal structure is adopted. This does not mean that tax law 
should have a particular moral content directly applicable by the courts, but that that 
content should inform the legal form adopted by tax law. There is a connection 
between reasons and legal structure that explains the mediating role of law,401 while at 
the same time there are certain internal values to practices that need to be fleshed 
out.402
To put it in canonical terms and place it within recent debates within legal 
theory, the problem with PBL is that it understands tax law as a nominal kind. In his 
397. ibid, 156.
398. This is an argument for PBL made by Freedman, as noted supra.
399. See for example MacCormick, “The ethics of legalism”, Raz, “The functions of law” and Postema, 
“Law’s autonomy and public practical reason”. For Postema, ‘[a]ccording to this tradition, while the 
law’s ultimate aspiration may be justice, its proximate aim and defining task is to supply a 
framework of practical reasoning designed to unify public political judgment and co-ordinate 
social interaction; and in this view of law’s fundamental task lies a key to understanding its nature’, 
ibid, 80.
400. MacIntyre, “First principles, final ends, and contemporary philosophical writing”, 157.
401. Raz, “Authority, law, and morality”.
402. I give arguments for this statement infra, Chs4 and 5, 167ff.
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attempt to argue for law as a functional kind,403 Michael Moore introduces a 
distinction between natural,404 nominal and functional kinds of things.405 Nominal 
kinds are those that ‘are simply a set of individual things that share no nature save a 
common name used to refer collectively to the class’.406 Or, in the modified definition 
of this concept adopted by Fernando Atria, nominal kinds ‘have no nature: there is 
nothing internal to them by virtue of which they are instances of the kind’.407 Both 
Moore and Atria try to show that law cannot be a nominal kind because we cannot 
explain some basic distinctions used daily in our legal practices. This is the problem 
with PBL because it does not explain what distinguishes tax law. It only gives us a 
nominal identification of the set of norms dictated according to the exercise of a 
particular ‘directed judicial law-making power’. PBL does not offer a structural 
account of tax law nor a substantive or functional approach to it.408 If we adopt PBL as 
proposed by Freedman, tax law is a nominal kind, that is to say, the principles enable 
the legislator to achieve whatever end they might have. In tax law these ends may be 
either incentivising or sanctioning for certain activities, obtain certain economic 
means, and so on.
As I argue later in part II of this thesis,409 to better understand tax law we 
should determine what its substantive content is. To put it in the terms used here, we 
need to address the question of the proper function of tax law and this is a task that 
needs justification from political theory.410 Once this is done I will develop an 
argument for the particular structure that tax law should adopt. The problem with 
PBL is that it is not able to justify why or in what way the structure it proposes for tax 
403. Those kinds that ‘have a nature that each instance of the class shares, [it is a] functional [nature]’, 
Moore, Placing Blame. A General Theory of the Criminal Law, 19.
404. ‘These are kinds like water or gold that not only exist “naturally” (that is, without human 
contrivance) but also have a nature to them that gives the essence of the kinds’, ibid, 19.
405. vid ibid, 19–23. It is not necessary at this stage to fully flesh out the definition of these kinds of 
things. I will come back to this debate with more detail infra, 233.
406. ibid, 19.
407. Atria, “Legislation and adjudication”, 345.
408. PBL is not a structural approach because it does not aspire to describe the way in which tax law 
should better be described. PBL as proposed by Freedman is a normative idea of what the 
structure of tax law should be for whatever purposes legislators might have.
409. vid infra, Chs3, 4 and 5.
410. Murphy, “The political question of the concept of law”, 375.
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law would be better for tax law. For this we will need to abandon the contemporary 




DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, TAXATION, AND TAX LAW
1. INTRODUCTION TO PART II
In the first chapter of this thesis I argue that tax avoidance is a legal and not a moral 
problem. In the second chapter I endeavour to show that some of the reasons that 
explain why we do not consider tax avoidance to be a legal problem are due to the 
fact that it is not comprehensible under the classical paradigm of tax law. Moreover, 
chapter two concludes that if the classical paradigm cannot understand tax avoidance 
as a legal problem then its legal expression, which is the contemporary general theory 
of tax law, cannot provide a legal answer to it. Therefore, after the first two chapters we 
are in a position from which we can assert that because of the problems associated 
with the classical paradigm of tax law, as well as unsuccessful attempts to provide an 
alternative to the contemporary general theory, a revision of the relationship between 
tax law – as a special or particular area of law – and its substance is needed.
However, this discussion has not yet taken place among scholars of tax law and 
there is not one particular area of study where we can find a remedy for the 
aforementioned diagnostic. On the contrary, while taxation issues have been discussed 
from several perspectives (economic – in its macro and microeconomics variants –411 
historical,412 political science,413 political philosophy,414 social psychology,415 and 
legal416) none have focused on the connection between the substance of taxation and 
411. vid, Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice; Stiglitz, Economics of the Public 
Sector; Hassett and Hubbard (eds), Inequality and Tax Policy; Mirrlees, Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation; 
Kocherlakota, The New Dynamic Public Finance; and, Adam, Besley, et al., Tax by Design: The Mirrlees 
Review.
412. vid, Gross, Fair Share for All. Jacobin Egalitarianism in Practice; Daunton, Trusting Leviathan. The Politics 
of Taxation in Britain 1799–1914; and, Daunton, Just Taxes. The Politics of Taxation in Britain 1914–
1979.
413. vid, Steinmo, Taxation & Democracy and; Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, et al. (eds), Taxation and State-Building 
in Developing Countries. Capacity and Consent.
414. vid, the bibliography discussed infra Ch3.
415. vid, Braithwaite (ed), Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion.
416. vid, Bergman, Tax Evasion and The Rule of Law in Latin America. The Political Culture of Cheating and 
Compliance in Argentina and Chile.
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the form of tax law. Each of these different approaches explains taxation from its 
particular point of view, but none explains or provides arguments for it adopting a 
legal form.417 To this dual task I dedicate in the second part of this thesis (Chs 3, 4, and 
5). In chapter three I provide an argument to show the shortcomings of liberal and 
luck egalitarian’s defence of taxation. Arguably, these theories are concerned with 
obtaining a justified level of distribution rather than with an argument for taxation or 
tax law per se. Hence, taxation and tax law are justified as mere instruments. As such, 
taxation and tax law are fungible and might be replaced by any other instrument. In 
chapter four I explore an alternative substantive understanding for taxation as a 
practice with an intrinsic good. This substantive aspect of taxation should provide an 
argument for it being an obligation and consequently, for it becoming a legal duty. In 
chapter five, therefore, I provide an argument for taxation’s form (tax law). The 
arguments in chapters four and five aim to understand the importance of taxation and 
tax law per se (and not as mere instruments for an economic conception of distributive 
justice).
Political philosophy is the field within which the substance of taxation has 
been discussed in the terms relevant to my argument. This discussion regarding 
taxation has mainly focused on its legitimacy and justification, rather than on the 
relationship between its substance and form. So, for example, contemporary debates in 
political philosophy, particularly those concerning theories of justice from the second 
half of the twentieth century, have provided alternative (and often overlapping) 
accounts of this relationship between distributive justice and taxation. However, this 
relationship has been justified externally and merely on instrumental grounds.418 
Therefore, according to this approach, taxation is nothing but a fungible means for 
achieving a particular conception of distributive justice. In other words, effort has been 
put into determining which is the best justified conception of distributive justice and, 
as a corollary, the justified level of taxation required to instrumentally achieve its ends. 
Under this scheme (henceforth referred to as the mere instrumental justification for 
taxation) the debate has mainly focused on justifying a particular conception of 
417. The point that I am making is that none of these approaches ask why taxation adopts a particular 
legal form. They take tax law for granted and assume that it is explained by virtue of its 
coerciveness. These approaches assume that they should explain or justify the contingent aspects of 
tax law.
418. Throughout this chapter I follow Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and external 
goods in practices and institutions, respectively. vid, MacIntyre, After Virtue, Ch14.
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distributive justice that would subsequently give legitimacy to a particular tax design. 
As a consequence, tax law is a coercive form of taxation that is in turn justified on 
moral grounds. This explains why the main argument for coercive taxation depends 
upon the degree of redistribution that a particular theory of justice is able to justify. 
Alternatively stated, tax law is legitimate so long as it is a successful means by which to 
achieve a particular standard of redistribution justified according to a theory of 
justice.419 Yet as I venture to show here, this justification of taxation renders taxation 
and tax law irrelevant since here it might be replaced by any functional equivalent 
(referred to later in this chapter as the Murphy and Nagel paradox).
Here I argue that the solution to the problems outlined in chapters one and 
two of this thesis require us to abandon the mere instrumental justification of taxation 
and tax law. These have to be replaced with an understanding of taxation as a practice 
with an internal good. This is an argument oriented toward showing that taxation is 
better understood as a practice with an internal good (and, that, therefore it is not a 
justificatory argument).420 For this purpose I draw on Alasdair MacIntyre's distinction 
between practices and institutions and their relationship with internal and external 
goods.421 In chapter four I provide an argument that shows that the internal good of 
taxation is recognition and that its external good is redistribution. This argument aims 
at showing that taxes are justified so long as we live in political societies that recognise 
private property as a necessary aspect of the political project of autonomy.422 
According to the argument defended herein, taxes represent the other face of private 
property and are not instruments for redistribution. In other words, if private property 
– and therefore taxation – is justified as a constitutive aspect of recognition, there 
exists a duty to pay taxes even when there is no need for redistribution. This 
understanding of taxation provides a better theoretical apparatus for proposing a new 
approach to tax law (and therefore to the legal form of the duty to pay taxes) that is 
better equipped to provide an answer to tax avoidance.423
419. vid,Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a new political debate, Ch4. Dworkin links 
redistributive taxation with the legitimacy of government based on the two principles of justice 
defended by him, namely, equal concern and equal respect.
420. vid infra, Ch3 and Ch4.
421. vid, MacIntyre, After Virtue, Ch14, and MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, Ch11.
422. vid infra, 202.
423. vid infra, Ch4.
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Let me present the structure of the second part of the thesis by summarising its 
argument in some detail. The main aim of chapter three is to show the limits of the 
mere instrumental justification for taxation when a merely economic conception of 
distributive justice provides the starting point of an argument for redistribution. 
Hence, the objective of chapter three is to deliver the first step toward a non-
instrumental, that is to say an intrinsic, justification for taxation. For this purpose I 
criticise the arguments provided by both liberal egalitarian and luck egalitarian 
political philosophers. In particular, when criticising liberal egalitarians’ justifications I 
focus on the way in which the mere instrumental justification is argued for by John 
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel. The aim of this 
argument is to show that their conception of distributive justice leaves us without any 
justification for taxation and with only a moral justification for redistribution. 
The same problem affects luck egalitarians; they miss the point of taxation by 
assuming that the mere instrumental justification can achieve the redistributive 
equality they argue for. I argue that an economic approach to distributive justice, based 
on a particular conception of equality as a state of affairs to be achieved, misses the 
point that underlies justice and equality as political ideals. The approach I advocate is 
pessimistic in that it affirms the fact that distributive justice cannot be reduced to 
economic concerns for (at least) two reasons: (i) material economic equality does not 
represent a political ideal in itself (it has no value in itself nor it is achievable or 
sustainable in time); and (ii) when equality is reduced to economic terms it loses its 
political-transcendental dimension.424 As I understand it, the political-transcendental 
dimension of equality, as an aspect of distributive justice, comprises the idea that we 
can only aspire collectively toward the achievement of individual emancipation. I fully 
develop these ideas in chapter five. Yet this idea operates as a motive for the persistent 
critique and revision of existing institutions (in this sense it is pessimistic). Or, in other 
terms, distributive justice should be understood pessimistically in its immanent aspect 
and positively in its transcendental dimension.425 To paraphrase Anne Phillips, and to 
use more familiar political categories, once this perspective of political concepts is 
424. vid infra, 168ff.
425. I have to thank Claudio Michelon for showing me the importance of the distinction between the 
immanent and the transcendental when applied to institutions. I owe the phrasing of this idea to 
Fernando Atria.
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adopted, taxes represent a movement from access to recognition.426 This is important 
because the political dimension of distributive justice is not captured by the mere 
instrumental justification of political institutions that is provided by contemporary 
liberal theories of justice. For liberal egalitarians and luck egalitarians institutions – and 
therefore legal institutions – are justified so long as they can achieve a particular end 
(for example, a justified level of redistribution) and they are irrelevant if they cannot.427 
This implies abandoning institutions once they fail to achieve those ends, in order to 
replace them with morality by extending the scope of justice.
The crucial consequence of tax law being justified in instrumental terms is 
that we cannot see the importance or significance of it being tax law. This implies that 
the theories criticised herein cannot solve the problems inherent in the classical 
paradigm of tax law, nor those belonging to the contemporary general theory of tax 
law; tax law does not posses any intrinsic substance and tax avoidance appears to be a 
problem of moral demands in non-ideal theories of justice.428 In chapter four I will 
argue for a conception of distributive justice that allows space for its political 
dimension. For this purpose, I return to Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice as 
a part of general justice.
Chapter four further develops the argument for a non-instrumental 
justification of taxation and tax law. I argue that taxation is better understood as a 
practice with an internal good and that tax law should adopt a form capable of 
embodying that internal good. The evident question is therefore, which is taxation’s 
internal good? By revisiting the redistribution or recognition debate between Nancy 
426. Phillips, Which Equalities Matter?, 83.
427. In legal theory a similar position is defended by John Gardner, for whom legal institutions are 
justified as long as they work. vid, Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: ‘[Law] is distinguished rather by 
the distinctive means that it provides for serving whatever ends it serves’ (207). ‘The law is no more 
than a means and we should welcome reliance upon it only to the extent that reliance upon it 
serves some worthwhile end’ (212).
428. For a general overview of non-ideal theories of justice vid, Valentini, “Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: a 
conceptual map”. According to Valentini, the debate between ideal and non-ideal theories came 
about as a methodological turn in political philosophy and is built around Rawls’ Theory of Justice. 
In this paper Valentini maps the debate and distinguishes three possible aims for non-ideal theories: 
(i) ‘full compliance’ versus ‘partial compliance’; (ii) ‘utopian or idealistic’ theory versus ‘realistic’ 
theory; and (iii) ‘end-state’ theory versus ‘transitional’ theory. Because of the scope of this thesis I 
will not be able to go deeper into this debate. However, the argument that I put forward in this 
chapter contains elements of the three interpretations of ‘non-ideal’ theories as distinguished by 
Valentini. I have to thank Cristián Rettig Bianchi for calling my attention to this point.
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Fraser and Axel Honneth,429 I argue that the internal good of taxation is recognition. 
At this point of the argument I will have developed enough elements in order to 
revise the relationship between taxation and private property. In chapter four I argue 
that when understood as a practice guided by recognition, taxation is constitutively 
connected with private property. I try to argue that the kind of recognition that 
taxation as a practice contains is not significantly different from the Hegelian 
justification of private property. By the end of chapter four I show that understanding 
taxation as a practice with recognition as its internal good is a more suitable 
interpretation of the persistence of tax law (and that would also, provide a reason not 
to replace it by any other available redistributive mechanism). With the argument 
developed in these chapters I expect to show that the conception of taxation argued 
for solves the two problems previously mentioned in the thesis: (i) it shows that tax 
avoidance is not simply a moral problem to be left to individuals’ ethical decisions but 
instead is one of misrecognition to be approached politically and institutionally; and 
(ii) the interpretation of taxation advocated for leads to the radical consequence that 
we have an obligation to pay taxes even if the need for redistribution is absent.
429. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?
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CHAPTER THREE. WHY SHOULD I PAY TAXES?
1. INTRODUCTION
Taxes are essential for the existence of a state.430 This is because they provide revenue 
‘by means of which [government] can procure both services and the material goods 
necessary for the performance of its functions’.431 In chapter two I argue that this 
economic function of taxes is one of the characteristic elements of the classical 
paradigm of tax law, namely that taxes are instruments of revenue and public 
expenditure.432 Most contemporary political philosophers assume this element of the 
classical paradigm. Even libertarians who argue that the only morally justifiable version 
of the state is the minimal state agree with this.433 However, if we want to go beyond 
the common place and explain what this agreement consists of then we cannot 
advance much. Are we implicitly saying that there are certain activities that the state 
must develop or finance? Or that taxation defines the level of public provision of 
goods and the contours of private property? Or that the state should redistribute 
wealth? Are taxes means for obtaining revenue to finance public expenditure? If this is 
so then does the justification of the duty to pay taxes depend on a particular level of 
provision of public goods (or redistribution)? Furthermore, which perspective – a 
purely economic one or one originating in justice and fairness – should we adopt in 
debates regarding tax policy? The answers to all these questions depend on the 
justification of taxation, that is to say on the function or purpose of taxation (and tax 
law).434 The function assigned to taxation takes for granted a particular relationship 
between taxes and distributive justice. This acquires special importance because in 
430. Tipke, Moral Tributaria del Estado y de los Contribuyentes, 27. For an application of this idea to the 
building of the state in developing countries vid, Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, et al. (eds), Taxation and 
State-Building in Developing Countries. Capacity and Consent.
431. Weston, Principles of Justice in Taxation, 44. vid, Steinmo, Taxation & Democracy and Ferreiro Lapatza, 
Instituciones de Derecho Financiero, 14–17.
432. vid supra, 77.
433. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Ch7 and Ch10. ‘The minimal state is the most extensive state 
that can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people’s rights’(149). ‘No state more 
extensive than the minimal state can be justified’ (297). The minimal state requires a minimum 
level of taxation. Libertarians following Nozick would not assign many functions to the 
government, but this is a different argument.
434. Contemporary liberal political philosophers have addressed the issue in these terms. However, in 
Ch5 infra I offer a teleological conception of institutions as an alternative to the functional 
approach.
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actual debates of political philosophy, capitalism is assumed to be a characteristic of 
contemporary Western modern plural societies. In what follows I accept this 
assumption for the sake of my critical review of some representative liberal egalitarian 
and luck egalitarian arguments for taxation.
My aim is to show that the merely instrumental justification of taxation is 
problematic because taxes and tax law become anything that is able to achieve coercive 
redistribution. There are not any reasons for taxation and tax law independent of the 
reasons given to justify the ends of a particular theory of distributive justice. Thus, tax 
law and taxation become instruments and their justification is purely instrumental; is 
this particular tax (law) policy a good instrument for achieving a particular level of 
economic justice (and therefore, redistribution)?435 I believe that the source of this 
problem is found in a misplaced relationship between distributive justice and taxation, 
where the former is defined as a particular distribution of goods and the latter as an 
instrument subordinated to that purpose. Part of this problem derives from the fact 
that contemporary political philosophy places excessive emphasis on achieving a 
conception of distributive justice that is purely economic without consideration of its 
political dimension.436 This understanding of distributive justice – as economic justice 
–437 inevitably leads to the instrumental justification of taxation and tax law.438 In brief 
then, taxes are understood as the means by which to obtain revenue in order to 
implement a particular conception of distributive justice. Therefore, taxes are a means 
either for redistribution (for whatever criterion defined by a particular theory of 
distributive justice) or for financing the minimal state. For those who adopt 
instrumental justification tax law is nothing but the coercive expression of that 
justification. It is not strange then to say that, at this conceptual level, liberal 
egalitarians and libertarians share the same conception of taxation and tax law.
Furthermore, the economic approach to distributive justice creates a problem 
for those who defend egalitarianism. Egalitarians mainly focus on debates concerning 
the standards for defining what is to be equally distributed (what G. A. Cohen calls the 
435. As argued in Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, passim.
436. Therefore, excessive emphasis is placed on the way in which individuals agree on the distribution 
of certain goods, as if this agreement might be something they could come into as equals. vid, 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, Ch17.
437. Macpherson, The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Essays, 1–20.
438. vid supra, 77.
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‘currency’ of egalitarian justice).439 Arguably, this focus brings two problems for 
egalitarians. First, because of their concerns about the determination of a particular 
equalisandum they miss what Aaron James identifies as ‘the significance of 
distribution’.440 Second, and following an argument put forward by Cécile Fabre,441 
for libertarians and (Coheninan) egalitarians a legal duty to pay taxes is equivalent to 
forced labour. The difference, of course, is that for the latter this legal obligation would 
be justified, while for the former it would not. Therefore, Fabre argues that a strong 
egalitarian theory, such as G. A. Cohen’s, does not succeed in making an argument for 
taxation against Robert Nozick’s objection, according to which a duty to pay taxes is 
equivalent to forced labour.442 The point I want to highlight from Fabre and Cohen’s 
arguments is that they are both trapped by the moral argument posed by Nozick. 
Among contemporary political philosophers it has become usual to find moral 
arguments for institutional arrangements. The problem with this approach is that 
moral arguments without concern for historical institutional evolution risk missing the 
point of institutional arrangements.443 Fabre and Cohen’s defence of egalitarian 
redistribution provides a good example through which I am able to illustrate what I 
consider to be problematic in the moral justification of taxation as a duty to help 
others by redistribution.
As I argue below, both liberal egalitarians (who argue for an economic 
conception of distributive justice applied to institutional design) and egalitarians (who 
argue for a moral duty to help others under an ideal of equality) miss the point of 
taxation because they focus on redistribution. Taxation becomes either a label for 
anything able to achieve redistribution or a moral justification to help others that does 
not differ from any other moral duty to help others. The problem for a justification of 
439. Cohen, “On the currency of egalitarian justice”.
440. James, “The significance of distribution”.
441. Fabre, “Distributive justice and freedom: Cohen on money and labour”.
442. For Cohen’s argument, vid Cohen, Rescuing Justice & Equality. Nozick’s argument is in Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia.
443. For an example of this problem vid, Rosanvallon, Democratic Legitimacy. Impartiality, Reflexivity, 
Proximity. Without any concern for the historical evolution of political institutions and the 
(historical) reasons that explain that evolution, Rosanvallon proposes several reforms to answer to 
contemporary legitimacy challenges posed to those institutions. cfr, Geuss, History and Illusion in 
Politics.
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taxation is evident. Why should we not replace taxation with social service?444 My 
answer to this is that other morally justified attitudes or institutions in contemporary 
market economies based on the economic conception of distributive justice cannot 
replace taxation. As I argue herein, once distributive justice is understood as an aspect 
of what Aristotle calls general justice, taxation is connected with the political 
definition as to how we are to relate to each other and in this sense taxation cannot be 
detached from private property. This requires us to keep in mind that legal institutions 
try to materialise what Cornelius Castoriadis calls the political ‘project of social 
individual autonomy’445 (where, if we follow the Hegelian justification, private 
property has an important role to play in the political definition of an individual).
2. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS
There are two main concerns that exist among contemporary advocates of what can 
broadly be covered under the notion of pattern theories of distributive justice.446 The 
first concern is to provide a moral justification for redistribution;447 the second is to 
determine what should be the thing to be distributed and how much of it should be 
allocated.448 These theories try to provide content for a conception of distributive 
justice, the core of which is the right determination of the distribution of the social 
product. Therefore, contemporary theories of distributive justice focus on determining 
the right principle(s) for the distribution of the social product. 
Before going any further I would like to introduce a distinction (that later on 
will be related to the Aristotelian distinction between general and particular justice)449 
between distributive justice and social justice. These two concepts are not always 
distinguished and when they are different authors use ad hoc definitions. John Rawls 
is an example of the former since he uses both terms indistinctively in A Theory of 
444. In fact, this is the conclusion at which we might arrive by following Fabre’s critique of Cohen.
445. Castoriadis, Figures of the Thinkable, 94. According to Castoriadis, this political project appeals to the 
‘autonomous action of people and at establishing a society organised to promote the autonomy of 
all its members’ (Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 95).
446. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Ch7.
447. Among the advocates of this position we find Rawls, Dworkin and Nagel. In general, those who 
defend liberal egalitarianism.
448. Advocates of this approach defend egalitarianism, among whom Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum 
and G. A. Cohen can be mentioned. 
449. vid infra, 176.
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Justice.450 David Miller451 and Iris Young452 are examples of the latter. Miller and Young 
have different ad hoc conceptions of social justice. For Miller, social justice derives 
from the Aristotelian and Thomistic notions of distributive justice but is wider in 
scope since its origin lies in an early twentieth-century concern with the ethical 
scrutiny of the existing economic and social institutions.453 He proposes a broader 
notion of burdens and benefits to be distributed according to three principles of 
justice (need, desert and rights), which are associated with three possible relations 
(solidaristic communities, instrumental associations and citizenship, respectively).454 
Young, on the other hand, argues that social justice cannot be defined by broadening 
distributive justice. She rather proposes abandoning the distributive paradigm in order 
to adopt a conception of social justice as ‘the elimination of institutionalized 
domination and oppression’.455 For the purpose of this argument I understand 
distributive justice in a canonical fashion as concerned with the distribution of 
benefits and burdens among society’s members in a world with limited resources.456 
On the other hand, the conception of social justice that I adopt partially follows 
Young’s perspective. Her approach calls us to remember that justice is not only about 
the distribution of things but that it also requires a critical attitude toward institutional 
arrangements upon which distributional patterns depend because, as she argues, 
nonmaterial social goods are not static but ‘a function of social relations and processes’. 
Her concept of social justice ‘includes all aspects of institutional rules and relations 
insofar as they are subject to potential collective decision’. As will become clear later in 
the argument, I distance myself from her conception because I believe that the 
‘concepts of domination and oppression’ that she sets as ‘the starting point for a 
conception of social justice’457 should be replaced by recognition.458
450. Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
451. Miller, Principles of Social Justice.
452. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference.
453. Miller, Principles of Social Justice, Ch1.
454. ibid, Ch2. Miller also develops in detail the content of the three principles of justice in the first part 
of his Social Justice.
455. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 15.
456. vid MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality, Ch.8. However, MacCormick does not 
distinguish between distributive and social justice. This idea of distributive justice is commonly 
expressed as ‘giving each its due’ or suum cuique.
457. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 16.
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As an example of the economic conception of distributive justice, we should 
consider what Samuel Fleischacker has to say about distributive justice in its modern 
(or contemporary) sense. Fleischacker analyses the history of distributive justice and 
concludes that there are ‘two notions of “distributive justice” in Western political 
philosophy’.459 According to his argument, these two notions can be identified with 
two authors or periods. The first runs from Aristotle to the late eighteenth century, 
while the second is formulated by John Rawls based on intuitions from the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.460 The main difference between these two notions, 
according to Fleischacker, is that the latter, and not the former, is concerned with the 
‘poor’. In its modern sense then, distributive justice ‘calls on the state to guarantee that 
property is distributed throughout society so that everyone is supplied with a certain 
level of material means’. Therefore, he says, ‘[d]ebates on distributive justice [...] centre 
on the amount of means to be guaranteed and on the degree to which state 
intervention is necessary for those means to be distributed’.461 According to 
Fleischacker, the main difference between the ancient and the modern principles of 
distributive justice centres on the role of merit. On the one hand, merit determines 
the content of the ancient principle of distribution. On the other, the modern 
principle of distribution ‘demands a distribution independent of merit’.462 Merit is 
relevant to the modern notion of distributive justice only after a certain level of 
distribution has been secured for all. What characterises the modern idea of 
distributive justice is the ‘belief that justice demands the redistribution of wealth’.463 
Hence, Fleischacker concludes that it is not possible to bring together the Aristotelian 
and Rawlsian conceptions of distributive justice. Later in chapter four I will argue that 
if we adopt a political conception of distributive justice, leaving behind the economic 
458. I develop this argument infra, 188.
459. Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice, 125.
460. ibid. Fleischacker considers that some of these intuitions can be found in Rousseau, Smith and 
Kant (53–79). He considers Smith’s contribution to be the most important one as he changed the 
‘moral imagination’ toward the poor and considered them as morally equal to the rich (62–68). 
According to Fleischacker, the modern notion of distributive justice arrived with Babeuf ’s 
consideration of poverty as a justiciable ‘affront [...] to people as human beings’, and not as a 
problem of becoming a good citizen (79).
461. ibid, 4.
462. ibid, 5.
463. ibid, 43. ‘[N]one of the [ancient] traditions say that a certain level of material comfort is owed to 
the poor by virtue of their being human beings, that justice demands some distribution of goods 
to all’ (44).
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conception of distributive justice, Fleischacker’s analysis is not ultimately relevant. The 
interesting point is not to oppose political and economic justice, because there is no 
doubt that they dealt with different historical realities, but to show how these two 
approaches can be brought together. This could be achieved by showing that political 
and economic conceptions of distributive justice aim at mutual recognition.
By critically revising the arguments for taxation developed by liberal 
egalitarian political philosophers, in what follows I reveal how the instrumental 
justification forms the expression of the economic conception of distributive justice. 
The conclusion of this argument is that the justification of taxation in Rawls’ theory 
still works within the classical paradigm of tax law; that Dworkin’s justification of 
redistributive taxation instrumentalises taxes at the cost of not justifying taxation but 
any progressive instrument for redistribution; and finally, that although Murphy and 
Nagel try to justify taxation they paradoxically privilege any institutional arrangement 
capable of achieving a particular level of distributive justice. I call this the Murphy and 
Nagel paradox. All these justifications leave us with a moral justification for 
redistribution but without any justification for taxes as such. The particular problems 
derived from the moral justification for redistribution will be dealt with at the end of 
the chapter, when the critique posed by Fabre to Cohen is revised.
Before continuing, let me introduce a brief clarification to avoid possible 
confusion. The argument that I am developing is different from the criticism 
developed by Amartya Sen against that which he calls ‘theories of ideal justice’. For 
Sen, these theories are far too concerned with institutions and ideal justice and do not 
show the same concern for practical changes that might improve people’s lives. Sen 
calls this approach to a theory of justice ‘transcendental institutionalism’ that aims for 
‘perfectly just societies’ in opposition to a ‘realisation-focused comparison’ approach 
that is concerned with ‘social realisations’ (to be found, according to Sen, in the work 
of Adam Smith, the Marquis of Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, 
Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill).464 Sen prefers to advocate for institutions ‘that 
promote justice’.465 However, Sen shares with the liberal egalitarian theorists mentioned 
464. Sen, The Idea of Justice. This argument crosses the entire book, however, it can predominantly be 
found in the preface, introduction and Ch2.
465. ibid, 82. [Emphasis in the original]. As I will try to show later, political concepts properly 
understood contain both aspects – the transcendental and the immanent – which Sen tries to 
separate, vid infra, 168.
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above the idea that institutions have a ‘significant instrumental role in the pursuit of 
justice’.466 So, for the purpose of the argument developed here, Sen shares the same 
problems as liberal egalitarian theorists even if he tries to take seriously, or rather 
precisely because he tries to take seriously, the mere instrumental justification of 
institutions that I am trying to leave behind.467
To summarise, the argument in this section aims to show that liberal egalitarian 
theories of justice fail to answer the problems detected in chapters one and two of this 
thesis because they assume that the justification of tax law depends on moral 
arguments in favour of redistributive taxation. Thus, these theories cannot solve the 
problem of tax avoidance because they disregard the importance of tax law. In what 
follows I critically revise some of these justifications for taxation.
3. LIBERAL EGALITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAXATION
From the second half of the twentieth century onwards, liberal egalitarian justifications 
for distributive justice have played an important part in justifying redistributive 
policies, especially against those who argue that the only possible just distributions of 
the social product are those that result from market exchanges.468 Arguing that equality 
in the distribution of (certain) goods is important for individuals when developing 
their life plans in modern capitalist economies was, for example, a key argument in 
John Rawls’ landmark contribution to the debate. Rawls argues that justice should be 
predicated on social institutions and aspire to pure procedural justice through his two 
famous principles of justice.469 As a landmark work, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 
contribution has been attacked from all possible fronts (from conservatives to 
egalitarians) and at all possible levels (from his idea that social institutions are the 
subject of justice to his two principles of justice). In what follows I analyse his work, in 
particular regarding the function assigned to taxation and its relationship with 
redistribution. Following this, I discuss an alternative to Rawls’ theory brought forward 
by Ronald Dworkin within the liberal egalitarian tradition. Dworkin proposes a 
modification to the criterion of equality aspired to by Rawls by moving away from 
466. ibid, xii.
467. I distinguish between mere instrumental institutions and teleological institutions infra, 209.
468. vid, Hayek, “The mirage of social justice”, 67–70.
469. In what follows I use Rawls’ last formulation of the principles of justice as stated in Rawls, Justice 
As Fairness: A Restatement.
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ex-post equality (Rawls’ ‘difference principle’) toward ex-ante equality (‘equality of 
resources’). According to Dworkin, this would secure the coexistence of personal 
responsibility and equality. Dworkin argues that if two principles of justice are adopted 
(equal concern and respect) the combination of equality of resources and individual 
responsibility for economic decisions provides justification for unequal market 
distributions better than the economic differences permitted by Rawls’ difference 
principle. Dworkin argues that his theory is able to bring together liberty and equality 
as political values and, therefore, to respond to the libertarian criticism posed by 
Nozick, for whom equality endangers liberty. I will revise critically what Dworkin has 
to say about taxation and the way in which he justifies redistribution. With my 
discussion of Rawls’ and Dworkin’s arguments in place, I will move on to focus on 
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s arguments for taxation as developed in The Myth of 
Ownership. Taxes and Justice. Murphy and Nagel defend taxation as part of a broader 
scope of institutional arrangements dependent on the adoption of a conception of 
distributive justice. Within this broader distributive schema every economic institution 
is dependent upon political decisions. Therefore, the definition of private property – as 
a contingent institutional construction – depends on institutional arrangements, of 
which taxation is one. But Murphy and Nagel are so concerned with a particular 
distributive outcome that, paradoxically, they end up forgetting about taxes. Above I 
called this the Murphy and Nagel paradox. It consists of providing a justification for 
taxation that leaves taxation behind. This paradox is a consequence of the way in 
which liberal egalitarians understand taxation. In order to explain this conclusion I 
present the argument that follows.
3.1. Rawls: Taxation’s corrective and redistributive functions
Ever since John Rawls tried to revive the contractualist tradition in the first edition of 
A Theory of Justice470 the discussion about distributive justice and institutions has 
become a central topic in contemporary political philosophy. Some of the questions 
Rawls’ theory tries to answer are: How do we secure justice in social interactions? 
How do we fairly distribute rights and duties in political societies? A central part of 
Rawls’ answers defines two principles of justice according to which the basic structure 
470. G. A. Cohen has recently argued that Rawls failed on this intent, vid Cohen, Rescuing Justice & 
Equality, 337ff.
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of society is to be designed. These principles of justice should obtain by agreement 
among individuals acting in an ideal hypothetical situation (the ‘original position’) in 
which they lack information about their particular situation (behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’), in conditions of equality and considering that resources are scarce (the 
‘circumstances of justice’). Those individuals should agree ‘once and for all’ on the 
principles that shall regulate future social agreements. Rawls argues that under these 
conditions rational individuals would agree on two principles of justice: first, the 
principle of equal liberty and second, a principle that establishes the conditions under 
which social and economic inequalities are justified. 
In Rawls’ last formulation the principles of justice read as follows. The first 
principle of justice, states that ‘each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all’.471 The second principle of justice contains two conditions 
for the justification of social and economic inequalities, ‘first, they are to be attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of 
society’.472 These two principles are lexicographically ordered so that the first principle 
has primacy over the second, and the first part of the second principle has primacy 
over the second (the ‘difference principle’). As a result, liberty should never be risked 
by equality. These two principles of justice provide the standard under which a scheme 
of pure procedural justice will secure that the just distribution of the social product 
obtains.
In this scheme, institutions (‘a public system of rules which define offices and 
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like’)473 that are 
part of the basic structure of society have a central role to play. They materialise the 
principles of justice within a political society and through their operations determine 
substantive justice. With this argument, Rawls expects to bring together as close as 
possible formal and substantive justice.474
471. Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, 42.
472. ibid, 42–43.
473. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47.
474. ibid, 52.
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Institutions have a crucial role to play in ethical theories such as Rawlsian 
ethical constructivism.475 Without the particularisation that a designed set of rules 
supposes, the abstraction and generality of the principles of justice would make it very 
difficult to determine the ways in which our particular behaviour adjusts to the 
restrictions imposed by justice. Or, as Onora O’Neill states, ‘[j]ust institutions and 
practices provide the specifications for judging the justice of particular acts or 
decisions’.476 Thus, institutional design should be, as much as possible, the expression of 
the two principles of justice in such a way that within the deontic scheme defined by 
social institutions the collective result of individual actions will be just.477 This explains 
why, for Rawls, the basic structure of society is the subject of the principles of 
justice.478 
What is the role of taxes in Rawls’ theory of justice? They have a role to play 
among the basic institutions of the political economy, namely ‘economic arrangements 
and policies, and their background institutions’.479 Following Musgrave, Rawls divides 
these institutions into four branches: allocation, stabilisation, transfer and 
distribution.480 Taxes are only relevant for two of those branches: the allocation and 
distribution. Taxes play a minor function within the allocation branch. The agencies or 
activities of this branch maintain a system of competitive prices, avoiding unreasonable 
concentrations of market power and also identifying and correcting the most evident 
deviances of efficiency that result from the inability of the market to measure social 
costs and benefits. To achieve these ends governments use taxes and subsidies, and 
modify the right to private property.481 The most relevant function of taxes occurs 
within the distribution branch. According to Rawls, the task of this branch is ‘to 
preserve an approximate justice in distributive shares by means of taxation and the 
475. ‘Political constructivism is a view about the structure and content of a political conception. It says 
that once, if ever, reflective equilibrium is attained the principles of political justice (the content) 
may be represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of construction (structure)’. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, 89–90.
476. O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, 182.
477. ‘The social system is to be designed so that the resulting distribution is just however things turn 
out’. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 243.
478. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 39–42.
479. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 228.
480. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance. A Study in Public Economy, Ch1. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
228, 243–245.
481. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 244.
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necessary adjustments in the rights of property’.482 In this branch taxes have two 
functions: first, they correct the distribution of wealth in order to secure the two 
principles of justice and their lexicographical order, that is political freedom, equality 
of opportunities and the difference principle; second, they secure the revenue required 
by justice, for example, to finance the provision of public goods.483 Examples of taxes 
that fulfil the first function are estate and inheritance taxes.484 Rawls does not provide 
any particular example of taxes that fulfil the second function, but it is safe to assert 
that he could agree with any kind of taxation policy that obtains revenue so long as it 
respects the two principles of justice (and their lexicographical order).485
From the previous analysis we can say that the functions Rawls assigns to taxes 
do not differ from those that, according to the classical paradigm of tax law, are widely 
accepted within public finance theory.486 His main contribution has been to provide a 
justificatory framework (namely, the principles of justice) for tax policy by locating it 
within a broader scheme of distributive justice (as economic justice). However, we do 
not find much help to solve the problems detected in chapters one and two in Rawls’ 
ideas because taxes are still understood according to the classical paradigm and tax law 
as justified merely instrumentally. In this sense, by not providing a particular 
justification for the legitimation of taxation per se, Rawls is still open to the criticism 
developed by Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, for whom taxes are equivalent to 
forced labour. Nozick argues that any theory, starting from the recognition of rights, 
cannot explain coerced redistribution as justified by a patterned conception of 
distributive justice. I agree that Nozick’s criticism carries the day, at least if it is 
presented as a logical argument, that is, how can you conclude that coerced 
redistribution is justified when the major premise is a right? There does not seem to 
be an intermediate premise to conclude that what those rights produce can be 
redistributed, except that the rights of the major premise are conditional rights; 
482. ibid, 245.
483. ibid, 245–247.
484. Rawls is particularly concerned with inheritance taxation to limit that which he considers to be as 
unjust as the natural distribution of intelligence, namely the inheritance of wealth. According to 
Rawls, inheritance is permitted if it does not endanger the two elements of the second principle of 
justice. vid, ibid, 245.
485. For the full argument of this statement, vid Sugin, “Theories of distributive justice and limitations 
on taxation: what Rawls demands from tax systems”.
486. vid supra, 58.
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however, to advance an argument that will be developed later,487 I would say rather 
that Rawls is not able to explain why we have taxation per se as opposed to any other 
mechanism able to achieve (re)distributive justice respecting his two principles of 
justice.
3.2. Dworkin: Redistributive taxation as insurance against bad luck?
Ronald Dworkin’s contributions to the theory of distributive justice can be read as 
offering corrections to perceived deficiencies in Rawls’ theory.488 Throughout his 
career, Dworkin argues that equality and liberty are not values in conflict because they 
should stand together for liberals whom, as Dworkin put it, are committed to equal 
liberty. In the debate concerning distributive justice he advocates for equality of 
resources. More precisely, he argues that the standard of equality should be equality of 
resources and not welfare or strict material equality. Equality of resources is an ex-ante 
criterion of equality (as opposed to the difference principle that is an ex-post 
criterion) that justifies economic differences that follow from individuals’ decisions for 
which they are responsible. Therefore, for Dworkin, economic inequalities are justified 
so long as they are an expression of individual choices for which each is responsible. 
This implies that inequalities that are a consequence of bad luck or which derive from 
differences in the natural distribution of talents highly valued by the market are not 
justified. Therefore, within this scheme redistribution is justified only when it is 
necessary for equality of resources (and not for welfare or simple ex-post equality of 
resources because in these cases redistribution goes against responsibility). Dworkin 
develops his idea of distributive justice as an expression of the two basic principles of 
justice that he advocates for, namely equal concern and respect.489
The function of taxes in Dworkin’s theory is, therefore, to secure the equal 
initial distribution of resources necessary to consider everyone with equal concern and 
respect. But what is the justification for (progressive) taxation? Dworkin offers an 
487. This argument will be fully fleshed out later on when discussing Murphy and Nagel’s ideas on 
taxation, vid infra, 148.
488. vid, Dworkin, Justice In Robes, Ch9.
489. Dworkin defines these two principles in different ways in different works. Sometimes he calls them 
equal concern and dignity, while in other works he refers to them as principles of ethical 
individualism. These principles are advocated for throughout his work, vid, Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously; A Matter of Principle; Sovereign Virtue; Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a new political 
debate; and, Justice for Hedgehogs.
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original argument to show that every rational individual would agree with 
redistributive taxation by building an analogy between taxation and a hypothetical 
insurance against bad luck. This is a hypothetical insurance because we live in fully 
operative societies and cannot expect to stop everything in order to redefine the 
extant distribution of goods to satisfy the demands made by equality of resources.490 
The hypothetical exercise proposed by Dworkin consists of determining the 
conditions under which prudent individuals would have bought insurance against bad 
luck and the natural distribution of talents. This system would make individuals 
responsible for their future; those who buy insurance will avoid future risk and those 
who do not will be responsible for their position. Dworkin assumes that everyone will 
buy insurance – those who have benefitted from luck and from natural talents and 
those who have not – in a hypothetical initial situation of equality. As a result, every 
member of a particular political community would buy insurance to forestall those 
inequalities that are not ascribable to them. The price of each of these hypothetical 
insurance policies would be determined by following the existent conditions of the 
insurance market, as we know it today. Just as happens in the existing insurance 
market, insurance premiums would be fixed according to the risk that each individual 
carries according to his or her position in the existing distribution of goods or well-
being. With this argument Dworkin makes sure that those who have a bigger risk 
(those who can lose more) will pay more for insurance than those who have a lower 
risk (those who do not risk much), just as happens in the insurance market today. 
Consequently, the hypothetical insurance system operates through progressive rates 
and justifies redistribution whenever unjustified inequalities affect individuals. 
Dworkin’s aim is to show that rational individuals would agree with a progressive and 
redistributive tax system.
If Dworkin’s argument is successful at justifying everyone’s interest in a 
progressive redistributive insurance scheme (and for the sake of my argument here let 
us assume that it is) why should we not replace taxes for that system? The point I am 
trying to make here is that, a corollary to Dworkin’s argument is that any other 
institution able to achieve the same economic effects can replace taxes. 
490. In “Sovereign Virtue revisited”, Dworkin adds that this insurance scheme is hypothetical since it is 
based on counterfactual arguments that explain how the insurance market would work in case 
individuals would have contracted.
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However, as I will argue in what follows and in chapter four, something is lost 
when we assume that what needs justification in taxation is only the economic result 
that a redistributive policy aims at. Let me just outline the reasons why I believe taxes 
are different from insurance in a significant political sense, that is, not only in the 
trivial sense that they are conventionally different institutions in the Rawlsian 
conception of institutions defined above. Taxes and insurance might be analogue in 
economic terms, but they have different political meanings and, hence, they are 
intrinsically different. I will argue that an individual who is being taxed and an 
individual who pays for insurance are not performing the same kind of activity, from 
the point of view of justice. In fact, it is not even the same kind of individual who 
takes part in each of these activities. In the former individuals acting as citizens have a 
duty to pay taxes, while in the latter individuals acting as rational economic agents buy 
insurance according to their economic interests. There are differences between taxes 
and an insurance market that have to do with the way in which we relate to each 
other. As citizens we assume that there is a certain kind of equality of status from 
which some of our duties derive; as insured individuals we have no political 
relationship with those who participate in that market, other individuals appear as a 
nuisance against whom I have to protect my economic interests. Furthermore, an 
important difference between taxes and insurance is that, in the former, revenue is 
destined to whatever ends the political community decides, while the latter they are 
paid in exchange of something according to the will of the insurance buyer. To recall 
Seligman’s definition of taxation – according to the classical paradigm – ‘the 
compulsory contribution from the person to the government to defray the expenses 
incurred in the common interests of all, without reference to special benefits conferred’.491 In 
other words, there is an important dissociation between private property and public 
expenditure. On the contrary, in Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme the 
(hypothetical) individual decides what to do with his property. Of course, Dworkin 
could argue that to act differently would be irrational, but this would not be an answer 
to the problem that I am trying to pose. Individuals would still have the last word on 
their property (otherwise it would not make sense to talk about private property in a 
contractual scheme) and the insurance scheme cannot explain why the duty to pay 
491. Seligman, Essays in Taxation, 304. [Emphasis added].
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taxes (as we know it today) assumes that the will of individuals is not needed for the 
duty to exist.
It is not strange to say that one of the characteristics that substantially 
differentiates taxes from other social interactions from which duties are created is that 
they imply a denial of private property. It is proper of taxes that taxpayers lose the 
possibility of directly determining either who will benefit from or what revenue will 
be destined for. As we shall see later, when analysing Murphy and Nagel’s ideas, taxes 
imply that private property does not exist before taxes. In this sense, taxes are a 
constant reminder of the conventional character of private property. Before moving to 
this analysis, however, let me first conclude the analysis of Rawls and Dworkin’s ideas 
about economic institutions. This is important because I show that besides the 
problems with justifying taxation merely instrumentally, there are other (internal) 
problems with Rawls and Dworkin’s theories of justice that have consequences for the 
best understanding of taxation.
3.3. Does an economic system require a moral idea of citizenship?
One of the most interesting ideas that Rawls has in mind when discussing the way in 
which the ‘principles of justice as fairness apply to the basic structure of society’ is that 
the ‘cumulative effect of social and economic legislation […] specify the basic 
structure’.492 This is important for Rawls because, as he says,
the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens 
come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they 
want to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an 
economic system is not only an institutional device for satisfying 
existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning 
wants in the future. How men work together now to satisfy 
their present desires affects the desires they will have later on, 
the kind of persons they will be. […] Since economic 
arrangements have these effects, and indeed must do so, the 
choice of these institutions involves some view of human good 
and of the design of institutions to realize it. This choice must, 
therefore, be made on moral and political as well as on 
economic grounds.493
492. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 229; also, Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, 10–12, 39–42.
493. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 229.
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It is important for Rawls to make this point in order to explain that the two principles 
of justice as fairness ‘despite its individualistic features […] are not contingent upon 
existing desires or present social conditions’.494 This allows him to answer possible 
criticisms against his idea that the principles of justice could be decided from an 
Archimedean point independent of the circumstances in which individuals are 
situated. This is not, however, the criticism that I wish to put forward. I believe that 
what Rawls fails to create is what he calls an ‘essential idea’. In his words, he wants to 
‘account for the social values, for the intrinsic good of institutional, community, and 
associative activities, by a conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is 
individualistic’.495 So the analysis he develops to appraise economic institutions implies 
adopting a predominantly moral perspective. But is the moral perspective adopted by 
Rawls the right one for his purpose? Does he show the ‘intrinsic good’ of 
‘institutional, community, and associative activities’? I would like to argue that, his 
individualistic conception of justice is not able to offer a solid foundation to what he 
was aiming to produce, that is, a proper account of the ‘intrinsic good of institutional 
[…] activities’. At best, Rawls can argue for the existence of an instrumental good in 
certain market and capitalist arrangements. I have already shown how his conception 
of the role of taxation rests on the classical paradigm and how this cannot be but an 
instrumental justification for taxation. Here I want to broaden the scope of the 
criticism beyond the realm of taxation.
This problem I want to highlight in Rawls’ theory of justice also affects 
Dworkin’s argument, in particular regarding his claim that distribution is determined 
according to a broader consideration of social arrangements.
The distribution that any society achieves is a function of its 
laws and policies, not only its property and tax laws, but the full, 
complex legal structure that its citizens and officials enact and 
enforce.496
Dworkin makes this point to argue that his conception of distributive justice is more 
complex than that of achieving economic equality, that his notion of equality of 
resources is a sort of equality of status that includes other aspects of equality, such as 
494. ibid, 232.
495. ibid, 233.
496. Dworkin, “Equality, luck and hierarchy”, 197–198.
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political equality.497 Hence, he expects to show that the distribution any society 
achieves is a function of the adoption of the principles of justice he argues for, namely 
equal concern and respect. But what kind of equal concern and respect can be 
expected from the individuals who take part in the institutional arrangements that he 
advocates for? I want to argue that the institutional framework defined by Dworkin 
does not allow for an equal concern and respect deeper than the one that individuals 
who meet in the market can aspire to, that is to say an instrumental notion according 
to which each individual shows each other equal concern and respect as long as it is 
useful for their economic interests.
Thus, in Rawls and Dworkin’s theories there is an expansion of the logic of 
the market that goes beyond market institutions. In more perspicuous terms, the kind 
of justification Rawls and Dworkin provide for taxation is not one that should be 
expected for a practice that is supposed to work with a logic different from the market 
one. Taxation limits the logic of the market, modifying the market distribution of 
goods by embodying a definition of what we owe to each other; taxes modify market 
rationality (not only its results). On the contrary, Rawls’ conception of political 
economy and his principles of justice imply that individuals understand themselves as 
concerned with their own well-being, just as individuals normally behave in the 
market (and a similar point might be elaborated in the case of Dworkin).
This is important for the argument I am trying to develop because the kind of 
individual presupposed by liberal egalitarians has no (economic) reason to agree with 
taxation (perhaps they will only have reasons to purchase insurance). In other words, 
taxation cannot be justified as affecting market distribution (by developing the 
allocative or distributive tasks assigned to it by Rawls) for egalitarian reasons,498 but 
only as making possible inequalities to which we would agree as a result of exchanges 
within a market economy. This idea is evident in Dworkin’s hypothetical market 
insurance. Here individuals are supposed to behave as market agents who are 
convinced to buy insurance (because they are self-interested), thus completely 
replacing the logic of taxation. This has consequences for tax avoidance. Institutions 
497. vid ibid, where he brings this argument against a critique posed by Samuel Scheffler in “What is 
egalitarianism?”.
498. I explain what I mean by equality as a political ideal infra, 168. For the time being it is suffice to say 
that this conception of equality tries to rescue the political aspiration underlying the demand for 
equality.
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created under the conception of the individual here criticised embedded conditions 
under which each has reasons to behave strategically to improve his individual market 
distribution (by not fulfilling his tax duties). To this objection Rawls and Dworkin 
might reply that they were trying to justify taxation and tax law. However, if they 
provide a justification for taxation it can only be instrumental (and, therefore, not 
contain an intrinsic good). From this perspective tax law can only appear as 
instrumental coercion aiming to achieve necessary redistribution for the correct 
functioning of the market (and its justified inequalities under the principles of justice, 
that is either Rawls’ justice as fairness or Dworkin’s equality of resources). As a 
consequence, these theories are not able to provide the substantive content that I am 
looking (and arguing) for regarding the justification of taxation. Two consequences 
follow: Rawls and Dworkin either (1) provide a justification for the classical paradigm 
of taxation, or if they deny (1) they have to assume (2) the classical paradigm with all 
its problems.
3.3.1. The moral limits of markets
In a recent book,499 Debra Satz convincingly argues that markets should be assessed 
not only for the good things we can achieve through them (mainly efficient allocation 
of goods and voluntary cooperation among strangers),500 but should also have in mind 
‘the effects […] on social justice, and on who we are, how we relate to each other, and 
what kind of society we can have’.501 So, Satz argues, markets have to be evaluated not 
only by considering their economic effects, but also through their political and moral 
consequences. She proposes a return to the classical political economists (Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo and Karl Marx) for whom the nature and limits of the markets are 
different than for contemporary economists, who apply market logic to any possible 
social interaction. For classical political economists, the market is ‘socially embedded’ – 
so it may have limits – and they understand that it might ‘shape societies as well as 
individuals’.502 Satz convincingly concludes that classical political economists are 
concerned with the distribution of the social product among different social classes as 





guided by their conceptions of a good society.503 Contemporary economists, on the 
contrary, approach economic problems as if everything might be reduced to economic 
relations between homogeneous individuals who behave as consumers. In the third 
chapter of her book, Satz subjects contemporary egalitarian political theory and the 
role it assigns to the market to revision. For this purpose, she introduces a distinction 
between general egalitarianism and specific egalitarianism.
According to Satz, general egalitarians ‘believe that the goal of efficiency entails 
that any desired redistribution take place through progressive taxation and transfer, not 
through a limit on the scope of the market’.504 On the contrary, specific egalitarianism 
‘requires that particular goods not be distributed using a market at all, even when 
blocking exchanges in these goods is inefficient’ and that ‘some scarce goods […] 
should be distributed (in kind) equally to all’.505 According to Satz, Ronald Dworkin’s 
theory of justice presents an example of general egalitarianism while Michael 
Walzer’s506 an example of specific egalitarianism.
Satz convincingly argues that Dworkin’s reliance on the market as ‘intrinsically 
connected to the distributive implications of treating people with equal concern and 
respect’ is a mistake. Markets, according to Satz, cannot tell us ‘what resources people 
are entitled to or what distributive outcomes are fair’.507 Her main argument is that 
sometimes treating individuals as equals requires more than providing them with 
resources, as happens with individuals with disabilities and female caregivers for 
example.508 The problem for people with disabilities is that even if they are given 
plenty of resources these are not enough for them to ‘achieve inclusion in society as 
equals’.509 I understand that Satz is trying to provide an argument to show that there is 
a group of important inequalities that cannot be solved using the ‘tax and transfer’ 
system because some inequalities do not respond to the logic of the market: they are 
related to the complex interaction of different institutions and institutional positions 




506. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism & Equality.




important category differences between market and moral interactions and the first do 
not cover the complexities of the second. In her words, ‘[f]ocusing on what 
distributions markets throw up will not tell us under which conditions people can 
interact as equals’.510 In this sense, market interactions already contain an idea as to 
how individuals should behave (as rational economic agents) and this says nothing of 
how we should relate to each other outside of the market. Dworkin’s ideas about the 
market conceive its instrumental goods as if they were intrinsic goods.
This also explains, in part, the concerns of specific egalitarians such as Michael 
Walzer.511 Walzer considers that there are certain specific goods that should not be left 
to market exchange because they could ‘change and degrade’512 their meaning. Satz 
argues that adopting this argument in order to limit markets has two problems: it is 
difficult to show that there is a shared value or that we assign the same meaning to 
certain goods, and, even if this problem could be solved by assigning or sharing a 
common meaning for certain goods, there is no close connection between ‘this 
understanding and the use of markets’.513 Markets are ‘typically instrumental 
mechanisms for achieving our ends; a market price is rarely the direct expression of 
our evaluative attitudes towards a good’.514 
So Satz contends that the solution to the problems she is trying to address is 
not to determine the criteria under which goods should be distributed,515 but to look 
at the ‘conditions under which cooperating members of a society can interact as 
equals’.516 Satz proposes that certain markets be restricted or that trading certain goods 
be blocked whenever those markets are ‘noxious’.517 I am interested in exploring the 
way in which Satz takes seriously the idea of the market and political economy 
assumed by classical political economists. This is important for the argument that I am 
developing because it shows that even if Rawls and Dworkin declare that they are 
510. ibid, 76.
511. Satz mentions other authors that she considers to be specific egalitarians, among which Elizabeth 
Anderson, Michael Sandel and Margaret Jane Radin have a place.






517. She develops the argument in ibid, Ch4.
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concerned with the way in which economic institutions have consequences for ‘the 
kind of persons [we] will be’, there are reasons to suspect that they are only paying lip 
service to the existence of a connection between institutions and those who live 
under those institutions.
Satz is concerned with developing criteria that will allow her to show that 
certain markets ‘need to be blocked or severely constrained’ because these (noxious 
markets) can endanger the equal standing that individuals owe to each other as citizens 
in a democracy.518 The consequence of her argument is that if other values are to be 
brought into the market, market interactions are to be transformed by setting moral 
limits to them before they change us. At the same time, this implies that certain social 
interactions ought to be kept out of the market. Satz considers that equal citizenship is 
one of those social interactions that should be kept away from the market. For this to 
be achieved the elements (‘preconditions’ according to Satz) that constitute the equal 
status of citizenship should be secured for every individual. She adds that these should 
be thought of in general as ‘social practices and not acts’.519 These ideas are endangered 
once a market approach is adopted and legitimised to explain interactions among 
citizens. As Satz says,
Human beings are malleable in a way that goods such as apples 
are not. We do not usually need to worry about the 
noneconomic effects of a market on the apples exchanged, but 
we do need to worry about whether a particular kind of market 
produces or supports passivity, alienation, or a ruthless egoism. 
Labor markets may be structured so as to accustom people to 
being pushed around and managed by others.520
With all these elements covered it is now time to take stock of the argument so far. 
Why is Satz’s argument about the moral limits of markets relevant to the argument 
that I am developing about taxation? Satz is concerned that Dworkin’s ideas about the 
moral justification of markets under equality of resources are unable to explain why 
some markets should be hardly regulated or even blocked. This would imply that we 
are not able to explain why in modern democracies we aim at equality of status and 
not the equality required for acting in the market. In more general terms, Satz’s 





Dworkin’s instrumental justifications for taxation. The instrumental justification 
deprives from taxation its public elements, reducing it to a private concern for 
individuals interacting in the market. In this sense, taxes are merely instrumental in 
achieving a particular economic result but have no relation to how we understand 
each other as citizens. Hence, Rawls and Dworkin cannot explain why taxes are part 
of those public institutions with which citizens are concerned. Thus far, Rawls’ 
allocative and distributive functions assigned to taxation, and Dworkin’s analogy 
between taxation and a hypothetical insurance, are not useful for justifying taxation. 
On the contrary, we lose important aspects of taxes in relation to citizenship 
obligations (in opposition to contractual market obligations).
3.3.2. Political economy for citizens or economics for market agents?
Rawlsians might rejoinder that my argument is unfair to Rawls’ justice as fairness. In 
order to establish if my argument is indeed unfair, is the question as to whether Rawls’ 
conception of political economy is compatible with an appropriate conception of 
citizens – as he expects to show when he includes distributive justice within the basic 
institutions of society as a reflection of the principles of justice – or, on the contrary 
and notwithstanding the above,521 that his basic structure mirrors a conception of a 
political economy tailored for market agents.
There are two reasons for saying why Rawls is not immune to my critique. 
The first is that he explicitly acknowledges that markets distributions can and should 
be corrected through taxation, and that taxation works as a corrective for market 
inefficiencies. In fact, if we follow Satz’s arguments Rawls assumes that markets should 
be corrected whenever they bring problems to efficiency. Furthermore, redistribution 
should be used to allow individuals to participate in market transactions. Therefore, 
Satz’s arguments would also apply here. But there is a second, stronger reason, for 
saying that Rawls also assumes that individuals behave as market agents and that his 
principles of justice require this. This second reason questions the redistributive task 
assigned by Rawls to taxation. According to an argument put forward by Fernando 
Atria and Claudio Michelon, Rawls’ difference principle assumes and encourages 
individuals to behave as market maximisers.522 Atria and Michelon argue that if the 
521. vid Rawls’ quote supra, fn.493.
522. Atria and Michelon, “Una crítica al principio de diferencia”.
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difference principle is justified because of the conditions of justice assumed by Rawls 
(who here follows Hume) individuals who have a bigger part in market distribution 
are entitled to it because otherwise those who are in worse conditions would not 
benefit from the increase in the social product.523 Atria and Michelon argue that by 
incorporating the circumstances of justice in the justification of the difference 
principle (namely, the second element of the second principle of justice) Rawls 
includes ‘market motivation’ as a ‘fact of human nature’. Following Atria and 
Michelon, the difference principle can only be introduced by Rawls once he 
naturalises human motivation as market motivation. Market motivation means that 
individuals have an incentive to produce so long as they can appropriate the fruits of 
their labour. So inequality is not only justified but is also necessary for ‘just’ 
institutions.524 Along the same lines, G. A. Cohen develops his argument against market 
incentives to show that Rawls does not stand up to the importance he assigns to 
fraternity.525 Cohen argues that the justification of inequalities brought by the 
difference principle ‘presupposes a model of society as non-community, in which 
relations among human beings are construed as strategic, with people taking one 
another into account as so many opportunities for and, obstacles to, gain, rather than as 
fellow citizens’.526 Cohen argues that this could lead towards a justification of, or take 
as a given, two kinds of inequalities that those who defend the difference principle 
would not accept: (1) structural inequalities and (2) ‘inequality-endorsing attitudes’.527 
Therefore, for Cohen, committed egalitarians can only accept the inequalities that the 
difference principle would justify whenever achieving equality is not possible because 
of existing circumstances. These egalitarians would then have a commitment with 
523. ibid, 222ff.
524. Elsewhere, I argue that Rawls’ theory of justice should be interpreted as a justification for the 
institutional arrangements existing in the USA at the historical moment in which Rawls was 
living and not as a theory aiming for justice. In other words, Rawls’ conception of justice is not 
able to explain how political concepts have an effect on political action; he limits his theory to 
morally justify existing capitalist institutional arrangements. vid, Saffie, “De la reciprocidad a la 
fraternidad”.
525. Cohen, Rescuing Justice & Equality, Ch1. This is a reproduction of his 1991 Tanner Lecture, 
‘Incentives, Inequality, and Community’.
526. ibid, 15. For the details of the argument, vid, 32ff. This does not mean that Cohen opposes the 
difference principle as a ‘principle of intelligent policy’ (30, fn.7) or as ‘optimal from the point of 
view of distributive justice’ (85, fn.7) in the absence of an egalitarian ethos, but as a principle of 
justice. Atria and Michelon do not make this distinction, although their arguments seem to reject 
the difference principle tout court.
527. ibid, 33.
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equality adjusted by reality (but not a commitment with inequality as a principle of 
justice).528 This distinction explains why egalitarians should oppose policies that rest on 
incentives for the well-off, such as tax cuts, namely because they go against equality as 
a principle of justice and do not pass the ‘interpersonal test’ for a ‘comprehensive 
justification’ proper of ‘justificatory communities’.529 So Cohen’s criticism of the 
difference principle as a principle of justice is that because it assumes that individual 
behaviour rests on incentives, it makes impossible a justificatory community among 
the well-off and the worse-off in political societies. The difference principle, therefore, 
‘tolerates inequality which is not necessary to improve the prospects of the worse-
off ’.530 I will discuss the consequences that Cohen derives from this argument shortly.
With this last argument we are now in a position from which we can conclude 
the argument against Rawls and Dworkin’s justifications for taxation. I have argued 
that Rawls and Dworkin cannot offer justifications for taxation but that their theories 
should be read as attempts to provide justifications for a certain level of redistribution. 
Hence, their justifications for taxation assume that taxation is subordinated to the 
moral justification of redistribution. Therefore, if redistribution is subject to the 
underlying assumptions of the market, taxation can only be instrumentally justified. 
The problem then is twofold: (1) Rawls and Dworkin cannot offer a justification for 
taxation per se (because any other instrument could achieve the same functions) and 
(2) taxation can only be justified as long as it benefits the individual who is paying. 
Here they assume the classical paradigm and they do so with a vengeance: taxation 
becomes the justification for market capitalism.531 Rawls and Dworkin’s 
instrumentalist justifications for taxation expect individuals to behave as market agents 
convinced that taxation will allow market incentives to continue operating against 
their expressed concerns with the achievement of fraternity or equal concern and 
respect among fellow citizens.
We can now move one step further. In what follows I aim to show that under 
the assumptions of liberal egalitarian theories of justice, taxation cannot justify tax law 
528. ibid, 34.
529. ibid, 41–46.
530. Murphy, “Institutions and the demands of justice”, 265. [Emphasis in the original].
531. This is not to say that they justify private property. I offer an interpretation of how taxes justify 
private property, but not a market capitalist system, vid infra, 202.
148
per se. The instrumental justification of taxation justifies any instrument able to achieve 
a particular expected level of distributive justice as the distribution of goods, but does 
not justify tax law per se. To sustain this point I analyse Liam Murphy and Thomas 
Nagel’s attempt to justify tax law and tax policy that paradoxically ends in leaving tax 
law and taxation behind. As I mentioned above, this is the Murphy and Nagel paradox.
3.4. Murphy and Nagel: The myth of taxes? 
Is it possible to analyse the justice of a tax system within a particular political 
community independent from the totality of institutional, political and economic 
arrangements of which it is a part? In one of the central arguments of their book The 
Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, Murphy and Nagel try to show that the answer to 
this question must be negative. According to them, one of the problems that constantly 
affect discussions about justice and tax policies is one of ‘myopia’. This problem 
consists of assuming that ‘justice in taxation [is] a separate and self-contained political 
issue. […] For what counts as justice in taxation cannot be determined without 
considering how government allocates its resources’.532 Thus, applying an economic 
criterion to measure distributive justice, what is relevant is not exclusively to establish 
a principle of justice according to which we can determine how much each taxpayer 
is to contribute. According to Murphy and Nagel, we are supposed to assess the final 
position in which individuals are after a distribution cycle. The crucial question, 
therefore, is to determine how much a person contributes and how many resources 
the government transfers to the same person. The solution they propose to this myopic 
approach is to broaden the view and to include in the discussion about justice in a 
particular economic system (not only about tax policy) the general scheme of fiscal 
revenue and fiscal distributions. Distributive justice requires, for Murphy and Nagel, 
knowledge about how much will constitute the welfare level that each member of a 
political community counts at any particular moment in time.
The second central element in Murphy and Nagel’s argument points to a 
problem in considering that principles of justice in taxation, namely the standards used 
to evaluate justice in tax policy (that specify a classical criteria of equity in tax 
matters)533 are applicable when evaluating and deciding upon tax policy. According to 
532. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 14.
533. vid supra, 85.
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Murphy and Nagel, these criteria of justice should be abandoned as they are founded 
upon a mistake. If the first problem consists of a myopic view that only considers 
revenue as part of a distribution scheme without considering the benefits given by the 
government (including the benefits derived from living within an institutionalised 
political community); the second problem, namely the use and application of 
principles of justice in taxation, assumes that the foundation from which the 
discussions of tax justice is predicated is a fair (market) distribution independent of the 
effects of taxes and a conventional scheme of rights, especially of the conventional 
definition of the right to private property.534 They call this mistake ‘everyday 
libertarianism’.535
With this argument, Murphy and Nagel show that traditional criteria for tax 
equity that aim to specify the economic principles of vertical and horizontal equity in 
the distribution of the tax burden assume that market distributions are fair.536 
According to the principle of vertical equity, justice in a tax system depends on 
unequals contributing unequally to tax revenue, put simply, those who have more pay 
greater taxes. Horizontal equity, on the other hand, demands that those in the same 
position pay the same taxes. Horizontal equity therefore rests on vertical equity. 
Murphy and Nagel argue that the problem with these traditional criteria for tax 
justice is the assumption that market distribution forms an adequate basis upon which 
to argue about justice in the tax system.537 In other words, if we follow these 
principles of justice in taxation – determining who are equal and according to which 
criteria – this implies accepting that the results of market distributions are just. 
‘Everyday libertarianism’ implies that existing economic institutions are just, even with 
all their assumptions, such as, for example, the idea that the right to private property is 
a natural right, that it is a right independent from our political decisions expressed in 
conventional definitions. What Murphy and Nagel remind us is that assuming that 
market distributions are just presupposes that there are politico-philosophical reasons 
that justify the application of an adjective to that distribution and those reasons cannot 
be but reasons provided by a libertarian theory of justice. Murphy and Nagel’s 
534. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 15.
535. ibid, 15, 31–37.
536. ibid, 16–39.
537. For a similar argument, vid Green, “Concepts of equity in taxation”, 89–95. Green criticises 
horizontal equity as predicated from a base that is not questioned by the criteria of equity.
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argument for tax policy would obtain once the ‘myopia’ is corrected and ‘everyday 
libertarianism’ abandoned, or so they seem to believe. Once ‘everyday libertarianism’ is 
abandoned private property should be understood as a conventional right, the 
definition and content of which depends on institutional arrangements (including 
taxes) justified according to a particular theory of justice (and, therefore, of a particular 
conception of distributive justice).
The concurrence of these two elements of the argument, namely that tax 
justice is an aspect of distributive justice as economic justice and that property rights 
are defined in a complex scheme of rules among which taxes are included, allow 
Murphy and Nagel to situate the argument at the level they so desire and as thus, 
within a broader discussion of political philosophy about which is the best conception 
of distributive justice.538 Therefore, taxes are necessarily one more element in a scheme 
of justice that conventionally defines private property. If we follow Murphy and 
Nagel’s argument we are invited to conclude that we cannot discuss pre-tax or post-
tax justice; we can only understand that the arch of a conception of distributive justice 
covers the discussion about taxation and private property:
All the normative questions about what taxes are justified and 
what taxes are unjustified should be interpreted […] as 
questions about how the system should define those property 
rights that arise through the various transactions – employment, 
bequest, contract, investment, buying and selling – that are 
subject to taxation.539
Once they reach this conclusion, Murphy and Nagel review the different aspects from 
which the justice of the tax system has been discussed. They apply their analytic 
scheme to analyse, in turn, debates surrounding the tax base, about how progressive 
the tax system should be, the application of taxes to inheritance, and the possible 
discrimination problems within a tax system.540 In all these cases the conclusion 
reached is the same: to be able to analyse the justice or injustice of political decisions 
in each of these aspects it is necessary to look to the general effects that result from the 
final distribution of the social product. Only then can the (distributive) state of affairs 
538. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 173.




be evaluated according to the conception of distributive justice better justified in 
moral terms.
Murphy and Nagel leave open the debate about which conception of 
distributive justice (utilitarian, liberal or egalitarian) should inform tax policy. They do 
not consider it necessary to make such a decision or argument because, they argue, it is 
possible to have a certain margin of theoretical disagreement in fundamental aspects of 
political and moral theory (which they claim happens between themselves). However, 
they agree as to the kind of function fulfilled by a tax system.541 Of course, according 
to Murphy and Nagel, the thicker the conception of distributive justice that is 
defended the more it will be demanded from the tax system. Yet they also argue that 
for the setting of limits for these demands it is necessary to have in consideration the 
economic effects of taxes. Here I quote the authors in extenso:
We believe that the main problem of socioeconomic justice is 
this. A capitalist market economy is the best method we have for 
creating employment, generating wealth, allocating capital to 
production, and distributing goods and services. But it also 
inevitably generates large economic and social inequalities, often 
hereditary, that leave a significant segment of society not only 
relatively but also absolutely deprived, unless special measures 
are taken to combat those effects. Our view is that while every 
government has the fundamental duty to guarantee security 
against coercion and violence, both foreign and domestic, and to 
provide the legal order that makes prosperity possible, it is 
almost as important to find ways of limiting the damage to the 
inevitable losers in market competition without undermining 
the productive power of the system. […] The most realistic aim 
is to try to ensure that everyone in the society should have at 
least a minimally decent quality of life.542
After this statement we can confidently situate Murphy and Nagel among those 
political philosophers who defend conceptions of distributive justice within the post-
Rawlsian liberal egalitarian tradition. As discussed earlier,543 according to this tradition 
some of the functions assigned to government are those that try to assure each 
individual has the minimal conditions for developing a life plan. This is especially 
important for those who do not benefit directly from market interactions. On the 
541. ibid, 181.
542. ibid. The same argument is repeated on 164.
543. vid supra, 120.
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other hand, those who benefit from market distributions should share part of their 
benefits with those in worse conditions. Thus, the government does not only provide 
the conditions that make it possible that the market works properly, it must also try to 
eliminate poverty. In Murphy and Nagel’s words, this is the ‘fundamental positive 
responsibility we have toward our fellow citizens’. They consider this to be even more 
important than ‘attacking inequalities at the upper end of the distribution’.544 So they 
advocate for what Fleischacker calls a modern conception of distributive justice. The 
final aim of this conception of distributive justice as economic justice is to secure a 
certain level of distribution of the social product in an adequate way among the 
members of a determined political society. But this adequacy is, as Murphy and Nagel 
state in the passage quoted above, the correct function of the market. This is the way 
in which Murphy and Nagel justify the function that taxes are called to fulfil. It is not 
only about obtaining the means for the state to provide public goods, but it is also 
about securing certain distributive effects and about this the market has something to 
say.545 In this way it is possible to secure economic progress with a minimum level of 
individual well-being for each person. 
This review of Murphy and Nagel’s arguments confirms what has been said 
before with the analysis of the Rawlsian and Dworkinian conceptions of distributive 
justice. It seems that liberal egalitarians assume that distributive justice only operates to 
secure and justify the inequalities that are a product of market distributions. This is 
problematic because it assumes that men behave as rational market agents, making it 
difficult to achieve justice without, at the same time, compromising with a sort of 
inevitable economic inequality produced by market capitalism. So liberal egalitarians 
defend a more limited version of the political economy than conveys the importance 
they claim to assign to it. 
Ultimately then, if we follow the argument and analysis proposed by Murphy 
and Nagel we should accept that taxation,
[H]as two primary functions. (1) It determines how much of a 
society’s resources will come under the control of government, 
for expenditure in accordance with some collective decision 
procedure, and how much will be left in the discretionary 
control of private individuals, as their personal property. Call this 
544. ibid, 182.
545. ibid, 25, 26, 147.
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public-private division. (2) It plays a central role in determining 
how the social product is shared out among different individuals, 
both in the form of private property and in the form of publicly 
provided benefits. Call this distribution.546
According to Murphy and Nagel, this is a conceptual and normative distinction that 
should be borne in mind when discussing economic justice and taxes. This distinction 
might have consequences in the design of fiscal policies because they are able to work 
independently; depending on what a particular conception of distributive justice 
demands, governments can deal with either function of taxation.
Indeed, as they argue taxes depend on the justification of the level of public-
private division and distribution that a particular government aims to achieve while at 
the same time not affecting the efficiency and economic growth that characterises 
capitalist market economies.547
It should be clear by now that the main functions assigned to taxes according 
to Murphy and Nagel (and in general, liberal egalitarians) are in the realm of 
economic policy. Taxes are instruments that fulfil a complex task, because the right 
design for tax policy should consider efficiency, the correct functioning of the market, 
and the ends of a particular theory of economic justice. Even if Murphy and Nagel do 
not expressly say so, this explains in part that the design of this ‘optimal’ tax system has 
been assigned to sophisticated economists who are able to tell us which tax policy 
design we need according to the results provided by complex mathematical models.548
Murphy and Nagel’s argument needs to be assessed on two different grounds. 
At the tax policy level they show that economic decisions cannot be evaluated 
independent of political decisions and institutions. What they term the ‘public-private 
division’ depends on the institutional arrangements decided by the members of a 
particular political society. The main consequence of this is that private property 
cannot be defined without considering taxation. Private property is what is left for 
individuals after the ‘public-private division’.549 However, and notwithstanding the 
546. ibid, 76. [Emphasis in the original].
547. vid supra, the main text accompanying fn.542.
548. vid, Kocherlakota, The New Dynamic Public Finance.
549. I believe that there is a problem in distinguishing between the two functions that Murphy and 
Nagel assign to taxation in the way they do so. I am not sure that in market economies, as 
defended by the authors, the ‘public-private division’ can be separated from ‘distribution’. This 
could only be differentiated if we assume that the ‘public-private division’ is static and previous to 
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importance of this insight, there is a paradox in the defence of taxes that they advocate: 
they do not say anything about tax law and taxation per se and end up justifying 
whichever institutional arrangement able to achieve the ends of a particular theory of 
distributive justice. This is the Murphy and Nagel paradox. This stems from the 
consequences that derive from a consideration of taxes as fulfilling merely economic 
functions (or that distributive justice is purely economic justice). This characterisation 
of taxes does not say much about taxation in itself and says even less about tax law per 
se. Any institutional arrangement able to achieve the two economic functions that 
Murphy and Nagel assign to taxation will suffice. It might be said that Murphy and 
Nagel do not consider this a problem. They even say when starting the book that taxes 
are ‘the most important instrument by which the political system puts into practice a 
conception of economic or distributive justice’.550 But of course, this is not an 
argument for taxation or tax law. Murphy and Nagel would have to accept that if we 
follow their conception of taxation, then tax law also becomes an instrument. Law is 
the means by which the results expected according to a particular tax policy design are 
coercively obtained. The coercion of law is the way in which we make sure that there 
are not any free riders that do not want to cooperate. But what distinguishes tax law 
from other areas of the law cannot be explained from this perspective. Neither can the 
authors explain how we come to be under the legal obligation to pay taxes.551 Even 
more importantly for the argument of this thesis, they cannot explain the conceptual 
difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion because a mere instrumental 
conception of tax law can only see tax evasion.552
market exchange. Once individuals exchange in the market we can only have ‘distribution’. 
However, if we take seriously their definition of the ‘public-private division’, then ‘distribution’ 
should also be a consequence and not a separate function of the ‘public-private division’. The main 
reason for this is that private property should always be subject to institutional division or the 
‘public-private division’. The distinction between the two functions can only work if the product 
of private property is private property independent of institutional arrangements. This is important 
because if we assume that the ‘private-public division’ is the important aspect of taxes, there is a 
constitutive connection between property and tax law according to which ‘redistribution’ does not 
make sense. I argue this infra, 202.
550. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 3. [Emphasis added].
551. vid supra, 93ff.
552. I would like to emphasise that the importance of the distinction is conceptual, because it allows us 
to better understand what it means to fulfil the obligation to pay taxes, even if tax avoidance and 
tax evasion might have the same conventional legal consequences. 
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As far as I can see, there are two possible alternatives for solving this paradox. 
Either we abandon the division of labour proposed by liberals, according to which 
institutions are the exclusive subject of justice and embrace an approach in which the 
role of the individual is important for achieving justice, as G. A. Cohen and Liam 
Murphy argue; or we abandon the liberal approach to institutions and political 
concepts tout court to redefine the relationship between institutions, political concepts 
and individuals’ behaviour. If we discard the first alternative then the door is open to 
explore the second. In what follows I explore the first alternative by reviewing a 
recent critique posed by Cécile Fabre to Cohen. I explore the second alternative in 
chapter five.
3.4.1. Murphy’s monism and Cohen’s egalitarian ethos
The analysis presented in the previous section leads us to the Murphy and Nagel 
paradox. Now we must explore one possible solution to this paradox. I call this 
possible solution the scope question and it entails questioning the Rawlsian idea that 
the basic structure of society is the subject of the principles of justice. The advocates of 
the scope question propose a modification to the applicability scope of the principles 
of justice whereby it also includes individuals. The analysis of this answer is important 
for the argument of this thesis because if successful it would provide a solution to tax 
avoidance.553 The answer would be formed in the following manner: if tax law is 
justified according to one or more fundamental principles of justice that apply to 
individuals and to institutions, then individuals should have to apply such a principle 
or principles to their everyday unconstrained choices in order to behave accordingly 
with what justice demands. If the principle or principles of justice entail egalitarian 
principles then something we can assume is that tax avoidance would not then be a 
form of conduct admissible according to any fundamental (egalitarian) principles of 
justice. 
Permit me to advance my problem with the scope question in a nutshell. I 
think it presents an unsatisfactory answer because (1) it stills rests on a mere 
instrumental conception of institutions that would leave us without any intrinsic 
553. I am not saying that these theories had this in mind. I am advancing an answer for my argument 
that might be produced by liberal egalitarians who have answered the scope question broadening 
the demands of justice by applying principles of justice to individuals.
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justification for existing and particular institutional arrangements; (2) it reduces legal 
duties to moral obligations; and (3) it is unable to explain how individual duties are 
born from legal institutions. Thus, liberal egalitarianism corrected by the scope 
question would leave us in the same place in which Prime Minister David Cameron 
left us in chapter one of this thesis, that is, with the understanding that tax avoidance is 
morally unacceptable.
In what follows I explore two answers to the scope question. The first is Liam 
Murphy’s monism in non-ideal justice. The second is Cohen’s egalitarian ethos of 
justice. Both answers are open to the same objection, to which I will turn after 
presenting Murphy and Cohen’s ideas.
Murphy proposes a monist approach to non-ideal justice. He argues that ‘any 
plausible overall political/moral view must, at the fundamental level, evaluate the 
justice of institutions with normative principles that apply also to people’s choices’.554 
His monism stands in opposition to what he calls the ‘dualist’ liberal approach to 
justice. According to the dualist approach, the ‘two practical problems of institutional 
design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of 
practical principle’.555 According to Murphy, monism is compatible with specific 
principles that apply only to particular policies, ‘such as the principle that taxation 
should be levied according to taxpayers’ “ability to pay”’, yet denies that this principle 
might be justified according to any ‘fundamental’ principle that ‘does not apply 
directly to people’s conduct’.556 Murphy’s is a non-ideal theory because he tries to 
show that there are demands of distributive justice even in circumstances of partial 
compliance, ‘where at least some others are not doing what they are required to do’.557
Murphy’s monism may work as an answer to the Murphy and Nagel paradox. 
According to this reading, monism would be compatible with any institution so long 
as the specific principle(s) of justice for that institution (for example, the ‘ability to pay 
554. Murphy, “Institutions and the demands of justice”, 253.
555. ibid, 254. [Emphasis added]. In this he mainly criticises Nagel’s defence of dualism contained in 
Equality and Partiality, Ch6 and Ch9.
556. Murphy, “Institutions and the demands of justice”, 254. I am not sure if Murphy would continue 
to defend this idea, that fundamental and specific principles might coexist. He and Nagel argue 
that the traditional criteria of tax equity cannot subsist if distributive justice is the standard for 
evaluating tax policy. I cannot explore this point further here. But contrast this argument by 
Murphy with Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, Ch2 and Ch3.
557. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, 5. vid also ibid, Ch.5.
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principle’ for taxation) is (are) justified according to the fundamental principle(s), that 
is, those principles that apply not only to institutions but also to individuals. Therefore, 
individuals would have the moral obligation to behave according to the fundamental 
principle(s) of justice, even when others do not fully comply with their institutional 
obligations. Notice that here I am not concerned with the content of the fundamental 
principle(s) of justice, but with the form of Murphy’s argument. This implies that tax 
avoidance would not be a problem for tax law because its demands would be 
equivalent to that of the fundamental principle(s) on which the institution is based. So 
individuals would still have the obligation to behave according to justice, even if they 
did not follow the letter of the law. This is so precisely because individuals would be 
under the same fundamental principle(s) of justice even in the absence of law. In this 
sense, the particular form adopted by the law would not provide any further specificity 
to the obligation as contained in the fundamental principle. Individuals would then be 
subject to duty within or outside the institution. Because Murphy is subject to the 
same criticism as Cohen, let me turn to Cohen’s argument before presenting a 
critique.
In Rescuing Justice & Equality, G. A. Cohen convincingly presents a critique 
against Rawls according to which focusing too much on the basic structure of society 
as the subject of justice implies missing the point of justice. Cohen argues that this is a 
consequence of the liberal approach, according to which there is a division of labour 
between what the state and the individual should do for justice. Rawlsian liberals 
would defend the idea that institutions are the subject of distributive justice (that the 
principles of justice apply to the basic structure of society), while individuals can do as 
they please privately. Cohen argues that, on the contrary, the demands of distributive 
justice are also applicable to individuals.558 In Cohen’s words, ‘[a] society that is just 
within the terms of the difference principle, […] requires not only just coercive rules, 
but also an ethos of justice that informs individual choices’.559 Here we recall Cohen’s 
idea about what a ‘justificatory community’ requires, namely that individuals behave in 
accordance with the difference principle ‘in their daily life and achieve a sense of their 
558. Cohen, Rescuing Justice & Equality, introduction and response to critics, and Cohen, “Where the 
action is: on the site of distributive justice”.
559. Cohen, Rescuing Justice & Equality, 16.
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own justice in doing so’.560 Cohen is interested in showing that this correction of the 
difference principle would fully justify egalitarian taxation rather than taxation 
according to the standard Rawlsian application according to which it should not affect 
the incentives that individuals have to act as rational market agents. So, an ethos of 
justice according to the difference principle, rather than coercive rules, is what is 
required so that in their choices individuals behave by following the demands of 
equality. According to Cohen, this ethos is also necessary for guiding choice within 
rules that cannot be designed so perfectly as to fit with what justice demands in all 
possible situations.561 So Cohen, as Murphy, also has a monist approach to the 
principles of justice.562
Cohen is concerned with correctly determining the site of distributive justice. 
He understands distributive justice as economic justice in the same terms that I have 
been discussing in this chapter: ‘justice (and its lack) in the distribution of benefits and 
burdens to individuals’.563 For this to be achieved, or in the terms I put it above and to 
answer the scope question, it is not enough to focus on the basic structure of society. 
Something more is needed.564 Cohen exemplifies his idea by analysing justice within 
the family. He shows that even if the family were to have been successfully included 
within the basic structure of society, as Susan Moller Okin demands in her critique of 
Rawls,565 the problem would still persist. Cohen seems to be saying that an extension 
of the basic structure of society to include more institutions to be subject to Rawls’ 
principles of justice would never suffice. There will always be space for some people, 
namely ‘those who have much more power than others’, and ‘to determine what 
560. Cohen, “Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice”, 8. [Emphasis in the original].
561. ibid, 10.
562. Some would argue that Cohen’s theory is also a case of non-ideal theory, vid Valentini, “Ideal vs. 
non-ideal theory: a conceptual map”. Cohen’s would be a realist non-ideal theory as he thinks that 
justice is not the only relevant value in political communities that is to be promoted. Therefore, we 
could never know what to do by attending exclusively to justice; justice should be pondered along 
with other values ibid, 657–658. I do not go deeper into this aspect of Cohen’s theory since it is 
not relevant for the argument that I make in this section.
563. Cohen, “Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice”, 12.
564. Cohen argues extensively that there is no clear definition of what Rawls would have included 
within this structure.
565. vid, Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family. For the argument that justice should be a central virtue for 
the family, vid Ch2, 26–33. For the argument that Rawls pays no attention to the internal justice of 
the family, vid Ch5, 93–97.
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happens within those rules’.566 With this argument Cohen tries to reaffirm the feminist 
claim, according to which ‘the personal is political’. However, he modifies the ‘site’ of 
that claim to state that the personal is political because ‘personal choices to which the 
writ of the law is indifferent are fateful for social justice’,567 and not merely because 
the personal is integrated into the basic structure of society, as Okin argues.
Although Cohen does not mention it in his argument, it seems to me that his 
ideas about the egalitarian ethos apply squarely to tax avoidance.568 Remember that 
tax avoidance, according to the contemporary general theory of tax law, implies that 
even where there are rules determining legal duties, individuals can legally avoid those 
rules when their action is not covered by a literal interpretation of the taxable event. 
The adoption of an ethos of justice would provide a solution to tax avoidance because 
if taxation were based on the right fundamental principle(s), individuals would have to 
comply with it even if a particular legal rule defining their tax liability did not 
explicitly refer to that principle. This would be a direct consequence of what justice 
demands from individuals according to the ethos of justice. Under such an ethos – 
according to which the principle(s) of justice that apply to institutions also applies to 
individuals – individuals concerned with justice and motivated by it should not 
choose to act in such a way that the fundamental principle of distributive justice is 
endangered by their personal behaviour. This is a plausible interpretation of Cohen’s 
ideas because even if he does not specifically refer to the justification of tax law in any 
of his works, he continually defends taxation as the means by which to achieve (his 
conception of) the fundamental principle of equality.569 Thus, it is possible to conclude 
that, according to Cohen, without the kind of ethos of justice he prescribes to political 
communities, tax law would be eroded through tax avoidance. To put it in positive 
566. Cohen, “Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice”, 23. [Emphasis in the original].
567. ibid, 24.
568. Cohen refers to two possible objections to his argument that he seems to admit would place into 
question his argument, vid the endnote to ibid, 29–30. The first is that the laws of the basic 
structure require compliance in order to be laws (according to Cohen, this is a possible Hartian 
objection based on H. L. A. Hart’s conception of social rules, vid Hart, The Concept of Law), while 
the second is that a coercive structure can only achieve its results if individuals comply (in 
opposition to being forced to comply). But if Cohen would have considered tax avoidance then he 
might have found a perfect example for his argument and an answer to these possible objections.
569. His notion of equality as equal access to advantage. vid, Cohen, “On the currency of egalitarian 
justice”, and “Equality of what? On welfare, goods, and capabilities”, Otsuka (ed), On the Currency 
of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, 61–72.
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terms, taxation could only exist in a society operating under such an egalitarian ethos. 
This conclusion is reaffirmed if we follow Cohen’s definition of the ethos of a society 
as ‘the set of sentiments and attitudes in virtue of which its normal practices, and 
informal pressures, are what they are’.570
So is the scope question successful in solving the problem for which we are 
trying to find an answer? I think it is not. Broadening the scope of the principles of 
distributive justice to include individuals and institutions is not a solution to the 
Murphy and Nagel paradox; rather it only makes it more manifest. As stated previously, 
Murphy and Cohen’s monist solution is unsatisfactory since it (1) rests on a merely 
instrumental conception of institutions, (2) resolves legal obligations into moral 
obligations, and (3) its not able to explain that (or indeed how) legal institutions 
specify individual obligations. I have already referred to the problems of (1) in the 
previous sections of this chapter so I will not return to this issue here. (2) and (3) can 
be understood as common issues that derive from assuming that the arguments in 
favour of principles of justice are moral arguments. Focusing on morality to explain 
the practical force of principles of justice denies what I will call in the next section 
‘institutional differentiation’ or why certain social interactions require different 
institutional arrangements. Because the first possible answer to the scope question 
analysed here does not recognise the importance of institutional differentiation, they 
are open to the sorts of criticism recently formulated by Cécile Fabre in relation to 
Cohen for the justification of taxation. To that criticism I now turn.
3.4.2. Can Cohen justify that taxation is not forced labour?
The first answer to the Murphy and Nagel paradox, the strategy of widening the 
scope of application of the principles of justice, ends up reducing distributive justice to 
a moral demand. In doing so monism and the ethos of justice cannot provide an 
explanation for institutional differentiation. Hence, any demand of justice is reduced to 
a moral demand and the Murphy and Nagel paradox is confirmed. Any institution 
able to achieve the moral demands of justice is fungible or functional equivalent or 
even irrelevant if individuals follow the principle of justice directly. So neither the 
scope strategy nor the liberal egalitarians justifications reviewed previously are able to 
grasp the importance of institutions. This is problematic because if we only observe 
570. Cohen, “Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice”, 28.
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certain distributive results and, consequently, limit our concern to assuring behaviour 
according to certain principles of justice, we will be led to a conceptual confusion 
which would have a detrimental effect to our ability to understand why institutions 
are relevant. So, for example, if we aim to ground social interactions on an egalitarian 
principle of justice it does not make any difference if we focus on the justification of 
taxation rather than on the egalitarian distribution of the work of individuals. As 
Nozick has famously argued, taxation and forced labour would be equivalent: both 
practices might be connected with equality at a moral level. Institutional 
differentiation is relevant because institutions embody important differences for the 
ways in which we relate to one another (recall the discussion above, p. 141ff, about the 
importance of market interactions for the classical political economist). The problem 
of institutional differentiation is clearly seen in a recent critique posed to Cohen by 
Fabre. Fabre’s critique might be read as demanding Cohen to fully take on board the 
consequence that would follow from his moral egalitarianism, that is to accept that 
taxation is indeed equivalent to forced labour. Fabre might not adhere to or agree 
with the critique formulated herein. However, this does not show that my argument is 
wrong but that Fabre is also subject to the institutional differentiation deficit.
In Distributive justice and freedom: Cohen on money and labour, Cécile Fabre 
criticises Cohen’s attempt to defend coerced taxation while at the same objecting to 
forced labour.571 Even if Fabre directs her critique specifically toward Cohen, she 
asserts that her argument still applies to any egalitarian theory that: (a) ‘claims the 
better-off are under an enforceable duty to transfer material resources to the poor or 
worse-off ’ and (b), ‘maintains that the talented are not under an enforceable duty of 
justice to labour for the sake of the worse-off ’.572 Thus, Fabre argues that (1) 
‘Cohenian egalitarians are committed to holding the talented under a moral duty to 
choose socially useful work for the sake of the less fortunate’ and (2) that, ‘Cohen’s 
arguments against coerced labour fail, particularly in the light of his commitment to 
coercive taxation’. In this sense, Cohen’s egalitarianism would be placed in doubt 
because of his partiality to ‘the interests of the better-off to the detriment of the less 
571. An argument Cohen makes in Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality, 230ff and Rescuing Justice & 
Equality, Ch5.
572. Fabre, “Distributive justice and freedom: Cohen on money and labour”, 395–396.
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fortunate’.573 As a consequence, liberal egalitarians would still be open to Nozick’s 
infamous challenge to coercive taxation, namely that it is equivalent to forced 
labour.574 Fabre concludes that under Cohenian egalitarianism the ‘talented are under 
a moral duty of justice to choose occupations which benefit the less fortunate’.575 I am 
not concerned here with the intricacies and details of the argument developed by 
Fabre in order to sustain her internal critique of Cohen. Neither am I interested in 
determining if she is right in that in moral terms there is no difference between 
coercing the talented into choosing a particular occupation for the benefit of others 
and taxation under egalitarianism. I simply want to highlight how two elements that 
underlie Fabre’s argument (and therefore Cohen’s also) are problematic. The first is the 
instrumental justification for taxation and the second is the moral foundation of 
distributive justice. By critically revising these two aspects of her argument I expect to 
restrict the domain of her critique to one that might apply to Cohen but not to 
egalitarians who are committed to the two points specified above as (a) and (b). 
Egalitarians might continue to hold (a) and (b) so long as they purge morality to 
provide space for politics and institutional differentiation. However, this assertion 
requires the arguments to be developed in chapter four and then fully fleshed out in 
chapter five. For the time being I want to focus on the two elements of Fabre’s 
argument to close the argument of this chapter by showing that the mere instrumental 
justification for taxation and the economic conception of distributive justice should be 
complemented if we are concerned with grasping a conception of both taxation and 
tax law able to solve the problems and shortcomings of the classical conception of tax 
law. This might also be put into more general terms: we should complement the 
economic conception of distributive justice if we want to recover the political aspect 
of our institutions and of equality.
573. ibid, 394. So Cohen would be exposed to a similar critique that the one he formulates against 
Rawls’ difference principle.
574. ‘Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour. Some persons find this claim 
obviously true: taking the earnings of an hour labour is like taking n hours from the person; it is 
like forcing the person to work n hours for another’s purpose. Others find that claim absurd. But 
even these, if they object to forced labour, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work for 
the benefit of the needy’. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 169. [Emphasis in the original].
575. Fabre, “Distributive justice and freedom: Cohen on money and labour”, 411.
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Although she only refers directly to this point in a footnote,576 throughout her 
paper Fabre assumes that taxation has an instrumental function that traditionally has 
been attached to it, that of achieving redistribution. Therefore, taxation is justified 
because of the benefits it may bring to the less favoured. If we combine this idea with 
the substantive ideal to be achieved (a conception of equality) then it is quite evident 
that there should not be any moral reasons for distinguishing taxation from other 
institutional arrangements capable of achieving the same result; Fabre does in fact do 
this by comparing taxation with forced labour. So she asserts that taxation implies a 
level of coercion that is acceptable to its ends (and she would extend this argument to 
cover forced labour). Compare this with what she says about justified coercion in 
punishment and criminal law. According to Fabre, punishing someone coercively 
requires a very high standard of epistemic certainty, so that the one who is punished is 
not used as a means. This leads her to justify criminal law under a retributive approach. 
However, when it comes to taxation and forced labour, Fabre would justify both 
under less demanding epistemic constraints because both are to be evaluated 
considering their ends, that is considering the benefits that would develop for the less 
fortunate. Fabre leaves open the question as to whether her argument redefines 
Cohenian egalitarianism in such a way as to make its egalitarian demands 
unacceptable. However, even if that debate is still open what I want to emphasise that 
it is with such a moral argument the instrumental justification for taxation has finally 
arrived to absolute moral instrumentality. So even if Fabre argues that coercion might 
be worthy in such cases as when ‘the law, pace Cohen, often helps [agents] develop the 
right mindset in their dealings with one another’, she suggests that this could happen 
with the law because it ‘can also help instil in agents adaptive preferences which are 
conducive to equality’.577 As I argue in the next chapter, I agree with Fabre in that the 
law can teach us to behave in certain ways. But precisely because of this, how can this 
be made compatible with a merely instrumental conception for taxation? What do we 
learn about equality? If we follow her argument we learn that equality is a result to be 
achieved by any possible institutional arrangement as long as it is correctly justified in 
moral terms. My point is that if Fabre wants to take this idea seriously so that agents 
by ‘being coerced, […] get used to doing it [behave as equality demands], learn to see 
576. ibid, 405 fn16.
577. ibid, 408.
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the advantages of doing it, and so on’,578 what is needed is not an instrumental 
justification of institutions but an intrinsic one. In other words, one that shows the 
good the practice in which the institution is based aspires to. This is the task that I 
assign to institutional differentiation. In this particular case, institutional differentiation 
should be able to provide reasons for distinguishing forced labour from coercive 
taxation. As I argue in chapter four by following Claudio Michelon, institutional 
differentiation does this labour by mediating on political ideals and their concrete 
instantiation.
The second problem with this approach is the moral foundation of the 
economic conception of distributive justice. By the moral foundation of distributive 
justice I refer to the common liberal egalitarian and luck egalitarian redirection of 
their claim to equality and to a moral principle. However, this attempt to moralise the 
normative source of redistribution denies the political dimension of equality and 
distributive justice. Liberal egalitarians and luck egalitarians seem to be committed to 
obtaining a particular level of equality in the distribution of certain goods, rather than 
with always being open to political demands for equality.579 Therefore, they would first 
define the principle of distributive justice and then expect to achieve the equality 
demanded by that principle of justice, either through coercive institutions or by direct 
appeal to the moral principle. Liberal egalitarians and luck egalitarians have a positive 
idea as to what might be achieved by (an instrumental conception of) institutions. 
However, the political demand for equality turns this relationship on its head. Rather 
than being a standard of distribution for particular goods, equality is understood as a 
political ideal: a reason that prompts political action. In this sense, the ideal of equality 
is always open to redefinition. The political approach is pessimistic with respect to the 
work of existing institutions but it is positive regarding the ideal. The political ideal 
works as a constant source of critique. It is what explains the requirement of constant 
institutional reform. In taxation, for example, the underlying demand for equality 
expresses a demand for mutual recognition (through property) rather than for material 
equality. In this scheme distributive justice depends on the political content of that 
demand for political equality. In this sense the relevant question regarding taxation and 
578. ibid.
579. The vagueness in this phrasing is due to the different possible contents that might be argued for 
these concepts, vid infra 168.
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tax law is not the liberal egalitarian and luck egalitarian motto with which I began this 
section; it is not ‘Why should I pay taxes?’ but ‘Why do we have taxes?’. These ideas are 
further developed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR. TAXES AS PRACTICES WITH AN INTERNAL GOOD
1. INTRODUCTION
I finish the analysis of the previous chapter by proposing a pessimistic approach to 
institutions (the immanent) combined with a positive standing toward political ideals 
(the transcendental). Furthermore, I show that the economic approach to distributive 
justice, combined with a moral demand for equality, creates a problem for egalitarians 
that is particularly troubling in taxation, namely the Murphy and Nagel paradox. 
Moreover, their argument might end up justifying too much, as in the case of Cohen 
and forced labour. I conclude that liberal egalitarians and luck egalitarians end up 
missing the political aspect of equality and the significance of distribution. They start 
with the wrong question (‘Why should I pay taxes?’) because they assume that 
individuals are entitled to property as within the classical paradigm of tax law.
The question posed should be a different one: ‘How are we as citizens to 
understand what living together means?’ I am not an isolated individual who needs to 
be convinced that paying taxes works in my own interests. As individuals situated 
within political communities we are citizens and this in itself supposes that there are 
some burdens that we have to share. These burdens are connected with what being a 
citizen involves among those who share a particular political project, the collective 
project of autonomy. This project is another way of putting across the idea that we aim 
at fraternity, that is to say recognition of our mutual dependency. In other words, an 
understanding of taxation (able to provide a solution to tax avoidance)580 cannot be 
‘found simply by appeal to self-interest and instrumental rationality […] what needs to 
be reformed in these cases is people’s understanding of the meaning of their 
relationship to those with whom they are interacting’.581 In this chapter I try to offer 
an alternative to the liberal tradition in which these ideas have a place. The argument 
is structured in five parts. In the first I offer a reading of equality in which it is 
recovered as a political ideal rather than as a material state of affairs (section 2). With 
that in place I focus on rescuing the political dimension of distributive justice at the 
expense of its economic conception (section 3). In the third part of the argument I 
introduce MacIntyre’s distinction between practices with internal goods and 
580. In the next chapter I build the bridge between these ideas.
581. Anderson, “Beyond Homo Economicus: new developments in theories of social norms”, 198.
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institutions with external goods; this is important for showing how taxation and tax 
law might have an intrinsic rather than an instrumental good (section 4). The fourth 
part of the argument argues that the internal good of taxation is mutual recognition 
(section 5). I fully resolve the argument by revisiting the relationship between taxation 
and private property to show how they are constitutively connected (section 6). The 
conclusion of this argument is that we are under an obligation to pay taxes even if 
there is no need for redistribution.
2. WHAT IS THE POINT OF EQUALITY?
Under this title Elizabeth Anderson presents a very strong criticism against luck 
egalitarians.582 According to Anderson, luck egalitarians’ theories of justice combine 
the worst of capitalism and socialism (mean-spiritedness, contemptuousness, 
hierarchical structures and morally distinguishing between the responsible and the 
irresponsible) thus denying what egalitarians should be concerned with. Anderson 
defends a conception of egalitarianism in which society is ‘generous, humane, 
cosmopolitan […] recognizes individuals as equals in all their diversity’ and at the 
institutional level is constructed so as to ‘promote […] arrangements that enable the 
diversity of people’s talents, aspirations, roles, and cultures to benefit everyone and to 
be recognized as mutually beneficial’.583 She argues that, on the contrary and by 
advocating for market efficiency and responsibility for choices, luck egalitarians assume 
‘atomistic egoism and self-sufficiency as the norm for human beings’.584 In this sense, 
Anderson claims, luck egalitarianism implies a denial of the different approaches that 
characterise egalitarians’ concerns, that is, that relations among citizens should be 
guided by the intrinsic and equal moral worth of every individual. Following 
Anderson, egalitarians should advocate two claims which when formulated in positive 
terms are defined as follows: 
582. In this paper, Anderson brings to the fore the label ‘luck egalitarianism’ to refer to theories that are 
‘hybrid[s] of capitalism and the welfare state’, among which she includes those of Dworkin, 





(a) That all competent adults are equally moral agents: everyone equally has the 
power to exercise and develop moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according 
to principles of justice, to shape and fulfil their conception of their good.585
(b) A social order in which persons stand in relations of equality. They seek to 
live together in a democratic community, as opposed to a hierarchical one. Democracy 
is here understood as collective self-determination by means of open discussion 
among equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all.586
These two claims represent the social and political equality claimed by 
egalitarian political movements. This sort of egalitarianism, which Anderson calls 
democratic equality, is different from luck egalitarianism in the following respects: (1) 
it ‘aims to abolish socially created oppression’; (2) ‘is […] a relational theory of 
equality: it views equality as a social relationship’; and (3) ‘is sensitive to the need to 
integrate the demands of equal recognition with those of equal distribution’.587 In 
what follows I will briefly refer to the contents of (1) and (2) and discuss how this 
relates to the argument that I have developed so far. Later in this chapter I turn to an 
analysis of (3).
Anderson’s democratic conception of equality progresses in the same vein as 
the argument that I started developing in the previous chapter. This is exceptionally 
remarkable regarding (2), the relational theory of equality. Instead of (2), liberal 
egalitarian theories advocate for equality as a pattern of distribution. In the terms 
outlined in the previous chapter, and following Fleischacker, they defend an economic 
idea of distributive justice.588 According to Anderson, this leads to an instrumental 
conception of social relations: ‘Social relationships are largely seen as instrumental to 
generating such patterns of distribution’.589 To this I would add that it also leads to an 
instrumental conception of institutions, as is argued extensively in the previous 
chapter.
In more general terms, Anderson’s democratic equality seems to me to present 




588. vid supra, 126.
589. Anderson, “What is the point of equality?”, 313.
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about this point, the conception of equality she defends is one that is sensible to the 
political. It assumes that the content of equality is open to political disagreement and 
always open to modifying its content so long as it is necessary for (1). This aim within 
democratic equality leaves it open to constant change through political, not moral, 
debate. At the same time, when combined with (2) it is able to motivate and explain 
political action. Contrary to the conception of equality that underlies economic 
theories of distributive justice, in its political reading equality is not a state of affairs 
that works as a standard to be achieved at some point in time but is an ideal against 
which we contrast social and political arrangements.
Joseph Raz’s argument about the importance of equality is useful here to 
better express the idea I am trying to put forward about the substantive content of 
equality. However, as I argue infra, I disagree with Raz’s conception of political ideals. 
According to Raz, equality is relevant only when there are other independent reasons 
– different from that of equality – that explain our concern with the distribution of 
what we value or not.590 For Raz, ‘Equality is said to matter where it affects what is 
valued for independent reasons; it matters only because what is to be distributed is 
valuable for independent reasons’.591 He argues that what gives priority to someone 
(S) over the other (O) in the distribution of goods is that S is at a disadvantage, in 
need, in pain or suffering in relation to O in relation to something that we value. But 
it is not inequality between S and O, ‘as an independent evil’ (of that which we value), 
that explains our concern with equality.592 According to Raz then, it is the 
disadvantage, the need, pain or suffering of S that concerns us.
It might be argued that Raz would disagree with my reading of his ideas 
concerning equality. In particular, that he is not dealing with equality as a political 
ideal precisely because he is trying to show that equality is not in itself ‘a foundation of 
morality and politics’ because theories founded on the ‘strictly egalitarian principle’593 
lead to an equalising of people even if this implies, for example, destroying some goods 
that cannot be distributed equally. Following Raz, strict egalitarianism might be 
590. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 235.
591. ibid, 240.
592. ibid.
593. The formulation of this principle is ‘All Fs who do not have G have a right to G if some Fs have 
G’. vid ibid, 225, 230–231.
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expressed in a matrix formed by coupled principles. The first couple comprises the 
insatiable/satiable principles and the second, non-diminishing/diminishing 
principles.594 Raz affirms that insatiable principles can be either non-diminishing or 
diminishing and that satiable principles are normally diminishing. He also affirms that 
non-diminishing principles admit large inequalities and that this is why they need an 
equality principle or egalitarian constraint to solve conflicts in the distribution of 
goods. On the other hand, diminishing principles tend to achieve egalitarian results 
even if they do not aim at equality, so they are better for guiding distributive conflicts. 
According to Raz, satiable diminishing principles are better expressions of the sort of 
problem that egalitarians try to solve (which in his reading only deal secondarily with 
equality). For example, if A and B are hungry and A receives food, then the next unit 
of available food should go to B even if this implies a non-egalitarian distribution of 
food.595 However, Raz argues that egalitarian theories are ‘based on non-diminishing, 
usually insatiable principles the operation of which is subjected to egalitarian 
constraints’596 and that they should be abandoned because the ‘ideals at the foundation 
of morality and politics are all diminishing and satiable principles’.597 Here he appears 
to be following Marx and Engels for whom, according to Raz, ‘[i]t has no normative 
force, it signifies no moral or political ideal, but it can serve as a useful political slogan, 
claiming for the proletariat the rights and privileges of the bourgeoisie’.598 Against this 
possible objection I would answer by distinguishing two aspects of the discussion. First, 
if equality can be a political concept then what importance should we assign to it? I 
will come back to this point later when discussing recognition599. For the time being it 
is suffice to say that I do not think that equality is the main political concept or ideal 
to which a political philosophy should aspire. Notwithstanding this assertion, equality 
594. Insatiable principles are those ‘which it is always possible in principle to satisfy to a higher degree’ 
ibid, 236. Satiable principles are those ‘marked by one feature: the demands the principles impose 
can be completely met’ ibid, 235. Non-diminishing principles are not defined by Raz but from his 
arguments they could be defined as those in which there are no limits to achieving the good aim 
to (as would happen with a principle stating the maximisation of wealth). These principles oppose 
diminishing principles. Diminishing principles are those according to which ‘the more G that F 




598. ibid, 217. [Emphasis added].
599. infra, 188ff.
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has a very important role to play, just as in Anderson’s (1) and (2). The interesting 
question comes with the second aspect. Here I need to specify what I mean by a 
political concept because this is the source of an important difference from Raz’s 
argument. First, I mean something different from that which Raz has in mind when 
dealing with principles of equality. Raz tries to find a principle with normative force. 
In this respect he seems to understand that the task of political philosophy is finding 
moral principles with normative force, as seen previously in that liberal egalitarians 
and luck egalitarians did. So Raz’s argument would be that equality is not the best nor 
is it an adequate moral principle upon which to found a political philosophy (he 
would actually opt for freedom as that principle). Through this Raz becomes open to 
the same criticism formulated earlier by myself that goes against theories that moralise 
political and legal concepts. Therefore, the important point here is to make a 
distinction between moral and political ideals, something that Raz conflates according 
to the quote above. This difference starts from a different conception of the task of 
political philosophy. Once we define this we will be in a position to better understand 
how political ideals (or political concepts) work. The importance of this task connects 
with Anderson’s (1) and its aim of democratic equality.
The main difference that distinguishes between political philosophies that 
conflate moral and political ideals and those that do not is the way in which they 
conduct political philosophy and the purpose they conduct it for. Following Raymond 
Geuss, I use his labels and refer to the former as Kantian theories and the latter as 
realist theories.600 Kantian theories of political philosophy, those that conflate morality 
with political ideals, try to anchor normativity in morality. Because we live in a world 
in which institutions and political concepts are left without any justificatory moral 
order,601 these theories can be interpreted as trying to solve problems of practical 
reasoning by referring to moral principles. They start their enquiry from the ideal 
world of morality in order to derive from it what we should do. As thus they focus on 
a determination of the moral principles in which we find guidance regarding how to 
act and what to do. These theories make a strong separation between how things are 
from how they should be, that is to say, between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, hence 
600. Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, introduction and passim.
601. vid, MacIntyre, After Virtue.
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distinguishing between political philosophy and political theory.602 The ‘realist 
approach to politics’, on the other hand, does not distinguish between ‘philosophy’ and 
‘theory’ and has, in Geuss’ version of it,603 four main assumptions.604 (1) It must be 
realist. This means that it starts from existing institutions that actually operate on 
different social levels at a given time. (2) It should recognise ‘that politics is in the first 
instance about action and the contexts of action, not about mere belief or 
propositions’.605 This implies that theories or ideas have an important effect on the 
way in which individuals exposed to those theories or ideas will behave in the future. 
The important idea here, even if Geuss does not put it in these terms, is to 
acknowledge the effects of what might broadly be considered speech acts. (3) Politics 
is historically located, that is to say, ‘it has to do with humans interacting in 
institutional contexts that change over time, and the study of politics must reflect this 
fact’.606 In this sense, politics cannot rest on immutable generalisations because such 
generalisations cannot tell us anything about practical reasoning within a particular 
institutional context. The importance of the historicity that Geuss appeals to rests in its 
connection with the way in which institutional contexts determine how political 
problems are presented to us and the ways in which they can be solved. (4) Politics is a 
craft because it is ‘about getting things done when people do not agree’.607 Geuss 
differentiates politics from the application of a theory because of the particularities 
that surround political action. This is what makes it a skill rather than a technique and 
it demands ‘political judgment’.608 All these elements highlight the connection 
between politics and power, a thing to which Geuss assigns great importance.609 If we 
accept Geuss’ realism then the tasks of political philosophy are five: (1) to provide an 
explanation of forms of political action and their results; (2) to evaluate the world we 
live in; (3) to provide an orientation for action; (4) to contribute ‘constructively to 
602. Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 16–19, 101.
603. For other realist approaches, vid Valentini, “Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: a conceptual map”.
604. Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 9–16.
605. ibid, 11. [Emphasis added].
606. ibid, 13.
607. Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics, 117.
608. Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 97.
609. ibid, 90–94. vid also Geuss, Politics and the Imagination, Ch3 and Ch4.
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politics by conceptual invention or innovation’; and (5) to analyse and help dissolve 
ideologies.610
Adopting Geuss’ realist approach, political ideals are relevant to the task of 
conceptual invention or innovation. In this sense they are important for political 
action but not because of their normative force as moral values. Being part of political 
action, political ideals have a different connection with practical reason when 
compared with what follows from rules. According to Geuss, political action is not 
subject to rules nor is it engaged in finding a solution to a specific problem; it is the 
sort of action that ‘changes a situation in a way that cannot be seen to be a mere 
instantiation of a pre-existing set of rules. It creates new facts, violates, ignores, or even 
changes the rules’.611 In this sense political action is connected with the ways in which 
we decide what kinds of people we will be. Political action deals with different 
problems that come about within political communities, such as deciding what to do 
in a particular case in which, for example, there are several technical alternatives, or 
where we know what to do but have to deal with the means by which we might do 
it.612 These are common issues in which political decisions are important. However, as 
Geuss argues, there is a third kind of problem in which political philosophy’s task of 
conceptual invention or innovation is important.613 These are the sorts of situations in 
which we do not have a clear idea about how to discuss a problem because there is 
not any clarity about the problem itself.614 In these cases the problem becomes clear 
only once we have a solution for it. For Geuss, conceptual innovation is not simply the 
task of providing a label for an existing reality or creating a name for something that 
does not exist. Conceptual innovation is relevant because such concepts can change 
reality. They are the sorts of concepts that create new possibilities for action, such as, 
for example, the ‘state’. These concepts help to clarify a problem, create a new reality, 
have a normative aspect, and are as much a description as an aspiration. In this sense 
then these concepts are ‘an important contribution both to clarifying an obscure 
610. Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 37–55.
611. Geuss, Politics and the Imagination, 41.




situation and to guiding action directed at institutional change’.615 But I submit that 
the most important characteristic that distinguishes political ideals from moral values is 
that the former, but not the latter, are open to political appropriation. These concepts 
have a life of their own. They are not mere tools that we construct in order to solve a 
particular problem and use whenever we have to deal with that problem. Their main 
characteristic is that they are open to new meanings. However, this meaning is not 
fixed. Because these concepts become part of political reality someone different from 
the ‘creator’ can appropriate their meaning. In this sense these concepts are similar to 
what Laclau calls an ‘empty’ and a ‘floating signifier’, the meaning of which depends 
on political ‘hegemonic struggles’.616 In other words, political concepts are open to 
political conflict; they are ‘the type of action whose objective is the transformation of a 
social relation which constructs a subject in a relationship of subordination’.617 In the 
way in which I understand them, political concepts try to avoid the sort of reasoning 
proper of morality. In the words of Chantal Mouffe, this is the sort of ‘reasoning that is 
specific to moral discourse and the effect of which when applied to the field of 
politics is to reduce it to a rational process of negotiation among private interests 
under the constraints of morality’.618 Morality and values, understood in liberal 
egalitarian terms, oppose the political since they represent an attempt to provide 
certainty where there is radical democratic indeterminacy.619 This approach to political 
ideals should not be confused with postmodernism. I am not advocating the radical 
indeterminacy and subjectivism of postmodernism. What I am trying to do is to take 
seriously the idea that in modernity we are the authors of the law; the consequence is 
that we should be open to the democratic determination of the content of political 
ideals. Equality in this sense implies a political definition of what it means to be equal.
615. ibid, 46.
616. Laclau, On Populist Reason, Ch5.
617. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 153.
618. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 49.
619. For an interesting argument against the tyranny of values, vid Schmitt, La Tiranía de los Valores. 
According to Schmitt, nihilism led to the subjective attribution of value to what were previously 
convictions and interests. This helped individuals to assume a perspective from which they could 
express what they considered important, that is, of worth. However, according to Schmitt different 
reasons replaced the subjective attribution of value with an objective scale of values. For Schmitt 
the risk underlying the adoption of ‘values’ in dealing with interests and convictions is that within 
this logic values are values for someone against another. What underlies a value, therefore, is 
someone’s decision to attribute worth to an interest or conviction.
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3. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
In the previous section I conclude that the importance of equality can be better 
grasped if it is interpreted as a political ideal rather than as a demand for material 
equality. Equality as a political ideal may imply, in particular circumstances, the need to 
fight for material equality. However, this is a manifestation of a broader concern with 
what we consider relevant for individuals as members of a political community. How 
does this conception of equality relate to distributive justice? The answer to this 
question implies a greater distancing from the economic conception of distributive 
justice that is characteristic of liberal and luck egalitarians. The difference is as follows. 
The political ideal of equality is located at the foundation of distributive justice and 
not in a state of affairs (an equality of X for all As) to be achieved as if the positions in 
which individuals are in at a determined moment are independent of a political and 
institutional framework. Under this non-economic approach to distributive justice the 
distribution or allocation of goods that distributive justice is concerned with is based 
on a previous political decision that conditions the criterion of distribution.
Among contemporary political philosophers Charles Taylor emphasises that 
distributive justice ‘becomes relevant when men are associated together in society, and 
have to share in some sense’.620 What Taylor argues is that underlying a notion of 
distributive justice there is a certain notion of men and society, that which he calls a 
‘social view of man’ and according to which ‘the human good is bound up with being 
in society’.621 This opposes what he calls ‘political atomism’ or, in other words, those 
political doctrines that have a ‘vision of society as in some sense constituted by 
individuals for the fulfilment of ends which were primarily individual’.622 In the latter 
there is not any space for distributive justice because individuals enter into the 
association to protect what they had before entering it. In the former, on the other 
hand, men are situated within a ‘certain kind or structure of society’ that is considered 
an ‘essential condition of human potentiality’.623 This structure defines the framework 
620. Taylor, “The nature and scope of distributive justice”, 294.
621. ibid.
622. Taylor, “Atomism”, 187.
623. Taylor, “The nature and scope of distributive justice”, 294.
177
of distributive justice. Other principles of justice depend on the structure of society 
because it defines the sorts of goods to be distributed or the agents among whom 
goods should be distributed. Only once the structure is settled is there space for 
particular principles of distribution. Taylor explicitly states that his analysis of 
distributive justice is close to Aristotle’s. Therefore, Taylor’s argument can be put into 
different words: he argues that the nature and the scope of distributive justice are 
defined according to what Aristotle calls general justice and particular justice, 
respectively. I consider this relationship between general justice and the structure of 
society to deserve further exploration, especially since it depends on the political 
definition of the kind of society we would like to live in. Naturally, these terms are 
slightly anachronistic for Aristotle, who has a limited idea of the ‘we’ that defines the 
structure of society. However, he recognises that this is important when he connects 
justice with the ‘constitution’ of society. So let us move deeper into Aristotle’s ideas 
about distributive justice.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, when distinguishing between justice in a broad sense 
as just actions according to excellence (universal justice, namely the kind of justice 
connected with the law) and justice in a particular sense as part of the former, 
Aristotle says:
[I]f one man commits adultery for the sake of the gain and 
makes money for it, while another does so at the bidding of 
appetite though he loses money and is penalised for it, the latter 
would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping while 
the former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, 
he is unjust by reason of his making gain by his act. Again, all other 
unjust acts are ascribed invariable to some particular kind of 
wickedness […]; but if a man makes a gain, his action is ascribed 
to no form of wickedness but injustice.624
This is an important passage. Here Aristotle defines the ways in which we can identify 
what exactly characterises particular justice according to the actions of the unjust man. 
If particular justice is a species of the genus justice then it must refer to a specific kind 
of virtue different from those comprised by universal justice, specifically those virtues 
that are realised in the agent who follows the law. Particular justice is defined in 
opposition to grasping. The grasping man is he who tries to gain from his actions. But 
grasping should not be unjust exclusively or only because of the fact that it is a gain. It 
624. (NE, 1130a25-1130b). [Emphasis added].
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is unjust because the gain represents a certain sort of inequality. In Aristotle’s theory 
this inequality is unjust because it is unmerited or undeserved.625
According to Aristotle there are two ways in which a man can be said to be 
unjust. An unjust man can be unlawful or grasping. By opposition then, ‘[t]he just […], 
is the lawful and the equal’ (EN, 1129a34).
The lawful man is just because the ‘acts laid down by the legislative are lawful, 
and each of these […] is just’ (EN, 1129b13-14). This idea of the law being just must 
be interpreted according to what Aristotle says in the Politics. According to his idea, 
when positing the law, the legislator is aiming at the common good. The common 
good depends on the system of government adopted, so it can be ‘the common 
advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the 
sort’ (EN, 1129b15-16). Governments that look for the common good ‘are constituted 
according to strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms’ (Pol, 1279a19-20). 
Those who behave according to the law exercise absolute excellence in relation to 
others (EN, 1129b26). However important this may be, it is not the sense of justice 
that is relevant as ‘a part of excellence’ (EN, 1130a14).
Justice as a part of general justice is concerned with the second way in which a 
man can be said to be unjust, that is when he acts in a grasping manner. Aristotle 
argues that this kind of justice is ‘indicated by the fact that while the man who 
exhibits in action for the other forms of wickedness acts unjustly but not 
graspingly’ (EN 1130a17-18). Here is when the passage quoted extensively above 
becomes relevant. It is the grasping action that allows Aristotle to build his notion of 
justice as one of particular excellence, which differs from the general excellence 
obtained by acting lawfully.
Grasping is relevant then for determining when a man is acting unjustly and is 
understood to be unjust ‘by reason of [someone] making gain by his act’ (EN, 
1130a29). The motive of this injustice ‘is the pleasure that arises from gain’ (EN, 
1130b3-4) and its force comes from relations with others that concern ‘honour or 
money or safety’ (EN, 1130a35-6). Thus, he who acts unjustly because he is acting 
graspingly is one who obtains gain in his relations with others. Aristotle is not very 
625. According to Miller, ‘[d]istributive justice is concerned with the distribution of goods, including 
political offices and property, […] according to some principle of merit and desert’. Miller Jr., 
“Aristotle on natural law and justice”, 300–301.
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clear as to the kinds of relations from which a grasping action might be predicated. 
However, it seems to entail a broad notion that not only refers to particular goods but 
also includes the less ‘bad things absolutely’ (EN, 1129b8). This becomes clearer once 
we analyse the different categories of particular justice.
There exists debate about the character and number of the species of particular 
justice distinguished by Aristotle;626 these discussions are not relevant for the purposes 
of the argument herein. It is suffice to say that in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle distinguishes between distributive, rectificatory or corrective, and reciprocal 
justice. For the purposes of the argument presented in this paper I focus exclusively on 
distributive justice as a form of particular justice.
Distributive justice as a kind of particular justice ‘is manifested in distributions 
of […] things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the 
constitution’ (EN, 1130b31-2). Aristotle exemplifies the sorts of things that can be 
distributed in accordance with this kind of justice, mentioning honour and money as 
he does so. The key aspect of distributive justice is that it refers to the distribution of 
‘things that can be divided among those who have a share in the constitution’. This 
poses two questions that need to be answered in order to get the point right. Who are 
the ones who have a share in the constitution? What is included in the constitution to 
be distributed? I endeavour to answer these questions in a moment, but before I do so 
it is necessary to understand the connection between justice and equality because, as 
said before, the unjust (in terms of particular justice) is equivalent to the unequal (EN, 
1131a10-1).627
Following Aristotle, we can say that equality in any kind of action is the 
intermediate between a more and a less (EN, 1131a10-14). As equality is connected 
with the just it makes reference to things and persons. Therefore, equality must exist 
between things and persons.628 This has consequences for the just. For a distribution to 
be just there must exist equality ‘between the persons and between the things 
concerned’ (EN, 1131a20). Aristotle understands that equality can exist only between 
626. vid ibid. According to David Keyt, ‘Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of (particular) justice: 
distributive (dianemetikon) and corrective (diorthikon)’, “Aristotle's theory of distributive justice”. 
ibid, 238.
627. vid, Miller Jr., “Aristotle on natural law and justice”, 300.
628. Miller Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics, 68–74. vid, Castoriadis, Crossroads in the 
Labyrinth, 294–299.
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those who are equal in merit.629 This is where we find parts of the answers to the 
questions posed above. Merit becomes relevant because ‘awards should be [given] 
according’ to it, and this seems to be evident from the fact that ‘all men agree that 
what is just in distribution must be according to merit’ (EN, 1131a24-6). But at the 
same time, Aristotle says that men disagree on what sort of merit is relevant: 
‘democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth 
(or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence’ (EN, 1131a26-8). 
Therefore, it is in the constitution where we find the relevant criteria of merit that 
allow us to determine equality. The relation of equality with the questions posed above 
is evident. It is in the constitution that we find the relevant factors (things and persons) 
that will allow us to determine what is equal (and just).
Equality between men and things to be distributed implies, according to 
Aristotle, that the just is ‘a species of the proportionate’ (EN, 1131a29). This kind of 
proportion is the equality of ratios between the four terms included in distribution, 
and it is relevant because it establishes the standard of justice in the distribution of 
common possessions (EN, 1131b27-8; Pol. 1280a15-19). From this it follows that the 
standard of equality in the distributions of common goods between equal men is given 
by proportionality.630
So far, the analysis of distributive justice as one part of particular justice seems 
to leave us at a halfway point. The rest of the path can only be properly understood 
once we look at general justice. This is how we can determine those who are equal 
and which goods are common goods. This will explain why, after specifying the 
different species of justice, Aristotle introduces ‘political justice’ as a new term, not 
used before, to refer to just acts (EN, 1134a26). This kind of justice is that which is,
[F]ound among men who share their life with a view to self-
sufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or 
arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil 
this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special 
629. This becomes more relevant when Aristotle discusses reciprocal justice and the necessity of money 
as an equalising standard. ‘For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor and a 
farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why 
all things that are exchanged must be somehow commensurable. It is for this end that money has 
been introduced, and it becomes in a sense intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore 
the excess and the defect […]’ (EN, 1133a7–20).
630. For a very informative analysis of Aristotle’s principle of distributive justice, vid Keyt, “Aristotle's 
theory of distributive justice”, 240ff.
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sense and by analogy. For justice exists only between men whose 
mutual relations are governed by law; and law exists for men 
between whom there is injustice; for legal justice is the 
discrimination of the just and the unjust.631
Although Aristotle refers to particular justice, when equality is specified as 
proportional (distributive) or arithmetical (corrective) his argument is oriented here to 
describe political justice. At this point it is important to distinguish political justice 
from legal justice. Political justice exists between free and equal men who share their 
life with a view to self-sufficiency. But since these men may act unjustly in their 
relations, it is necessary that law governs them. Here Aristotle should be read as 
referring to the ‘institution of law’. Because men can act unjustly, ‘we do not allow a 
man to rule, but law’ (EN, 1134a36). In this way, and with the help of the magistrate 
(‘the guardian of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also’, EN, 1134a37-b1), we 
are able to ensure justice among those who have ‘equal share in ruling and being 
ruled’ (EN, 1134b15).
However, political justice (and the function assigned to law for it) is different 
from legal justice; the latter is a species of the former. There are two species of political 
justice: natural and legal justice.
Natural justice is ‘that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist 
by people’s thinking this or that’. Legal justice is ‘that which is originally indifferent, 
but when it has been laid down is not indifferent’ or that which derives from ‘all the 
laws that are passed for particular cases’ (EN, 1134b18-21). However, this does not 
mean that law can be arbitrarily created. The law is substantively dependent on the 
content of the constitution. According to Aristotle, ‘the goodness or badness, justice or 
injustice, of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of the states’ as the ‘laws 
must be adapted to the constitutions’ (Pol. 1282b1 and ‘laws are and ought to be, 
framed with a view to the constitution, and not the constitution to the laws’, 1289a9). 
Otherwise laws would be ‘only a convention’ (Pol. 1280b13) and not different from 
any other convention.
If this is the correct reading of Aristotle’s treatment of justice in Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, then we might review the analysis by stating that political justice is 
only possible between equal and free men who share their life with a view to self-
631. EN, 1134a26-32.
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sufficiency. These men have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. This kind of 
justice is expressed in the law. In this way equality can be assured because nobody will 
have an unequal share in his part. Political justice has two parts: natural and legal 
justice. The law contains aspects of natural and legal justice. Natural and legal justice as 
parts of political justice expressed in the law can constitute either general or particular 
justice. General justice as contained within the law refers to conduct that expresses 
virtue and this is why it is connected with excellences in general. Particular justice is 
concerned with the avoidance of grasping, and it has two parts: distributive and 
corrective justice. The first refers to the correct distribution of common goods and the 
second corrects inequalities derived from voluntary or involuntary transactions. 
However, there is another justice, that which is ‘without qualification’ (that is, not 
political) (EN, 1134a24-26). This kind of justice shows how the reciprocal is related to 
justice between unequal men in their exchanges. Reciprocal justice is that which 
makes possible associations for exchange. Here ‘reciprocity is established in accordance 
with a proportion [represented by money] and not on the basis of equality. For it is by 
proportional requital that the city holds together’ (EN, 1132b33-35). This kind of 
justice is not enough for defining a state, yet it is one of the conditions without which 
a state could not exist since the end of the state is the good life and this is one of the 
means for achieving it (Pol., 1280b18-1281a2).
Even if we have so far been able to answer the questions posed above – what is 
to be distributed and among whom – if we follow Aristotle’s scheme it is also 
important that we determine who distributes. In this sense, equality is one of the 
conditions for the existence and subsistence of any state. As a condition of existence, 
equality is connected structurally with the common good because it is the common 
interest in equal terms for equal people (Pol.1282b14–20). As a condition of 
subsistence equality should be maintained in time. This is the way to maintain peace 
and avoid revolutions (Pol. Book V).
With this analysis of Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice I intend to 
show how justice is connected with a political notion of equality. Equality in 
Aristotelian terms can be understood not as an economic end but as a political ideal 
the content of which is defined as part of political justice (by reference to the political 
constitution of a particular political community). The economic content of distributive 
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justice is subordinated to the political definition of the principles of distributive 
justice.
4. PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONS
Until this point the argument has shown that equality should be understood as a 
political concept and that distributive justice depends on the definitions of the 
common good adopted by a political community in which men are situated. These 
two arguments are necessary steps in advancing toward an understanding of taxation 
that supersedes the mere instrumental justification that I have criticised previously. The 
next step in this argument requires a new mode of arguing for institutions that is 
different from the instrumental justification attached to the self-interested notion of 
man that underlies the liberal and luck egalitarian arguments. If we review the 
argument we see that institutional arrangements should be structurally dependent on a 
conception of the common good, of that which is good for those who live within a 
political community. This argumentative shift will reveal what I consider to be the 
most important difference of the economic approach to distributive justice, namely 
the possibility of showing that taxes are practices with an internal good.
What do I mean by a practice? For this I will follow Alasdair MacIntyre’s, for 
whom a practice is,
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the results 
that the human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended.632
Example of practices according to MacIntyre include a vast array of human activities 
in which the elements of the definition meet, such as, the ‘arts, sciences, games, politics 
in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life’.633 I want to argue 
that taxation is a practice with an internal good in MacIntyre’s sense. For this purpose 
I divide the argument into two. In this section, following MacIntyre, I discuss the 
632. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 187.
633. ibid, 188.
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relationship between practices with internal goods and institutions. In the next section, 
I argue that the internal good of taxation is recognition.
In After Virtue MacIntyre distinguishes between two kinds of good that can be 
related to human activities: internal and external goods.634 Internal goods have two 
characteristics: (a) they can only be specified by reference to the practice they are part 
of and (b) ‘they can only be recognized by the experience of participating in the 
practice in question’.635 These are ‘genuine goods’ because they are ‘ends worth 
pursuing for their own sake, if they are pursued at all’.636 External goods, on the other 
hand, are goods that obtain from participating in a practice because they are ‘externally 
and contingently attached’637 to the practice. In this sense, ‘[t]hese things are good only 
qua means to something further that is itself good’.638 MacIntyre’s example is of 
someone who wants to teach a child who is more interested in candy than in chess, 
how to play chess. One might offer money to buy candy for the child to first move 
him to play and then more every time that he wins. The teacher expects the child to 
acquire a ‘taste’ for the game so that he ends up playing not for money (to buy candy) 
but for the love of chess. In this example money and candy are external goods to the 
internal goods of chess, and the child might be willing to acquire them even by 
cheating. However, with time the expectation of the teacher is that the good in 
playing chess will be shown and realised so that the child comes to play chess because 
he likes it. Practices with internal goods require participation in the practice so that 
the person taking part learns about what is good within the practice. Each practice, or 
a group of similar practices, is distinguished from another practice or other practices 
by virtue of the internal good that characterises it or them.
To be part of a practice requires following the ‘standards of excellence and 
obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods’.639 He who wants to 
participate in a practice has to acknowledge the rules and standards that define the 
634. In a later book Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre adds a third kind of goods, namely, those 
related with human flourishing, goods that are goods for us qua human beings. These are the goods 
that allow us to order internal and external goods, vid ibid, 67. I will come to this later, infra 209.
635. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 188–189.
636. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 66.
637. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 188.
638. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 66.
639. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 190.
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practice and be subjected to criticism accordingly. If I want to play football then I not 
only have to learn the rules of the game, but also how to play the game. This is, for 
example, something that characterises great football players. Maybe these players are 
not the best athletes around (the fastest, the better trained, and so on), but they know 
exactly where to stand in the field and they know how to ‘read the game’. The same 
applies in a different way to a good referee. A good referee not only has to memorise 
the rules of the game, but he also has to have some experience of playing football or at 
least some experience that allows him to distinguish between, for example, when to 
award an indirect free kick because a player ‘plays in a dangerous manner’ and when to 
award a goal scored with a ‘scissor kick’ when the defender’s head is close to the foot 
of the scorer. To take a more complex example, he has to know when to caution a 
player with a yellow card when several fouls are committed by different members of 
his team in the middle of the field as a tactic that falls within the remit of unsporting 
behaviour.
According to MacIntyre, a crucial difference between internal and external 
goods is that the latter, ‘when achieved […] are always some individual’s property or 
possession’.640 This explains that the more an individual has of an external good the 
less there is for others to achieve. This may happen because of the nature of the good 
or it may happen contingently. This differentiates external goods from internal goods 
because even if there is competition to excel in obtaining such goods, ‘their 
achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice’.641 
So when Messi plays for Barcelona not only does Barcelona win more championships, 
but the whole game of football is transformed. Barcelona’s achieving excellence in 
football implies that other teams will improve in their training, tactics, and so on.
However, assuming for a moment that football is a practice with an internal 
good, how are we to distinguish between an excellent football player and one who 
tries to achieve the external goods of professional football by winning no matter what? 
This is the point at which virtues become relevant. MacIntyre states that ‘every 
practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it’.642 





other words, the virtues that define the practice. So if we follow MacIntyre then the 
internal goods of a practice are its virtues.
The way in which we share certain standards and purposes that characterise 
the practice defines the way in which we relate to each other. So, for example, acting 
justly requires that we treat everyone equally according to a certain standard. Justice 
requires that we do not treat two people differently in the same situation. The content 
of justice, what MacIntyre calls the ‘code of a practice’,643 may vary (such as if in the 
case of justice it requires merit or desert, for example) across different cultures or 
perhaps due to other factors, yet he affirms that practices cannot ‘flourish in societies 
in which the virtues were not valued’.644 MacIntyre does not say here that a vicious 
individual cannot perform brilliantly or greatly within a practice (such as, for example, 
a player scoring with God’s hand). What he is saying is that to be a great performer 
that individual needs virtues in order to learn how to perform (indeed, that same 
football player might have been inspired by other great football players) and that by 
being vicious he will deny himself the rewarding experience of achieving those goods 
(this might explain why that same football player might become an unsuccessful 
football manager).
For MacIntyre, practices should be distinguished from two other possible 
modes of acting in the world with which they can be confused.645 Practices are 
different from technical skills. Although technical skills are relevant for achieving the 
goods of practices they indeed lack some important aspects of practices. The ends and 
goods of practices change since they are an expression of the internal goods and the 
human powers that relate to them. In this sense, the ends and goals of a practice 
mutate because a practice has a history and its own development requires that it 
supersede that history. On the contrary, a technical skill has a limited use in relation to 
a particular fixed end. A technical skill changes either because it is not good for 
achieving a particular fixed end or because the end changes. However, here there is 
not any historical relationship with a tradition.
The second contrast occurs with institutions. MacIntyre argues that practices 
are different and should not be confused with institutions. This point is particularly 
643. ibid, 193.
644. ibid.
645. In the next few paragraphs I follow ibid, 193–197.
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important for the argument that I am trying to develop because my argument rests on 
the possibility of sustaining that taxation and tax law stand as practice and institution, 
respectively. Let me explain what the relationship between practices and institutions is 
for MacIntyre. There are two elements to this relationship. The first explains why 
practices and institutions can be confused and the second explains why they should be 
differentiated. Let me start with the features that differentiate the two. According to 
MacIntyre, practices are concerned with internal goods and institutions with external 
goods. This is quite a strong difference since MacIntyre states that institutions are 
‘necessarily’ concerned with external goods, such as money, other material goods, the 
distribution of power, and so on. Because these are goods ‘no one can despise them 
altogether without a certain hypocrisy’; however, they are not virtues. This is because 
institutions are always competitive. But what differentiates practices and institutions 
from one another is something that simultaneously explains why they are closely 
connected. For MacIntyre, institutions are necessarily connected with external goods 
because they are the ‘bearers’ of practices. To be sustained over time practices require 
institutions. In this close relationship there also lies a risk. Practices may succumb to 
the ‘acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common 
goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution’.646
If I understand MacIntyre correctly then the external goods of institutions 
may be helpful in achieving and sustaining the internal goods of practices. However, 
and this is an important difference, with the mere instrumental justification of 
institutions provided by liberal individualism they are not merely explained because of 
those external goods. Institutions should be the expression of practices and this implies 
that they are also connected with the internal goods that characterise the latter. This is 
what I interpret MacIntyre as saying when he states that the ‘virtues are of course 
themselves in turn fostered by certain types of social institutions and endangered by 
others’.647 So in the particular case that I am interested in – the revision of the deficits 
of the contemporary theory of tax law in explaining tax avoidance – this has led me to 
question the existing institution. The way in which I have been doing this is by 
offering an understanding of the institution as connected with something that is good 




shown that this institution is not explained via instrumental justifications of taxation. 
What I am now in the position of doing is using MacIntyre’s distinction between 
practices and institutions to search for the practice that underlies tax law or, to put it 
differently, to ask whether taxation is a practice with an internal good. 
5. RECOGNITION, SOLIDARITY AND TAXATION
Up until this point of the argument I have offered an interpretation of equality as a 
political concept, attempted to rescue the political dimension of distributive justice by 
using Aristotle’s ideas of general and particular justice and, with the help of 
MacIntyre’s distinction between practices and institutions, shown that there exists a 
relationship between both institutions’ external goods and practices’ internal goods. I 
have arrived at these interpretations by trying to overcome the limits of liberal 
egalitarian and luck egalitarian theories of justice. But all these efforts would not make 
sense if I continued to work with the liberal conception of the rational individual.648 
The plausibility of the alternative views that I am trying to develop here about 
political concepts and institutions rests on a different notion of human beings. This 
notion of human beings is more complex than the liberal atomistic approach, because 
it tries to bring together both the individual and social elements that characterise the 
life of individuals in modern societies. So, for example, we cannot assume the Lockean 
social contract interpretation of society according to which a rational autonomous 
individual enters into social life to protect its natural rights via a social contract. On 
the contrary, for the complex notion individuals are never isolated and are always part 
of a political community. Rather than being a rational individual who decides to enter 
into a contract, and here I paraphrase MacIntyre’s ideas in Dependent Rational Animals, 
the individual can only develop his practical rationality as the product of a series of 
interrelated and complex processes within social relations and interactions. Needless to 
say, these scenarios of alternative notions of human beings qua individuals only 
became possible when the modern subject replaced the ancient idea of the human 
being as zoon politikon in communities in which everyone had a predefined position.649 
The complex notion could be interpreted as an attempt to bring together the ancient 
idea of an ethical community with the modern notion of the individual.
648. vid supra, 59.
649. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 7–10.
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There is not one dominant definition of the complex notion of the individual 
and indeed, on the contrary, different arguments have been provided. Among 
contemporary thinkers, and to mention but a few examples, MacIntyre argues that we 
can only flourish as human beings if we develop a certain kind of practical reason that 
stems from our dependent and vulnerable nature;650 according to Axel Honneth, who 
combines the theoretical Hegelian model of social struggles with Mead’s social 
psychology, the possibility of becoming a fully autonomous individual depends on 
certain forms of social recognition;651 finally, for Castoriadis, individual and collective 
autonomy cannot but be understood as a (the socialist) revolutionary political project 
(a project that rests on two previous historical moments in which institutions were 
questioned, namely ancient Greece and the end of the High Middle Ages in Western 
Europe).652
I cannot go deeper into the details of these theories here, not only because the 
intricacies and complexities of the arguments merit a specialised monograph, but also 
because it would take us away from the line of argument that I am putting forward. 
For the purpose of this argument it is enough to develop two points. First, to show 
how is it that according to these theories interaction with other individuals explains 
the way in which we might become autonomous subjects. In other words, the first 
task is to explain the idea of recognition. For this purpose I follow Honneth’s social 
theory, to which I will also add some of MacIntyre’s insights.653 Second, I explore the 
connection between taxation and recognition. Stated differently, the second task is to 
show that taxation is a practice with an internal good. This is a crucial argument for 
my thesis because it allows me to show that taxation has an intrinsic good and it is not 
650. An argument he develops in MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals.
651. For Honneth’s general account of this idea, vid The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of 
Social Conflicts. vid also Anderson and Honneth, “Autonomy, vulnerability, recognition, and justice”, 
where the authors criticise Rawls’ conception of autonomy applying the structure of social 
recognition.
652. vid, Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 80ff; Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy. 
Essays in Political Philosophy, 124–34; Castoriadis, Figures of the Thinkable, Ch5; Castoriadis, A Society 
Adrift. Interviews and Debates, 1974–1997, 3–4. For Castoriadis, revolutionary politics is ‘a praxis 
which takes as its object the organisation and orientation of society as they foster the autonomy of 
all its members and which recognises that this presupposes a radical transformation of society, 
which will be possible, in its turn, only through the autonomous activity of individuals’. 
Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 77.
653. I do not develop Castoriadis’ theory because it is highly dependent on psychoanalytical ideas and 
its connection with existing social arrangements would be too demanding to show the point I 
make.
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to be justified merely instrumentally. There is a second reason as to why this is 
important for the argument of this thesis. If taxation has intrinsic value then I have 
solid ground to show why tax avoidance is (something more than a moral) problem.
Recent debates in political philosophy have rescued the term ‘recognition’ 
from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.654 Honneth, for example, develops his normative 
social theory by starting from Hegel’s early University of Jena works. Honneth takes 
from Hegel the theoretical explanation as to how identity formation depends on 
intersubjective recognition. According to this explanation human flourishing depends 
on different ethical relations, each of which is constituted through different struggles 
for recognition. Within this scheme, social conflicts are not mere expressions of 
individual interest, but they are a fight for the very possibility of becoming an 
individual. According to Honneth’s reading, Hegel provides a closed system of 
recognition that culminates in an ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that is too closely built in 
relation to existing institutions. Honneth argues that these two characteristics limit the 
application of Hegel’s theory of recognition in modern times because it requires an 
extremely substantive idea of the good and because it limits the possibility of 
extending the struggle for recognition to new social interactions outside existing 
institutions. Honneth tries to overcome these limitations by providing a formal 
conception of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that works as an ‘appropriate tool for 
categorically unlocking social experiences of injustice as a whole’.655 The theory of 
recognition advocated by Honneth becomes a normative standard, according to which 
social institutions are constantly evaluated by individuals who, because of unjust 
existing institutions (and their legitimation principles), struggle for recognition.
654. For an informative review of Hegel’s ideas on recognition and its application to contemporary 
practical philosophy, vid Siep, “Recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and contemporary 
political philosophy”. There is some debate in the literature about the origin of the term 
recognition. Siep, for example, argues in this paper that the concept is originally found in Fichte, 
although Hegel extends the application of the concept beyond direct intersubjective relations. In 
contemporary practical philosophy, Siep distinguishes three different uses that have been given to 
the term: (i) as mutual respect among autonomous persons, (ii) in the context of social psychology 
and philosophical research on the development of identity, and (iii) among different worldviews 
and cultures in multicultural communities (113–114).
655. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 133. vid also Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. 
The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Ch9.
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Following Hegel, Honneth identifies three ‘forms’656 or ‘spheres’657 of 
recognition. Each of these spheres represents a different stage in which a human being 
might become the subject of recognition. In each of these stages there are different 
modes of recognition and different content for recognition depending on the concept 
of the person to be found in each one. The different stages at which a human being 
can be the subject of recognition are: the individual, the person and the subject. The 
modes of recognition for each of these stages are: the family, the civil society and the 
state. The content of recognition for each of these spheres is also different. In the 
family the individual is recognised through an affective relationship that covers his 
concrete needs; in civil society the law recognises a person as an abstract legal person 
and therefore in terms of his formal autonomy; finally, in the state subjects are 
recognised according to their individual particularity as ‘concrete universals’ through 
solidarity.658 The end of these intersubjective stages of recognition, according to 
Honneth, is to achieve human self-realisation. Each of these stages contains ‘normative 
demands that are, structurally speaking, internal to the relationship of mutual 
recognition’.659 To reach this point Honneth has had to add to Hegel’s theory what he 
considers a ‘postmetaphysical naturalistic equivalent’ that can be found in Mead’s social 
psychology.660 The combination of these ideas gives a common ground to Honneth’s 
application of recognition as a social theory. This common ground is the claim that,
the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of 
mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical 
relation-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from 
the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as 
their social addressee.661
However, Honneth has to add a crucial element to show that these ideas can explain 
the way in which individuals struggle for recognition. This is the idea of disrespect, the 
‘negative equivalents for the corresponding relations of recognition [that] enable social 
actors to realise that they are being denied recognition’.662
656. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 25.
657. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 138.




662. ibid, 93. Honneth fully develops these forms of disrespect in ibid, Ch6.
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After this short introduction to Honneth’s social theory, let me briefly describe 
the content of each sphere of recognition and its correlative negative equivalents. The 
first sphere is that of love. Love covers those ‘primary relationships […] constituted by 
strong emotional attachment among a small number of people’. This is the first stage 
of reciprocal recognition in which each individual recognises the other in terms of his 
or her most basic needs or, as Honneth reports, what Hegel describes as ‘being oneself 
in another’.663 Here the paradigmatic relationship is that of the mother and child. This 
relationship starts immediately after birth as one of ‘absolute dependency’ between 
mother and child or, as Winnicott calls it, a stage of ‘symbiotic togetherness’.664 The 
child develops its individuality through a complex separation with the mother. The 
baby learns to differentiate herself from the mother by being able to separate her needs 
from her mother’s. The mother also learns to relate to the baby in a way in which she 
is able to provide security while at the same time distancing herself. In this process of 
mutual recognition both child and mother are able to relate to each other in terms 
through which they recognise their needs but at the same time they recognise each 
other as individuals. This relation of recognition can be understood as a 
‘communicative arc suspended between the experience of being able to be alone and 
the experience of being merged’.665 Therefore, in loving one ‘recognizes in the other 
[…] only the other’s individual independence’ as it supported by reciprocal or ‘shared 
concern’.666 Relations of love are essential to developing self-confidence.
Though substantively different from the one of love, the sphere of law is 
structurally identical to it. In this sense, ‘we can only come to understand ourselves as 
the bearer of rights when we know, in turn, what various normative obligations we 
must keep vis-à-vis others’.667 The law puts us in the place of a general other. This 
understanding of law, or better of the legal system, as a space of recognition is only 
possible after modernity. Only then, once exceptions and privileges are no longer 
acceptable, could the legal system be understood as ‘the expression of the universal 
663. ibid, 95.
664. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional 
Development, 84–87. Cited by Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, 99.




interest of all members of society’.668 In the modern legal system the law is the 
expression of an agreement among equal and free partners. According to Honneth, 
legal rights are the expression of this new form of recognition. Thus, ‘[i]n obeying the 
law, legal subjects recognize each other as persons capable of autonomously making 
reasonable decisions about moral norms’.669 With the transition to modernity legal 
rights became recognised in a universalistic fashion for members of political 
communities. So legal recognition is the recognition of the equal worth of persons in 
legal decision making, that is to say in autonomous ruling. Honneth executes a 
historical analysis to show how what started as a formal recognition of legal equality – 
with civil and political rights protecting negative liberty and political participation – 
has led to a more substantive conception of citizenship so that individuals can truly 
participate autonomously in civil society with social rights guaranteeing a certain level 
of welfare.670 The ‘positive relation-to-self that legal recognition makes possible’ is that 
of self-respect.671 This is the product of every individual becoming responsible for his 
or her own decisions while sharing with everyone else the conditions that make 
autonomous decision making possible. I develop self-respect by respecting the 
decisions of others who respect my decisions.
The last sphere of recognition is solidarity, which positively provides self-
esteem. In this final stage the development of an undistorted relation-to-self comes 
back to the individual, this time however as part of a kind of ‘social esteem that allows 
[individuals] to relate positively to their concrete traits and abilities’.672 The evolution 
of this notion of self-esteem is also historically dependent. Thus, in the ancient world, 
self-esteem was dependent upon the position that corresponded with the individual in 
a pre-ordered society. In modernity, Honneth argues, social esteem has come to be 
determined according to the ‘dominant conceptions of ethical goals in a society’.673 
668. ibid, 109.
669. ibid, 110.
670. ibid, 110–121. In this historical description of the evolution of rights, Honneth follows T. H. 
Marshall’s very influential work. vid, Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class”. Honneth does not 
mention two very important theoretical building blocks of these ideas, specifically, Rousseau’s 
transformation of man into citizen after the social pact, vid “The Social Contract”, Ch6, and Marx’s 
critique of the rights of man as the right of the bourgeois, vid “On the jewish question”.




The sphere of social-esteem prizes those differences that the law does not consider for 
recognition because of its universality. In other words, these are differences that we 
should all recognise in other individuals. This historical evolution,674 as explained 
herein, has led to solidarity in a form in which each member of different social groups 
‘knows himself or herself to be esteemed by all others to the same degree’. According 
to Honneth, members of these groups share a value horizon ‘in which each participant 
learns to recognize the significance of the abilities and traits of the others’.675 
Individuals develop self-esteem because they are in a position to refer to themselves 
via those achievements that the group considers to be valuable. For Honneth these are 
solidaristic relations because our shared goals can be realised only if I care actively for 
the development of the other’s characteristics, even if they are foreign to me.676
The normative force of Honneth’s social theory of recognition requires an 
ethical framework, an ethical life or Sittlichkeit, according to which the forms of 
recognition are oriented. Honneth tries to set his conception of ethical life between a 
Kantian universal morality and the substantive ethos of a concrete political community. 
He therefore offers a formal concept of ethical life and one that explains the ways in 
which the structures of recognition can provide the social conditions for self-
realisation. In this task he considers it inevitable that we start from the forms of 
recognition related to love. To repeat, these are the forms that allow individuals to 
develop self-confidence. Honneth considers these to be necessary for ‘every type of 
self-realization’.677 While initially in The Struggle for Recognition he was unable to see 
that these relations are also open to redefinition, he later argues that they might be 
redefined through the requirements of new forms of care.678 The other two forms of 
recognition should be adjusted to fit our contemporary forms of social interaction. In 
this sense, Honneth argues that opening up these forms of recognition to their 
historical evolution is the right path to follow. This movement maintains the formal 
structures of recognition while at the same time allowing for their redefinition by 
social struggles of recognition. Thus, for Honneth, the law should continue to develop 
in ‘the direction of increased consideration for the particular circumstances of the 




678. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 144-147.
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individual without losing their universal content’.679 The biggest problem for Honneth 
is how to provide for a substantive but not fixed horizon of common interests as 
required by solidarity. This problem has increased with the continuous exacerbation of 
the individual proper of modern forms of capitalism. Honneth does not provide an 
answer to this problem (at least not in The Struggle for Recognition)680 but trusts that it 
might be solved through future struggles for recognition.681 In this way, Honneth’s 
theory of recognition is always ready to explain the ways in which new social 
movements’ struggles for recognition require changes in any of the spheres of 
recognition without, at the same time, a systematic closure by identifying with any of 
these demands.682
MacIntyre is more dramatic than Honneth regarding this last point. He 
actually thinks that ‘neither the modern nation-state nor the modern family provide 
the kind of political and social association needed’ to sustain those virtues that we 
require to flourish as rational human animals.683 However, there is a very important 
point that stands in common between Honneth and MacIntyre. They both develop 
their ideas from a conception of the good through which individual autonomy 
depends on the autonomy of others in interaction.684 True, MacIntyre does not 
develop his argument in terms of recognition, but his argument in Dependent Rational 
Animals rests on intersubjective relations upon which human flourishing depends. In 
Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre calls these the virtues of ‘independent rational 
agency’ and the virtues of ‘acknowledged dependence’. In this sense then both 
theories have in common an important teleological aspect since both theories aspire 
to the realisation of our humanity.
679. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 177.
680. Because of the way in which his work has evolved, he will very probably address this issue in a 
soon to be published (in English) book: Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundation of Democratic Life.
681. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 179.
682. Honneth argues for this interpretation of his theory in his response to Nancy Fraser’s critique in 
Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 110–137. This allows him to incorporate 
demands for redistribution in the grammar of the struggles for recognition without limiting 
recognition to redistribution (or for this purpose any other social demand).
683. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 9. The argument is fully developed in ibid Ch11.
684. For Honneth’s point vid, Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 259.
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To the two different kinds of good referred to above in section 4, namely 
internal and external goods,685 in chapter seven of Dependent Rational Animals, 
MacIntyre adds a third kind of good. These goods are those that make possible human 
flourishing. These are goods that are good for us qua human beings. Through these 
goods we learn to think as human beings. According to MacIntyre, what distinguishes 
us from other dependent animals is that we think in a particular way since we are 
rational animals capable of developing practical reasoning:686 ‘Human beings need to 
learn to understand themselves as practical reasoners about goods, about what on 
particular occasions it is best for them to do and about how it is best for them to live 
their lives’.687 In this sense, without these goods we cannot distinguish between 
internal and external goods.
MacIntyre argues that to become practical reasoners we are necessarily 
dependent on others. In his words, ‘[t]o become an effective practical reasoner is an 
achievement, but it is always one to which others have made essential 
contributions’.688 The contribution that the other makes is directly related to our 
animal dependency. What differentiates us in this sense from other animals, according 
to MacIntyre, is that we have memory and from birth to death are in different 
positions regarding dependency; we begin receiving care, we learn to behave as carers 
and we will have to care for others in some point of our life. Or we even learn to 
behave according to what is expected of us by depending on what others can teach us. 
This happens when, for example, we engage in a particular existent practice. To return 
to the football example, we have to learn what it means to be a good football player 
and we only learn this by engaging with others. This is what MacIntyre means when 
he says that, 
There is no point […] in our development towards and in our 
exercise of independent practical reasoning at which we cease 
altogether to be dependent on particular others.689
Moreover, MacIntyre convincingly argues that because we are part of these networks 
of relations what we give will at some point depend on what we receive. Neither what 
685. vid supra, 183.





we receive nor what we give can be measured by strict reciprocity. This happens either 
because we might have to give to one from which we did not receive or because we 
might have to give much more to someone from whom we have received less.690 Here 
MacIntyre makes an interesting point about certain relationships of giving and 
receiving in institutionalised contexts. These are, according to MacIntyre, certain 
‘relationships without which I and others could not become able to achieve and be 
sustained in achieving our goods. They are constitutive means to the end of our 
flourishing’, although they also have an oppressive face proper of institutions and their 
connection with external goods.691 Here it is important to note what MacIntyre 
means by ‘means to the end of our flourishing’. He does not assume the mere 
instrumental approach I criticise earlier in this thesis. This is an instrumental approach 
in which the instrument becomes constitutive of the end, as he argues, going back to 
Aristotle.692 Therefore, there is a necessary connection between the way of doing 
something (the means) and the end, because the means is part of a whole. In the 
example given by MacIntyre, making a particular move in a game of chess is a means 
for playing chess. MacIntyre continues his argument by showing how social networks 
of giving and receiving rest on a group of particular virtues. These are the virtues of 
‘independent rational agency’ and the virtues of ‘acknowledged dependence’. But I 
will not describe the content of these virtues since this exceeds my point. 
So, how do these ideas come together in the analysis of taxation as a practice? 
With the help of Honneth’s ideas about struggles for recognition and MacIntyre’s 
ideas of our mutual dependency, we are in the position of being able to say that our 
development as human beings is conditioned by social interactions. To develop as 
human beings to our full capacity we depend on others and the complex social 
networks that we build with those with whom we interact. The sphere of love – or 
the first stages of our animal dependency – establishes the ways in which we are to 
relate to others in our early life regarding our concrete needs. As important as this 
space is for basic self-esteem it is not the main concern of those practices that come to 
be institutionalised. The spheres of recognition that closely relate to practices and 
institutions are those of law and solidarity. So, if I am looking for a justification for 
690. ibid, 99–102.
691. ibid, 102. At this point, recall what was said supra, 183.
692. ibid, 106.
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taxation as a practice within this scheme then I need to find the good in that practice 
(this would provide the foundations for that practice to become an institution). I think 
that there are good reasons for saying that taxation is one such practice, either by 
adopting Honneth’s formal conception of the good or MacIntyre’s substantive 
conception of human flourishing.693
What kinds of reasons do we have for having taxation? In chapter three I 
extensively argue that the reasons for having taxation cannot be mere instrumental 
reasons.694 Now we have another reason for explaining why they cannot be mere 
instrumental reasons: the kinds of goods that an instrumental conception of taxation is 
related to are the kinds of goods that MacIntyre calls external goods. But these 
external goods are not enough for explaining the persistence of taxation. Even more 
so, and as I have argued before, the mere instrumental approach to taxation rests on a 
poor understanding of our humanity. It assumes that we live our lives as market agents 
who engage in ‘cooperative’ interaction since it is rational to do so (recall the 
Dworkinian individual who buys insurance). Or as MacIntyre puts it, 
Each participant […] must have good reason to believe that 
maximization constrained by rules governing access to and 
engagement in cooperative bargaining with others will afford 
her or him more of what she or he wants than will 
unconstrained maximization.695
The mere instrumental justification of institutions therefore denies the connection 
that exists between our social arrangements and interactions, as well as the ways in 
which they transform our lives. What the mere instrumental justification denies is 
precisely the point that Honneth and MacIntyre put forward, that the possibility of 
our full development as individuals is a collective enterprise. The mere instrumental 
justification of taxation thus denies the very idea of our mutual dependency. This is 
still a very general affirmation. I will try to be more specific by further developing the 
relationship between taxation and (spheres of) recognition. For this purpose the two 
logical spheres of recognition would be the law and the state. However, as I am not yet 
693. Note however that this is not what a liberal would call a moral conception of the good. MacIntyre 
is not concerned with a substantive conception of the good life, but what is good for us as the 
kinds of beings that we are.
694. vid supra, 123ff.
695. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 114.
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concerned with the institutionalisation of taxation in tax law I will leave this analysis 
for the next chapter.
What we know as taxation deals with the ways in which goods are distributed 
among members of a political community.696 As stated in previous chapters, taxation is 
an important aspect of our living together since it secures the material conditions that 
make possible our living together. Taxation in this sense cannot but be understood as 
part of a historical evolution in which recognition through law and the state have 
made possible the full development of self-realization. In this sense, taxation is part of 
ethical life and an essential practice for solidarity. It is one of the ways in which we 
realise the demands of recognition at the level of the state. To use Honneth’s terms, the 
good in taxation is self-esteem. A possible objection to this idea is that I still have to 
show that taxation is not a contingent good, that it is not a possible good for a 
particular community at a particular time. This objection would advance allowing the 
following lines: defining the good in these terms limits us to existing practices as we 
know them, or as Nancy Fraser would put it, I would be falling into a ‘dogmatic 
attachment to the Keynesian-Westphalian frame’.697 I can think of two possible 
answers to this objection. The first is the same answer given by Honneth to Fraser’s 
criticism in their exchange about redistribution and recognition. This answer rests on 
one of the central theoretical elements of the critical theory tradition, specifically the 
claim that there is transcendence in the immanent.698 One of the central characteristics 
of critical theory is that it starts from existing institutions, as we know them, in order 
to subject them to constant criticism. This explains that institutions as we know them 
are open to constant extension and redefinition. Or, in the different terms previously 
articulated, it requires us to adopt a pessimistic approach toward existing institutions, 
while at the same time being positive about the underlying political ideals. So situating 
taxation as a practice in the sphere of solidarity does not mean accepting the 
contingent institutionalisation of the practice as it exists, namely as tax law. On the 
contrary, the idea is to explain the historical transformation of that practice – in light 
of its evolution and the demands associated with it from the perspective of 
696. vid supra, 55ff.
697. Fraser, Scales of Justice, 37.
698. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 238–248.
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solidarity.699 Thus, starting from practices as we know them does not restrict our 
possibilities; on the contrary, it guides new debates in light of the sort of relevant good. 
This leads us to the second possible answer. This answer requires us to show 
that taxation is a practice in which there is a good that is good for us qua human 
beings. Applying MacIntyre’s ideas, this would mean that in taxation we find a good 
that allows us to flourish as human beings, that is as animals able to fully develop 
practical reason. More precisely, taxation would have to be a practice in which we can 
learn about the virtues of ‘mutual dependence’.700 Of course, it would be a mistake to 
read within this that taxation is the practice through which we learn about such 
virtues. This would be equivalent to saying that it is the only practice or a practice that 
includes all those virtues. My claim is more modest. I think it is enough to show that 
taxation is a practice where we have the possibility of learning these virtues. As such, 
this possibility defines our best explanation and understanding of that practice. But just 
as MacIntyre argues, the achievement of those virtues requires a network of practices 
and different communities in which the individual develops his or her life. We have to 
distinguish this potentiality for the virtues with another possible problem, in other 
words, that the practice is institutionalised in such a way that it makes impossible this 
reading. Indeed, part of the difficulty in accepting an interpretation of taxation such as 
the one that I propose rests in the way in which taxation has been institutionalised in 
contemporary Western capitalists countries. This explains in part why it is seen as an 
oppressive institution. The institutionalisation of taxation, as justified under the mere 
instrumental justification combined with existing neoliberal market economies, 
produces an explosive result in which there is no possible space for solidarity or the 
virtues of mutual dependency. Each is supposed to understand oneself as an isolated 
monad (a God or an animal in Aristotelian terms) that competes for external goods 
against other monads.
As stated at the beginning of this section, once it has been shown that taxation 
is a practice with an internal good, we have good reason for explaining why tax 
avoidance is problematic. The advantage of this approach is not simply that we have a 
better systematic explanation for tax avoidance, namely one that depends on the 
699. For the idea of a historical justification and explanation vid, Taylor, “Explanation and practical 
reason”.
700. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, Ch10.
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definitions adopted. This would be a superfluous advantage obtained only by fiat. The 
advantage of the interpretation I argue for is that it allows us to better understand the 
social complaint and indignation levelled against companies and individuals engaged in 
tax avoidance. Through a combination of the ideas developed above, if taxation is a 
practice that relates to those goods that are part of our mutual dependency, then the 
indignation concerning and the reason why tax avoidance is so problematic is because 
taxation becomes the site of a struggle for recognition, a struggle that solidarity 
demands. Tax avoidance stops being a moral problem ascribed to individuals; it is a 
problem of disrespect. In this sense, tax avoidance shows a lack of recognition for those 
with whom we share the ‘ethical life’ in the state. But the denial of recognition that 
comes from tax avoidance is even worse since it can become a problem of reification. 
In Honneth’s terms, reification is ‘the process by which we lose the consciousness of 
the degree to which we owe our knowledge and cognition of other persons to an 
antecedent stance of empathetic engagement and recognition’.701 Consequently, 
through this process of ‘amnesia’, as Honneth calls it, we lose the correct perception of 
the expressions of others, we lose the capacity to be affected by them.702 We lose, that 
is to say, the cognitive ability to understand that our ‘cognition owes its existence to an 
antecedent act of recognition’.703 This is what happens in cases of tax avoidance 
because we engage in a practice in which we have completely lost the elements of 
recognition embedded in it. In this case we do not see the internal good in taxation 
but only its external good. Moreover, I would say that in cases of tax avoidance we 
also lose the sense in which private property is justified in terms of recognition. He 
who engages in avoidance does not see how his property depends on it being 
recognised by others. He denies recognition in private property by accumulating more 
than that which corresponds. Other individuals hinder his property and they become 
mere obstructions to his impulse of accumulation.704
To sum up the ideas in this section, taxation is a kind of practice that 
constantly reminds us of our mutual dependency. In this sense, it is a practice with an 
internal good since it brings us closer to the recognitory virtues of mutual 
701. Honneth, Reification: A New Look to an Old Idea, 56.
702. ibid, 58.
703. ibid, 59.
704. In this I follow Honneth’s ideas about the social sources of reification, vid ibid, 75–85.
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dependency. Tax avoidance shows a lack of respect to others with whom we share our 
dependency and carries the risk of reification. However, we still have to add a further 
argument in order to explain why taxation is just this kind of practice. So the question 
is why do we do what we do through taxation? The answer to this question highlights 
the relationship between private property and taxation. To this I turn in the next 
section.
6. TAXATION AS PRIVATE PROPERTY OR PRIVATE PROPERTY AS TAXATION
If the argument has been successful so far then I should have been able to show that 
taxation is a practice with an internal good. But taxation is not a practice that stands 
alone in the world, it is part of a complex network of practices and it is particularly 
related with one of these, namely private property.705 Here it is relevant to recall the 
discussion made in section 3.2 of chapter two about the relationship between private 
property and taxation according to the classical paradigm of tax law.706 According to 
this paradigm, private property is a natural right that can be limited only to the 
acceptance of the owner. This justification of private property explains, to an 
important extent, that the justification and justice of taxation is linked to public 
expenditure for the protection of natural rights and is distributed according to the 
benefit principle. Yet in contemporary political societies and legal systems it is almost 
unanimously accepted that this justification of private property rests on a previous 
decision about the system of property allocation to be adopted. That is, there is not 
one system of property justified per se according to considerations that are different 
from political decisions.
If we follow Jeremy Waldron then the concept of property is ‘the concept of a 
system of rules governing access to and control of material resources’.707 This system 
might be configured under different alternative forms for allocating those material 
resources. The most commonly known systems are private property, collective property 
705. I am not concerned here with the particular content of the right of ownership in any particular 
legal system. My concern is with the concept of property and its possible justifications.
706. vid supra, 67.
707. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 31.
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and common property,708 but there may be others that our institutional imagination 
may allow for.
So private property is one of the possible systems for allocating property. 
Furthermore, the justification for this system can also vary. There may be utilitarian or 
consequentialist justifications, such as Hume’s,709 or deontological or rights-based 
arguments.710 Rights-based arguments are those that justify a right to private property 
through the protection of an individual interest considered to be of such importance 
that it holds ‘others (especially the government) to be under duties to create, secure, 
maintain, or respect an institution of private property’.711 If we follow Waldron’s 
analysis, there are two different kinds of rights-based justifications: (i) special and (ii) 
general.712 A special-rights (SR) based argument is an ‘argument which takes an 
interest to have this importance not in itself but on account of the occurrence of some 
contingent event or transaction’. A general-rights (GR) based argument is one that 
‘attributes that importance to the interest itself, in virtue of its qualitative character’.713 
According to Waldron, these justifications have important differences, particularly 
regarding redistribution. Because of its dependency on the contingent event or 
transaction on which it depends, a SR-based argument is less permeable to 
redistributive concerns. On the contrary, a GR-based argument would justify 
redistributive policies.714 In the first, the possibility of redistribution depends on the 
specific way in which the SR is to be acquired; if there is not any conformity with 
these conditions then there is more space for redistribution. In the second, 
redistribution is part and parcel of the GR since private property is understood to be 
something that everyone should have. If Locke’s theory of property presents a 
paradigmatic case of a SR-based argument, Hegel’s is the paradigmatic case of a GR-
based argument. The right to private property in the latter case would be a necessary 
708. ibid, 37–42.
709. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 42. For the difference between 
utilitarian and rights-based considerations in justifying private property, vid Waldron, The Right to 
Private Property, 73–78.
710. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Ch3, and Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes 
and Justice, 42–45.
711. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 115.
712. ibid, 115–117, in general Ch4.
713. ibid, 116.
714. ibid, 440–441, 444.
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component of recognition, that is the objectification of the subjectivity of an 
individual in the world.715 
Waldron does not give reasons for preferring any of the possible alternatives for 
justifying a right to private property as an SR-based or GR-based argument. He just 
describes the various possible alternatives given by different theorists. He is certainly 
right in saying that politicians and theorists should have a clear idea of these different 
alternatives since they entail different implications for the particular configurations of 
the right to private property that are normally not considered.716 However, he does 
not give us much help in addressing the relationship between taxation and private 
property. He only gives us an indirect idea when he says that each of these 
justifications is differently exposed to redistribution.
Murphy and Nagel address this issue directly. They generalise Waldron’s point 
by saying that any definition of private property is conventional. Therefore, its specific 
content and justification depend not only on a decision about the justification of that 
particular right, but on a theory of distributive justice of which decisions about 
taxation constitute an important part. Their argument therefore turns Waldron’s point 
about redistribution on its head; private property cannot be the standard against which 
we measure redistribution because whatever private property we have, it is a creation 
of the tax system. Murphy and Nagel argue that the relevant question here is not what 
part of my property can the government take, but how should the tax system decide 
about the public/private division of the social product?717 In their words, ‘the issues of 
taxation are not about how the state should appropriate and distribute what its citizens 
already own, but about how it should allow ownership to be determined’.718 This 
would give way, Murphy and Nagel argue, to political arguments about what kind of 
distributive justice we want to have in a particular political community. However this 
may be, Murphy and Nagel still have not answered the problems that derive from their 
paradox.719 Remember that according to this paradox anything able to perform the 
function of taxes might be considered a tax. The definition they provide about private 
715. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §§41ff.
716. Waldron, The Right to Private Property, 444–445.
717. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, passim and Ch9.
718. ibid, 176.
719. vid supra, 148.
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property confirms the paradox because even if they are saying that the definition of 
private property depends on taxation, what they are really saying is that the definition 
of private property will depend on the definition of the theory of distributive justice 
adopted. So they seem to be arguing for a much more radical idea than the one they 
are willing to support. This radical idea is that private property and taxation are 
conceptually inseparable. This is, for example, exactly what they do when they say that
the main problem of socioeconomic justice is [that] [a] capitalist 
market economy is the best method we have for creating 
employment, generating wealth, allocating capital to production, 
and distributing goods and services. But it also inevitably 
generates large economic and social inequalities […]. [I]t is […] 
important to find ways of limiting the damage of the inevitable 
losers in market competition without undermining the 
productive power of the system.720 
From this quote I understand that Murphy and Nagel are subordinating taxation to a 
redistributive function, rather than accepting the necessary consequence of the radical 
idea that they suggest (that private property is constitutively linked with taxation).
I believe that the reason why Murphy and Nagel cannot accept the radical 
consequence that underlies the conventional approach to private property is to be 
found in their liberal background; or, to be more specific, the atomistic conception of 
man characteristic of the liberal tradition.721 How is it that ‘the productive power’ of 
the market system can be undermined? Within the liberal tradition this would happen 
whenever an individual sees that there is no point in producing more wealth because 
they cannot benefit directly from the accumulation of that wealth. But this is precisely 
the point that is undermined if we adopt the conception of man introduced in the 
previous section of this chapter.722 
The intersubjective development of the subject, or the possibility of our 
flourishing as human beings, requires that we recognise rights when this is needed for 
our self-respect. The right to private property is this kind of right. If we follow Hegel, 
it is a right that grants us space for the objective expression of our subjective will in 
the world. Waldron says that this has consequences for redistribution. I would rather 
say that this has consequences for the amount of property we can accumulate. This 
720. Murphy and Nagel, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice, 181.
721. Taylor, “Atomism”.
722. vid supra, 188.
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definition of the right to private property has an intrinsic limit: the recognition of 
private property for others. If we assume, along with Murphy and Nagel, the 
conventional nature of private property, then this limit implies that taxation is 
constitutive of private property. This is the radical consequence of the argument: 
taxation is a constitutive aspect of private property. Private property and taxation are 
two faces of the same coin. 
However, if this is so then two other important consequences follow. The first 
is that we do not have any need to justify redistribution. What we call redistribution 
will become a necessary consequence of recognising a conventional right to private 
property. Redistribution (affecting private property in order to modify a previous 
distribution) should be a constitutive consequence of private property; we will have a 
constant allocation of goods under a conception of ‘ethical life’. This makes perfect 
sense in the scheme that I describe above, namely one in which taxation is an 
expression of solidarity in a structure of distributive justice as part of general justice. 
This leads to a second consequence that is crucial to the legal form that taxation 
should adopt once it is institutionalised in tax law. If we take Murphy and Nagel’s idea 
seriously, that is, that the definition of private property depends on taxation (and 
taxation is not justified on mere instrumental grounds), the obligation to pay taxes can 
be explained on new grounds. The obligation to pay taxes will no longer depend on 
the will of an individual, but on the objective existence of the right of private 
property. Each individual, to whom a right of private property is recognised, will have 
the duty to pay taxes. Or in terms concurrent with the content of this chapter, the 
duty to pay taxes cannot be justified in mere instrumental terms; it will be part of 
private property. With this argument I expect to have offered a better understanding of 
taxation than the one of the classical paradigm of tax law. In the next chapter I explore 
an alternative to the contemporary general theory of tax law.
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CHAPTER FIVE. TAX LAW AS A TELEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION
1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I argue for the institutionalisation of taxation as a practice, applying and 
expanding on some of the ideas and arguments contained in the previous chapter. My 
aim is to provide an explanation of tax law as a teleological institution. This task 
requires showing that tax law can constitute the institutionalisation of taxation as a 
practice with an internal good (and that this requires more than establishing or 
creating ‘a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights 
and duties, powers and immunities, and the like’).723 To fulfil this task I distinguish 
between teleological and merely instrumental institutions as two different kinds of 
institution. Institutions of the first kind mediate between political ideals (the 
transcendental) and political action (the immanent).724 These institutions perform their 
mediating role by embodying the conception of the good contained in the underlying 
practices they are based on to achieve a superior good (their ‘telos’). Hence, within 
immanent conditions teleological institutions always aim for their telos. This means 
that the telos of these institutions sets a direction of movement according to which the 
immanent is subject to critique, rather than defining a state of affairs to be achieved. 
Thus characteristically, teleological institutions do not have the task of achieving a 
particular state of affairs. By state of affairs I understand the allocation of certain kinds 
of goods, rights and duties, powers and immunities to people, which obtain from an 
institution understood as a public system of rules. This is the main difference between 
teleological and merely instrumental institutions. Merely instrumental institutions lack 
any transcendental dimension and are designed to bring about a particular state of 
affairs. They are designed as technological instruments and as such are evaluated 
according to their achievements. As will become clearer later in this chapter, these 
institutions are exclusively functional. This kind of institution is functional for political 
ends, understood as a fixed and achievable state of affairs. This does not mean that 
723. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 47.
724. In this I follow some of Claudio Michelon’s ideas about political institutions. Michelon 
characterises political institutions as mediating between political ideals and political action in 
Michelon, “The Public Nature of Private Law?”. However, as I explain later in this chapter, my 
conception of teleological institutions varies from Michelon’s conception of political institutions, 
vid infra, 209ff.
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teleological institutions do not bring changes to the immanent. However, the kind of 
change that they bring is different, that is, they can change the way in which we relate 
to each other rather than a state of affairs defined exclusively according to a public 
system of rules. Hence, teleological institutions are the kinds of institution that can 
achieve political or relational justice. In other words, they fit the conception of 
distributive justice as political justice advocated for previously in chapter four.
There is not any place in contemporary political philosophy for teleological 
institutions; this makes the task of explaining some of their characteristics more 
difficult. To overcome this, I start this chapter by revising the telos in tax law (section 
2) and I then attempt to provide a definition of teleological institutions (section 3). 
Later, I endeavour to show that modern law can be a teleological institution (section 
4), and for this purpose I defend a distinction between teleological and exclusively 
functional institutions (sections 4.1. and 4.1.1) and show the limitations of adopting a 
functional conception of the law (section 4.1.2). Finally, to fully characterise 
teleological institutions I leave behind contemporary political philosophy to draw 
upon political theology as an alternative perspective that can provide further insight 
(section 4.1.3). In this section I argue that teleological institutions are the secularised 
version of their equivalent theological concept, viz. the sacraments.
By the end of the chapter (section 4.2) I explore the way in which a general 
theory of tax law might benefit from the ideas developed herein. In particular, how 
these ideas provide criteria by which to adopt a substantive interpretation of tax law. 
For this purpose I examine notions of ‘law’s aspiration’ and ‘legality’ or the ‘ethics of 
legalism’, as developed by Zenon Bankowski and Neil MacCormick.
2. THE TELOS IN TAX LAW
In chapter four I argue in favour of a political conception of distributive justice based 
on the Aristotelian structure of justice.725 Within this Aristotelian framework the 
content of distributive justice rests on a previous political decision. Structurally then, 
distributive justice depends on the political definitions that belong to general justice. 
This conception of distributive justice explains better than the economic conception 
of distributive justice the way in which equality should work as a political ideal, that is, 
725. vid supra, 176.
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as part of the political definitions of general justice.726 I also provide the substantive 
political ideal that defines the content of general justice, namely mutual recognition. 
By bringing together Honneth’s ideas of recognition and MacIntyre’s ideas about the 
good, I try to show that the internal good of taxation as a practice is solidarity. I finish 
chapter four by showing that within the modern political project of collective 
autonomy, taxation and a general right to private property are constitutively mutually 
dependent.
Notwithstanding the arguments and conclusions arrived at in chapters three 
and four, I have not yet provided an explanation for the institutionalisation of the 
practice of taxation in tax law. The main problem here is to show that tax law is able to 
embody the good of taxation. The risk is losing this good by assuming that tax law is a 
mere instrument by which to achieve the ends of the practice of taxation. This would 
imply falling back onto liberal egalitarian and luck egalitarian understandings of 
taxation and tax law as mere instruments.727 Or, to paraphrase MacIntyre, the danger is 
that the institutional embodiment of taxation as a practice might focus exclusively on 
its external obscuring its internal good. Hence, to avoid this risk or danger I need to 
explain the way in which tax law can embody the internal good of the practice of 
taxation, that is to say, how tax law can be conceived of as having intrinsic value. To 
develop this explanation I introduce a distinction between two kinds of institution: 
teleological and mere instrumental (or exclusively functional) institutions. Showing 
that tax law has intrinsic value requires an adoption of the teleological conception of 
institutions. According to the teleological conception, institutions are not mere 
instruments, tools or technological devices designed to achieve an end. Teleological 
institutions do not operate in this form because rather than bringing about a particular 
state of affairs their role is to mediate between the immanent and the transcendental.
3. TELEOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONS
In chapter four I utilise MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and external goods to 
develop an argument that shows that taxation is a practice and that its internal good is 
mutual recognition.728 This is a first necessary step in offering an explanation of 
726. It also explains why the logic of the market denies the equal political standing of citizens.
727. vid supra, 130ff.
728. vid supra, 183ff.
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taxation alternative to the merely instrumental justification I identify in liberal 
egalitarianism. Here I further develop MacIntyre’s distinction and ideas to argue that 
tax law is the institutionalisation that makes possible the persistence of that practice.
Let me very briefly return to MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and 
external goods; I would like to clarify its relationship in relation to a second 
distinction made between practices and institutions. Internal goods are goods that can 
only be specified by reference to the practice they are part of; they can only be 
recognised by experiencing them within the practice and they are pursued for their 
own sake. On the other hand, external goods are a necessary concern of institutions 
(and only contingently attached to practices); they can normally be achieved and 
experienced outside practices and they exclude others because they are always 
someone’s property or possession. According to MacIntyre’s definitions, external goods 
are not goods per se. They are so, that is they are goods, ‘qua means to something 
further that is itself good’.729 This definition sets a condition for the relationship 
between institutions and the good because external goods will only be goods if they 
are ‘means’ to the good in itself. Therefore, the condition that needs to be satisfied is 
connecting an institution with a telos (with this ‘further that is itself good’). To 
summarise, the relationship between institutions and the good is contingent; it 
depends on identifying a further good to which the external goods of the institution 
are ‘means’. In more general terms, institutions might have a telos so long as they are 
‘means’ for the good. On the contrary, they will not have a telos if they are not ‘means’ 
for the good.730 In conclusion, external goods will be goods so long as they are 
attached to teleological institutions. Institutions, therefore, are important for the good 
because they stabilise and bring continuity to practices, but at the same time they 
imply a risk because they make the ‘further’ good unstable. This instability means that 
rather than fostering the practice and its underlying good, they can destroy both of 
them.
From the analysis of the preceding paragraph I would like to put forward the 
following idea: teleological institutions have to be transitive between the goods of 
729. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 66.
730. vid infra, 228ff.
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practices and the goods of human flourishing.731 Here I would like to distinguish two 
senses in which an institution might be transitive.732 The first I call a general level and 
the second, a particular level. An institution is transitive at the general level when the 
universe of rules from which it is composed is able to embody, as a whole, the good of 
the practice. An institution is transitive at the particular level when each of its rules is 
open to redefinition by appealing to the good of the practice. This second sense, the 
particular level, should be discarded because it makes it almost impossible to 
coordinate conduct and this is one of the most important reasons for having 
institutions. Rules would be continuously open up to redefinition according to the 
substantive content of the institution and would not make any difference in practical 
reason for those participating in the institution. On the contrary, at the particular level 
institutions should exclude the reasons that justify the institution as a whole. If they do 
not then they would be nothing but putative or apparent institutions. This does not 
mean that the application of rules within teleological institutions should be blind to 
the institution’s telos. At the general level, transitiveness requires that those who have 
to apply particular rules are open to the best possible interpretation of those rules 
according to the institution’s telos. At the same time however, that telos restricts the 
possible interpretations of those particular rules in light of the institution’s telos. So the 
telos works both as the substantive openness and substantive closure of possible 
interpretations.733
However, teleological institutions are not supposed to be, and nor could they 
be, the perfect embodiment of the good. There are two characteristics of teleological 
institutions that explain why they cannot be a definitive embodiment of the good. The 
first characteristic is their transcendental dimension and the second, their immanent 
dimension. Their transcendental dimension derives from their connection with the 
telos. The telos presents itself as an image of the future and as such is open, that is to 
say, we can move toward it or away from it.734 MacIntyre combines this connection 
between an uncertain future and the telos with the idea that human actions are only 
731. As argued supra Ch4s5, 188ff, these goods are independent.
732. The distinction that follows is inspired by Rawls’ distinction between two different conceptions of 
rules, namely, the summary and the practice conception of rules. vid, Rawls, “Two concepts of 
rules”, 33–40.
733. I come back to these ideas infra, 248.
734. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 215.
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intelligible within a historical narrative.735 This gives him ground to affirm that if our 
individual lives are to make sense, or if we describe our actions as those of a good 
lawyer, doctor, academic, or any other that implies assuming a role,736 we must 
understand ourselves as part of a tradition. Because of this combination between the 
historical and the teleological:
What I am, […], is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that 
is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a 
history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, 
whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a 
tradition.737
The tradition is important because it ‘grounds’ the telos. History provides an important 
direction, orienting present actions to a telos that is in part contained within the 
historical evolution of the tradition. It is important not to mistake the sort of 
transcendentalism I am presenting here for either a certain kind of ‘religious’ idea 
about the future – one that does not connect us with the present – or for the idea of 
the transcendental as the normative foundation of our moral order as pertaining to an 
eternal time.738 In this ‘religious’ sense transcendentalism would be disconnected from 
the immanent and of no use to criticism. The transcendental aspect of institutions is 
derivatively connected with its religious origin, but the way in which I interpret 
MacIntyre’s ideas about it is similar to the way in which this idea is part of ‘the legacy 
of Critical Theory’s left-Hegelian[ism]’, as Honneth argues.739 According to this legacy, 
institutions are to be understood as containing ‘inner-social transcendence’.740 In this 
context, Honneth argues that ‘the real challenge of [this] tradition is being able to 
show that such reference points – such demands – are not the result of contingent 
735. ibid, 204–218.
736. For the idea of role, vid ibid, Ch3, 27–32.
737. ibid, 221.
738. vid, Taylor, A Secular Age and Modern Social Imaginaries.
739. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 238–239.
740. One good reason that might explain this connection between MacIntyre and the left-Hegelian 
tradition is their connection with Marxism. On MacIntyre’s ideas about Marxism and Christianity 
and the way in which these traditions connect the present and the future, vid MacIntyre, Marxism 
& Christianity. ‘Only one secular doctrine retains the scope of traditional religion in offering an 
interpretation of human existence by means of which men may situate themselves in the world 
and direct their actions to ends that transcend those offered by their immediate situation: 
Marxism’ (2).
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conflict situations, but rather express the unmet demands of humanity at large’.741 In 
this sense, the transcendental is not only an unfulfilled ideal but also the ‘normative 
potential that re-emerges in every new social reality because it is so tightly fused to the 
structure of human interests’. As Honneth explains, the transcendental is attached to an 
existing ‘form of practice or experience which is on the one hand indispensable for 
social reproduction, and on the other hand […] points beyond all forms of social 
organisation’.742 So the transcendental aspect of teleological institutions explains why 
they cannot be perfect, that is, because they have a seed of change within them (and 
not because they cannot fulfil a ‘religious’ standard). Their transcendental dimension 
explains how the force of constant critique moves the existing institution, as we know 
it, towards its full realisation.
Someone might object to this conception of teleological institutions by 
arguing that they cannot be part of the modern world and, particularly, contemporary 
political societies. For this critic teleological institutions can only have a place in an 
ancient world in which a substantive definition of the good is presupposed and 
heteronomous. On the contrary, there would be no place for teleological institutions 
in plural contemporary secular societies. Hence, for example, in contemporary 
societies institutions cannot have a teleological dimension even within comprehensive 
liberalism.743 Let us take the example of Rawls’ perfect procedural justice. According 
to Rawls institutions are the subject of justice and, as such, they are instruments. This is 
what characterises the liberal ‘positive’ approach to institutions.744 For the ‘positive’ 
approach existing institutions are important so long as we can effectively realise 
political values through them. A liberal like Rawls would argue that if we were not 
able to achieve a state of affairs that works as a justified goal – that is, according to 
741. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 243–244.
742. ibid.
743. Here I am thinking of Rawls’ argument as contained in A Theory of Justice. In this book Rawls 
advocates a conception of justice as fairness characterised by proceduralism. Dworkin’s liberalism is 
more problematic for the characterisation made in the body of the text. Dworkin defends a 
substantive conception of liberalism according to which institutions and the good life are defined. 
Dworkin’s substantive version of institutions, however, is not radically open to the future as a 
liberal framework always provides its closure. To put it in other terms, he does not have a telos 
based on the good (for human flourishing, as in MacIntyre, or for solidarity, as in Honneth) but his 
theory is functional to American political liberalism. I will come back to this discussion when 
analysing the functional approach to the law. vid infra, 233.
744. vid supra, 117ff.
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justified political values – the problem is mainly due to the defective design of 
institutions. Remember what was stated in chapter four about equality as a value.745 
For those who defend a mere instrumental justification of institutions, once the 
political value is justified, it works as an end to be achieved. According to this 
conception of institutions, that is, the merely instrumental one, there is no dependency 
between the institution and the value but a merely instrumental contingent 
connection. There is no dependency, that is, because the content of the end is fixed; it 
will not change according to the way in which institutions condition our existence. 
Vice versa, the end does not provide any critical standard by which to criticise and 
reform our existing institutions other than efficiency in achieving their goal. If these 
institutions are not able to achieve an end, as the technical tools as they are considered 
to be, a better tool should replace them. Institutions and political values are 
understood to be independent from one another and the relative importance is 
assigned to the value (this is why it is expressed as a value).746 The value’s substantive 
content might expand to cover several institutions and become of more value than 
other values. In this scheme there is no communication between institutional reality 
and the underlying justification of the value. Contrary to what happens in teleological 
institutions, the future is not open but limited to the effective achievement of the 
value and it is not contained in existing practices, since these are merely instrumental. 
Furthermore, the mere instrumental approach to institutions does not consider them 
to be connected with a history. They are understood merely as contingent historical 
arrangements.747
One possible answer to this specific argument put forward by the positive 
critic to the teleological conception of institutions, is to show him that the good is 
neither as rigid as he assumes it to be and neither it is imposed from the “outside”. 
This possible answer would have to show, first, that the good is not a value but that it 
is what I call in the previous chapter a political ideal. This implies that a sort of 
metaphysical standard does not rigidly fix the content of the good, because it is open 
745. vid supra, 168ff.
746. vid Schmitt, La Tiranía de los Valores.
747. An example of this approach can be found in Pierre Rosanvallon’s Democratic Legitimacy. Impartiality, 
Reflexivity, Proximity.
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to political definition.748 Another argument with which to answer the critic comes 
from what I point out earlier as one of the relevant characteristics of teleological 
institutions, namely that they are part of what MacIntyre calls a ‘living tradition’.749 To 
be part of a living tradition means that the institution is set within a historical 
narrative. Being part of a historical narrative has the consequence that bringing 
together the past and the future of the tradition changes the present. Consequently, 
teleological institutions move toward the good as a result of the constant revision of 
the good and its institutional expression. In MacIntyre’s words,
[A]n adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of 
those future possibilities which the past has made available to 
the present. Living traditions, just because they continue a not-
yet-completed narrative, confront a future whose determinate 
and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives 
from the past.750
Teleological institutions do not, therefore, yearn for a past that was lost with 
modernity. On the contrary, as stated before, I understand them as bringing the past 
and the future together to change the present. This explains that the transcendental 
aspect of teleological institutions can only be understood as part of a narrative within a 
living tradition. In this sense, the transcendental aspect of teleological institutions 
cannot be properly understood without bearing in mind their second characteristic, 
namely their immanence.
The second characteristic of teleological institutions is their immanent 
dimension. This characteristic of teleological institutions highlights their connection 
with politics and history. Teleological institutions have something in common with 
merely instrumental institutions: they are ways to help produce political decisions 
about what should be done in concrete cases. In this sense, they depend on political 
power and the material conditions that exist in a determinate place and time. The 
immanent character of teleological institutions is what makes them part of modern 
imaginaries according to which we are the ones that autonomously decide about what 
we are to do.751 The immanent in this sense highlights that institutions are directly 
748. For a similar idea, vid Atria, “La verdad y lo político (i): La verdad y su dimensión constitutiva” and 
“La verdad y lo político (ii): Democracia y ley natural”.
749. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 222.
750. ibid, 223.
751. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries.
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connected with human life, as we know it.752 Notwithstanding that they are both 
political institutions in the sense described earlier, there is an important difference 
between them. Teleological institutions differ from mere instrumental institutions in 
that their immanence is historical. It is not just that they deal with this world as it is, 
but that they have a history within it. Therefore, teleological institutions do not 
respond to the mere instrumentalism of functional logic because they are part of an 
order that ‘must also be able to explain historically how normative changes and 
improvements in the forms of social organization have come about’.753
The way in which I have been trying to characterise teleological institutions 
has a very close connection with Claudio Michelon’s non-liberal conception of 
political and legal institutions. According to Michelon, from a non-liberal perspective, 
political institutions, of which the law is a species,754 mediate between the 
transcendent and the immanent ‘in the sense that they offer mechanisms that help 
answer the question about what should be done in concrete cases, while still pointing 
to an ultimate meaning that lies beyond them’.755 On the other hand, from the liberal 
perspective institutions are understood in an instrumental way, ‘as tools to purge 
private vice collectively, either by effectively building better people […] or by 
providing mechanisms that make private vice work for the benefit of the public 
good.’756 From Michelon’s non-liberal approach, institutions create a space for political 
discussion about the meaning of communal life and political action by insulating the 
discussion from the ‘pressures of deciding what to do here and now’.757 Michelon’s 
characterisation of political institutions has consequences for the law. According to 
him law has a claim to connectedness. This means that law is normally presented by 
political authority as being in the interests of all and not just a particular faction of 
society. In this sense, a political decision presents itself as an interpretation of truth and 
752. Taylor, A Secular Age.
753. Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, 245.
754. Michelon, “The Public Nature of Private Law?”, 196–197.
755. ibid, 196. In “The public, the private, and the law”, Michelon provides a different definition. He 
says that ‘law must be understood as a mediating institution, positioned between the struggle 
towards the arché of politics (which includes a raised consciousness of the ultimate meaning of 
political life), and the pressing need to act – to carry on in the absence of the fulfilment of that 
quest’ (92–93). True, Michelon is talking here about the law as a mediating institution, but he 
makes it synonymous with political institutions in general as is clear from the text in the body.
756. Michelon, “The Public Nature of Private Law?”, 196.
757. ibid.
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this is characteristic of all factions that put forward a political agenda. Hence, ‘a claim 
to truth cannot differentiate one proposed policy or legal regulation from another in 
and off itself ’.758 I understand that Michelon is trying to make a conceptual point 
about law, namely that it necessarily has a claim to connectedness. This is substantively 
equivalent to Aquinas’ claim that law is intrinsically connected with the common 
good, as Michelon argues. In the latter’s words, law’s claim to connectedness means 
that ‘all members of a particular political community have an interest in the 
flourishing of everyone else, whether they acknowledge it or not’.759 Michelon offers 
an argument to show that substantively, ‘at a deep level, law is an expression of the 
intrinsic connection between the realisation of each member of the relevant 
community’.760 In other words, if law were used to secure the interests of a faction of 
society, it would not be law. Or as Michelon puts it, ‘there is a philosophically 
meaningful awkwardness in using the law to destroy policies that embody that 
connection’.761 For Michelon this awkwardness comes from the fact that those who 
advocate for an individualist approach to law and politics conceptually claim through 
law that this sort of policy goes in the interests of all.
As stated previously, there is a difference between my conception and 
Michelon’s conception of political and legal institutions. Although we agree on 
describing political institutions and the law as mediating between the immanent and 
the transcendental, we differ in the extent to which we assume that legal institutions 
would work in the common interest. The difference is that I would add to Michelon’s 
‘conceptual’ claim about the law that there should also be space for substantive 
demands that aim for the common good within the law. Correctly identifying the 
substance of the institution would also give space to distinguishing between those who 
claim to represent the general interest and those who appropriate institutions for their 
interest. These substantive criteria would imply that it would be perfectly acceptable to 
say of those who are in the latter position that they do not understand what they are 
doing when referring to the institution. Hence, if Michelon expects his criterion to be 






distinguish between those institutions that ensure the interests of all from those 
putative institutional arrangements. My point is that the kind of argument according 
to which institutions mediate between the transcendental and the immanent requires 
not only a formal approach but also a substantive one.
For the purpose of my argument, Michelon’s conception of political 
institutions helps me to emphasise by contrast that my conception of teleological 
institutions includes a substantive aspect. In the way in which I define them above, 
teleological institutions provide a better idea of how these institutions are connected 
with political concepts. In this sense, teleological institutions are a different kind of 
institution from those institutions that fulfil mere instrumental functions. As stated 
previously, merely instrumental institutions do not relate to the superior good and, 
therefore, the external goods they serve are simply that: external. This is not just a 
minor philosophical detail. The difference is important for political purposes. The 
teleological conception of institutions that I am trying to delineate provides a clearer 
space for political criticism. It provides us with a criterion to distinguish between 
those institutions that are an expression of the common interest and those that 
represent factional interests. It also gives a better account of the difference between 
political ideals and political values. Or to put it in different words, there is a categorical 
difference between instrumental and teleological institutions that should be 
acknowledged in a conceptual enterprise concerning institutions. Let me exemplify 
how this would work when evaluating policies. I will use a tax policy example to 
show how the teleological conception of institutions allows us to distinguish between 
teleological institutions and merely instrumental institutions.
A very prominent debate in contemporary tax policy revolves around the 
question of which tax base should be chosen for direct taxation.762 There are two main 
positions regarding this issue. The first alternative is to tax according to (one among 
various possible definitions of) income, and the second, according to consumption. 
How can we distinguish which of these two alternatives is the real expression of 
taxation and tax law? In this debate it is recognised immediately that these alternatives 
express some ‘equity issues’, namely that one of them comes closer to what a just 
system should be. The substantive interpretation of taxation that I defend in this thesis 
762. For details about this debate, vid Meade, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation. Report of a 
Committee chaired by Professor J.E. Meade, Ch3.
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becomes relevant in this kind of problem as the decision about which of the two 
alternatives should be chosen depends on the underlying conception of taxation. As 
already argued, according to the teleological conception of taxation those who have 
property have a duty to pay taxes and this duty is part of what mutual recognition 
requires. On the other hand, arguments from an economic efficiency standpoint have 
completely different criteria upon which to base the decision. From the economic 
perspective the following reasons recommend the adoption of a consumption base: (i) 
it is difficult to acutely define what income is; (ii) ‘it taxes what a person takes from 
the economic production system rather than what he puts into it’; (iii) it provides 
more opportunities for enterprise and taxes heavily those who consume and dissipate 
wealth; and (iv) ‘it avoids problems arising from the distinction between earned 
income and investment income’.763 But the reasons for adopting this consumption 
base are not innocuous; they are the expression of a particular conception of taxation 
that could be included within the classical paradigm of tax law.764 According to this 
conception of taxation, taxes are necessary for financing public expenditure but they 
should not affect economic efficiency; they should be neutral between the income and 
the substitution effect, they should reflect vertical and horizontal equality, be aware of 
possible international effects on capital flowing from jurisdictions with high tax rates 
to those with lower tax rates, should have a low cost of administration and compliance, 
and should be flexible to economic changes and stable in time.765 Based on these 
standards those who adopt the economic perspective recommend the adoption of the 
consumption base for direct taxation. This tax base allows individuals to accumulate 
capital to invest or save as they wish without paying direct taxes. Direct taxes would 
only apply when these individuals decide to consume. So here we see a conception of 
taxation according to which there is no connection between property and taxation, 
rather, individuals have an ‘incentive’ to accumulate capital. Notice that the difficulty is 
not that the state will face financial problems; establishing a high tax rate can solve this. 
The problem, rather, is that it is assumed that taxation has a merely instrumental 
function. How are we to decide which of the tax bases should be chosen? The 
teleological conception of institutions I am arguing for provides us with a substantive 
763. ibid, 44. For arguments about how this tax could be applied, vid ibid Ch8.
764. vid supra, 58.
765. Meade, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation. Report of a Committee chaired by Professor J.E. 
Meade, 7-22. vid, Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector, Ch17.
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definition of what taxation should be and therefore will provide us with substantive 
criteria to say that a direct tax with a consumption base would not be taxation at all. 
This implies that tax law cannot be designed in such a way that private property is 
assumed to depend exclusively on a labour-like theory of property or, in more general 
terms, a theory of private property based on Lockean grounds. Notice how this 
conclusion is different from that which Michelon would have to arrive at following 
his notion of law’s claim to connectedness. Michelon would have to say that, even if 
they do not know it, those who choose the consumption base would be under an 
institutional arrangement that makes claims to connectedness. This conclusion seems 
to be a denial of the purpose that those who defend these policies would have, that is, 
to deny that private property depends on mutual recognition. In sum, Michelon’s 
argument implies denying political differences by assuming that political and legal 
institutions subject those who appeal to them to the claim to connectedness. This does 
not seem to me to be a sound conclusion. Rather, I would say that those who do not 
agree with teleological institutions, that is, institutions that aim for mutual recognition, 
should assume that they cannot claim to be talking of the same institutions. In the 
example discussed here, those who opt for the consumption base tax would have to 
assume that they do not know what taxes are because they consider them to be 
equivalent to exactions. This shows an important political difference between those 
who consider that we are part of a political community, in which mutual recognition 
is relevant because we are all of equal moral worth, and those who consider that each 
of us is entitled to what each achieves in the market with no concern for those who 
have no fortune in it.
4. CAN LAW BE A TELEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION?
So far I have argued that institutions can be teleological so long as they mediate 
between the transcendental and the immanent or, in other words, so long as they 
embody practices with internal goods. What remains to be explained is whether (and 
how) law might be one of these institutions. This is an instance of the general problem 
of how to conceive of the good in pluralist societies. What makes it particular is that 
the question is now asked about an institution. The general problem can then be 
rendered specific in the question of whether (and how) teleological institutions might 
have a place in contemporary pluralist societies. As we saw above, teleological 
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institutions are the embodiment of the good. They are part of what is good for us as 
members of political communities and as such they are part of the common good. 
This concern with the common good is, of course, one of the characteristics of natural 
law theories within the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions. Earlier I argued that 
mutual recognition is part of the common good and that taxes are practices of mutual 
recognition. Is this enough to show that tax law can be a teleological institution? This 
is a difficult question and MacIntyre’s answer to it lacks in subtlety: in our 
contemporary political societies it is not possible to appeal to a common good.766 For 
MacIntyre, advanced modernity brought with it a fragmentation of the good between 
my good and what is good for others.767 According to him, a characteristic of 
contemporary societies is that we are to choose what is good for us in individual 
terms. Moreover, he considers that contemporary attempts to update natural law with 
cultural modernity have failed.768 Thus, if we were to follow MacIntyre, teleological 
institutions could not be part of what is good for us because of the moral 
disagreement characteristic of modernity.
MacIntyre’s pessimism leads us to a dilemma: should we accept that we live 
under oppressive heteronomous769 institutions because there is moral disagreement in 
modernity? Do we have any alternative? Contrary to what MacIntyre argues there are 
good reasons that show that our political institutions rest on an aspiration to 
commonality and the common good.770 One of the best reasons for explaining the 
aspiration to commonality is precisely that such institutions are part of the law. Let me 
briefly develop this idea. One of the facts that liberal political theorists tend to 
disregard is the fact that from the very moment we are born we are members, and are 
766. MacIntyre, After Virtue, Ch18. vid also, MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, Ch13.
767. MacIntyre, “Theories of natural law in the culture of advanced modernity”, 109ff.
768. ibid, 93ff. According to MacIntyre, this is the case of intents such as the ones from Neil 
MacCormick, Ernst Weinrib, Michael S. Moore, Germain Grisez and John Finnis.
769. In my interpretation of MacIntyre, institutions will be oppressive as opposed to emancipatory 
because, following Atria, we see ‘the other’s interest as opposed to one’s own’. Atria, “Living under 
dead ideas: Law as the will of the people”, 121. At the same time, again in my interpretation of 
MacIntyre, institutions are heteronomous because they are instruments for someone’s will. All this 
is consequence of MacIntyre’s pessimism about moral disagreement: we are subject to another’s 
will as there is no way in which I can be sure that that will is also mine because there is no 
common moral ground. I do not share MacIntyre’s pessimism for the reasons provided in the main 
text.
770. In this part of the argument I expand and modify the application scope of some ideas and 
arguments I developed as a criticism of Zenon Bankowski’s Living Lawfully. Love in Law and Law in 
Love in Saffie, “Fulfilling the law by breaking it? Formalism within legality”.
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part of, a political society that we did not choose to join.771 At the same time, one of 
the main characteristics of being part of a community is to be subject to the law, or as 
Herbert McCabe has put it, ‘[t]o be subject to law is to be a member of a community; 
law is, if you like, the bearing of the community as such on its individual members’.772 
So there is not one moment in which autonomy could be understood as being outside 
of the world that exists (and will continue to exist) with the independence of our will. 
If one tries to explain political arrangements from a starting point that assigns 
overwhelming weight to the claim that autonomy is what truly matters, one would 
necessarily be denying our mutual dependence and vulnerability.773 That is the truth of 
communitarianism (or a certain version of it): a better starting point in an attempt to 
explain our political arrangements is to assume that the individual is a social creation 
and that autonomy can be politically relevant only when it is part of a political project 
aiming at mutual recognition.774 How can we avoid heteronomy if we come to a 
world that is pure heteronomy? Here is where the law has something to say in 
modernity. The main characteristic of modern law is that it stopped being the 
expression of another’s will or of the logos of the world. In other words, in modernity 
the law stopped being heteronomous. In modern times the law is the autonomous 
creation of the people; the law is the expression of the general will or of the will of 
the people. Two important modern political ideas conflate in this understanding of the 
law. The first is concerned with determining what constitutes ‘the people’;775 the 
second, with the possibility of identifying and determining the content of the will of 
the people as what goes in the interests of all. Both ideas address the problem of 
explaining how the universality of the law can come to terms with individual 
freedom.776 We are now in a position to return to Michelon’s idea that law has a claim 
to connectedness. This time however, his idea will not be interpreted as a conceptual 
771. Walzer, Politics and Passion. Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism, Ch1, and Arendt, The Human 
Condition.
772. McCabe, Law, Love and Language, 36.
773. vid supra, 188ff.
774. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 77.
775. Fernando Atria has very convincingly argued that the law allows us to identify people and not the 
other way around. This argument has the consequence that the people is politically constituted and 
identified through the law, thus avoiding any naturalistic conception of the people that might lead 
to totalitarian consequences, vid Atria, “Living under dead ideas: Law as the will of the people”.
776. vid, Pelczynski, “Political community and individual freedom in Hegel's philosophy of state”; Taylor, 
Modern Social Imaginaries, Ch13; and, Laclau, On Populist Reason, Ch4 and Ch5.
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claim. If it is not interpreted in conceptual terms, the differences between my position 
and his position disappear. We would agree that law has a claim to connectedness and I 
would like to argue further that this will remain so as long as the law is understood as 
the will of the people or the expression of the general will. Yet to argue that law has a 
claim to connectedness is not enough to answer to MacIntyre’s pessimism. This 
conception of the law needs to be complemented with a certain kind of institution 
oriented toward realising the common good. My claim is that these institutions are 
teleological institutions.
The teleological nature of the institution we call law is often made opaque to 
us for reasons that are closely related to MacIntyre’s scepticism about the impossibility 
of law embodying the common good. Modern law is the result of a political process; 
hence we cannot assume that teleological institutions will be the necessary product of 
that process. There is no reason to assume that the political process and therefore 
political institutions cannot be appropriated to promote the interests of a faction (as in 
non-democratic countries) or even used to implement policies designed to benefit a 
particular group of society in economic terms (as we have seen neoliberal policies 
do).777 This is equivalent to saying that we cannot be sure that institutions will embody 
the underlying practices and their goods. The antidote to this problem, and to 
MacIntyre’s scepticism, is to provide the best understanding of political institutions (in 
the way I have been trying to do in this thesis with taxation and tax law). Thus, what 
we need to make explicit is the connection between political institutions, the law and 
the common good. In this task the political concept of representation has a lot of 
work to do. Representation is the political concept that tries to bring together the 
general and the particular will/interests. It is through the concept of representation 
that my will can be contained in the general will.
For this purpose it is helpful to look at what Gillian Rose says about political 
representation. In Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation, Rose builds 
her argument by showing how the polarisation of the political debate between liberals 
and communitarians has left individuals subject to either ‘the arbitrariness of the 
“libertarian” individual, and the arbitrariness of the “communitarian” interest 
777. This could be read as part of the criticism that I make above about Michelon’s conceptual claim 
about the law’s claim to connectedness.
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group’.778 For Rose, the abandonment of the universal by making it synonymous with 
‘totalitarian’, and at the same time the attempt of liberating the individual or the 
community from domination, ‘disqualifies both the libertarian and the communitarian 
[…] from any understanding of the actualities of structure and authority, intrinsic to 
any conceivable social and political constitution and which their opposed stances still 
leave intact’.779 What is needed is to build a third category that is able to relate the two 
opposites. This third category is, according to Rose, the universal. Only through the 
universal can we recognise the ‘devastation between posited thought and posited 
being, between power and the exclusion from power’.780
Rose adds further complexities to this diagnosis of the shortcomings of the 
liberal/communitarian (false) dichotomy. She argues that we will never find a clear 
answer for the content of the categories and their relation, so that we can only ‘mourn’ 
this loss. For Rose, ‘mourning’ is the process of not letting go; ‘mourning becomes the 
law’ because we can only live in this uncertainty, constantly redefining the boundaries 
between the three categories.781
According to Rose, the universal – that is, the law – is neither the ‘superior 
term’ nor the ‘symbolic’, but the ‘middle’ that falls ‘towards or away from mutual 
recognition’ that is ‘formed or deformed by reciprocal self-relations’.782 But as we shall 
never achieve mutual recognition in the law, we mourn and rediscover politics, that is, 
‘the risk of action arising out of the negotiation of the law’.783 We thus come closer to 
finding an answer to the question about the relationship between political institutions, 
the law and the common good. We are starting to understand that politics and the law 
do not stand in polar opposition to the individual. However, we know that the ‘middle 
is broken’, that we shall not find certainty in the universal. Here is when political 
representation becomes relevant as the place of the ‘broken middle’. Only political 
representation can ensure that the inescapable universal consequences of political 
action are considered as such by those in power. Political representation ‘understands 







all agents in power and out of it, to face the dilemma of asserting this moral will solely to 
guard their particular interest’.784 At the same time, it is only representation that can 
allow us to understand that law should also be an institution of the ‘middle.’ Only 
through representation does the law become my law; the law that I apply to myself is 
the law that someone else applies to him/herself. To put it in terms of what Fernando 
Atria has called ‘a dead idea’; this political understanding of the law is the way in 
which the law is an expression of the will of the people (of the general will).785
So the law is part of the political aspect of our lives; that is, the law is not a 
particular but the general will. If the law is not part of the general will then relations 
of power become opaque to the critique of the citizen and, at the same time, for those 
who do not take part in the process according to which the law is defined, it becomes 
more and more distant from mutual recognition. So any political theory concerned 
with freedom and autonomy should assume that we are born into and become part of 
different groups, in which we have not chosen to be a part. In other words, we cannot 
avoid being born into, then being part of and subject to, structures of power into 
which we never freely decided to be born into or to belong to. The law, therefore, 
should be understood in its connection with the general interest, as this is the only 
way in which we can ensure that everyone can be heard in an unavoidably alienated 
world:
For politics does not happen when you act on behalf of your 
own damaged good, but when you act, without guarantees, for 
the good of all – this is to take the risk of the universal interest. 
Politics in this sense requires representation, the critique of 
representation, and the cr itique of the cr itique of 
representation.786
In politics, our particular interests can only appear through representation as an 
expression of the general interest. Or in Rose’s words, ‘[p]olitics begins not when you 
organise to defend an individual or particular or local interest, but when you organise 
to further the “general” interest within which your particular interest may be 
represented’.787 To summarise, representation is a necessary aspect of law in modernity 
784. ibid, 62.
785. Atria, “Living under dead ideas: Law as the will of the people”, passim.
786. Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation, 62.
787. ibid, 4.
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because it makes possible political autonomy, that is, that the law is my law even if I do 
not agree with its content.
We still have to address the problem of how are we to determine the good in 
contemporary societies if there is no common moral framework to which to appeal. 
Part of the answer to this problem is developed by showing that political 
representation has the task of making autonomous law possible. So we have a political 
concept that permits each of us to be the author of the law through political 
participation and political critique.788 But we still have to answer the question 
concerning the content of the law. How can we know if its content is part of the 
good? To answer this question the work of Cornelius Castoriadis is particularly 
helpful. Castoriadis’s analysis of the institution of society shows how institutions can 
only be understood as part of the ‘project of social individual autonomy’.789 This 
project in turn underlies what he calls the political ‘project of radical democracy’;790 
that is, the attempt to achieve mutual recognition. As a project it aims to achieve 
mutual recognition through the ‘autonomous action of people and at establishing a 
society organised to promote the autonomy of all its members’.791
According to Castoriadis, society is instituted as a consequence of the work of 
the radical imaginary. One aspect of the radical imaginary is that it is social-historical. 
The ‘social imaginary’ is what ‘in the social-historical is positing, creating, bringing 
into being’.792 It is in the European or Greco-Western tradition where we find the 
seeds of the radical imaginary as the founding of philosophy and democracy.793 This is 
788. Notice that I am not saying here that this mechanism is perfect or that it does not come under 
scrutiny. On the contrary, representation has always been a debated political concept and as a 
political paradigm its bases have been in question with special intensity during the last decade 
because of the advocacy of new political arrangements that go beyond the Westphalian state. These 
intents, however important, have not yet been successful enough to explain the kind of problems 
that I am dealing with in the body of the text. For an argument showing the exhaustion of the 
paradigm of representation and its institutional arrangements, vid Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy. 
Politics in an Age of Distrust. For a seminal intent to explain the post-sovereign state, vid 
MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth. For an 
intente to apply these ideas to legal theory, vid Walker, “Out of place and out of time: law's fading 
co-ordinates”.






important, according to Castoriadis, because it is only through this social-historical 
consciousness that societies can become autonomous. Otherwise, they are 
heteronomous societies: societies in which the individual is absorbed by institutions 
and does not have the disposition to contest them.794 This project made possible the 
calling ‘into question, in words and in deeds’795 the institutions that constitute the 
social. This is the way in which what is instituted is open to constant transformation. 
Following Castoriadis, the law is the primal institution of society, without which 
society cannot exist. For a society to be autonomous it has to accept that its laws are 
given by itself ‘without the possibility of alluding to any non-social basis, to any norm 
for its norm, to any measure of its measure’,796 and ‘without the possibility of resorting 
(except by deluding itself) to some non-social source or foundation’.797 For 
Castoriadis, the law has two aspects: it is both instituted and institution. This means 
that at the same time that the law makes possible the existence of society it also makes 
possible action, that is, our doing. Within this schema we make sure that the law is our 
law and, at the same time, that if we want to change it we are not subject to any 
external norm.
Therefore, once the law is the product of an autonomous society committed to 
the project of radical democracy, there is no epistemological certainty about the good. 
On the contrary, an important aspect of the political project of modernity is that we 
are open to the constant possibility of changing our institutions according to our 
social imaginaries. We become the authors of our own law. Does this mean that we 
shall not be able to solve our political disagreement, that we cannot achieve a common 
ground for the good? Maybe MacIntyre is right in this (but, does not the fact that we 
are discussing this point go against his argument?); however, it seems to me that we 
have to learn to live with this uncertainty. What helps us in dealing with it is precisely 
that we have historically established institutional arrangements according to which we 
can overcome those limitations. In this sense, political and legal institutions help us in 
being conscious of the limits of the world we live in. In this particular case, that we 






political and legal institutions do aspire to what can be considered the modern good, 
that is, the project of achieving mutual recognition. Otherwise institutions would be 
nothing but oppressive and heteronomous. 
Before analysing the differences between teleological and functional 
institutions, let me very briefly take stock of the argument developed so far. I start by 
defining teleological institutions as mediating between the immanent and the 
transcendental; I also argue that transcendence has to be understood as aiming at 
mutual recognition and for this purpose teleological institutions have to be transitive 
to the good of the practices they embody. Then I apply this definition of teleological 
institutions to show that the law can be such an institution even in advanced 
contemporary societies. I provide two arguments to sustain this conclusion. First, that 
in modernity law identifies and expresses the content of the will of the people and 
that as long as political representation operates, the will of the people is autonomous. 
Second, I argue that the good in contemporary societies is defined politically and that 
teleological institutions are committed to the radical democratic project of modernity 
that implies achieving autonomy through mutual recognition.
4.1. Are teleological institutions functional?
In the previous section I deal with a possible objection against teleological institutions: 
that they do not have a place in advanced modernity. I expect to have shown that law 
is a teleological institution and that for this to be so we have to bear in mind law’s 
political justification, according to which the notion of the law as the will of the 
people has an important role to play. There is, however, a second possible objection to 
the teleological conception of institutions. According to this objection, teleological 
institutions would not be different from functional institutions. Hence, teleological 
institutions would be fully equivalent to functional institutions and they would not 
bring any further insight to our understanding of institutions. In functional terms, the 
teleological conception of institutions defended here could be stated as: 
- Tax law is established in contemporary political societies because it facilitates 
the distribution of private property; or, 
- Tax law has an internal good because it facilitates mutual recognition.
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Trying to answer this possible objection is particularly important in law, as some 
influential legal theorists advocate that law is of a functional kind or that it can be 
better understood as having a point or purpose.
Before analysing the difference between teleological and functional institutions 
I would like to introduce a distinction between functional explanations and saying that 
something is functional (including both natural and conscious functions,798 and 
expressed as ‘what the function of something is’).799 The distinction is relevant because 
here I am trying to make a point not about the former but about the latter. Functional 
explanations, as possible explanations of certain consequences or events in the world, 
can be understood as answering what G. A. Cohen has called a why-question (‘Why it 
is the case that p?’).800 In this sense, functional explanations explain that something has 
occurred. This is why Cohen says that ‘reference to the effects of a phenomenon 
contributes to explaining it’. According to Cohen, there is a ‘special type of causal 
explanation advanced in these and like instances, deriving its peculiarity from 
generalisations of distinctive logical form’.801 Cohen makes an important point in 
distinguishing between making a functional explanation and attributing a function to 
a thing. Hence, it would be logically possible to have a functional explanation of a 
phenomenon without attributing a function to the explanandum. In logical terms 
then, a functional explanation is able to answer any why-question: ‘It could explain 
why a certain event occurred, why a particular thing has a certain property, why 
something regularly behaves in a certain manner, and so on, without restriction’.802 I 
am not concerned here with functional explanations defined in this way, because I 
think Charles Taylor is right when he says that there would be no difference between 
them and teleological explanations as explanations of the form ‘in-order-to’.803
What I am interested in arguing here is that there is a difference between 
saying that something is teleological and that something is functional (that has a 
798. Wright, “Functions”, 142–143. Conscious functions should be understood here as ‘designed’ 
functions and not be confused with ‘appeals to consciousness’ as the attribution of a goal or the 
mental attribution of a function, ibid, 143.
799. ibid, 140.
800. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence, 251. [Emphasis in the original].
801. ibid, 250. [Emphasis in the original].
802. ibid, 255–256.
803. Taylor, A Secular Age, 213.
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function). This would serve as a basis to affirm that teleological and functional 
institutions are different. On the contrary, if there were no difference between 
something being teleological and something being functional, the teleological 
conception of institutions would not bring any further insight to our understanding of 
institutions. This is particularly important in law, as different functional explanations 
have been offered to explain what kind of thing the law is. In what follows I first deal 
with the difference between teleology and functionality in the second sense defined 
here. Then I revise functionalist conceptions of the law.
4.1.1. Functionality
The literature on the legal and political importance of functionality and, more 
specifically, on functionalism, is vast and it deals with many different aspects of 
functionalism, not all of which are relevant to the argument I am developing. I shall 
focus on one particular way in which institutions can be said to be functional which is 
directly relevant to the problems I am interested in discussing. These instances are: (i) 
those in which a function is attributed to a thing or (ii) those in which a thing is 
characterised because of its function.804 Cornelius Castoriadis has referred to 
functionality as the,
[U]nbroken chain of means and ends or of causes and effects on 
the general level, the strict correspondence between the features 
belonging to the institution and the ‘real’ needs of the society 
considered; the accent is placed, in short, on the complete and 
uninterrupted circulation between a ‘real’ and a ‘rational-
functional’ element.805
I am interested in this notion of functionality because it is at the centre of the mere 
instrumental conception of institutions that I criticise in this thesis. The problem with 
adopting this notion of functionality to describe institutions is that it is not able to 
explain appropriately the institution because it reduces them to an instrument. Or, as 
Castoriadis puts it, this approach should be criticised as long as it ‘holds that 
institutions can be reduced to this [functionality] and that they are perfectly 
comprehensible on the basis of this role’.806 I understand that Taylor makes a similar 
804. I interpret these two instances as equivalent to what Wright calls conscious and natural functions, 
respectively. vid supra, fn798.
805. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 116.
806. ibid.
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point when he argues that materialism should not be understood as a teleological 
explanation of events in time.807 According to Taylor, ideas have as much an important 
place in historical motivation as the materialist thesis. Taylor’s argument is that 
practices require not only material conditions to exist but also a shared background of 
meaning. In his words, ‘[p]eople have to share certain understandings of how they can 
function with others, and what the norms are, if they are to engage in these 
practices’.808 This is how Taylor tries to explain, ‘without offering anything like a causal 
explanation of the changes’,809 how the idea of moral order was a result of the 
combination of several factors including ideas, institutions, and so on.810
The functional approach to institutions, therefore, is unable to explain the 
complex way in which political and social changes as well as the ideas that shape our 
social world take place in history. According to Castoriadis, the functional–economic 
approach explain institutions ‘by its role in the overall economy of social life’.811 The 
characteristics and explanation of institutions depend on the place that they have in 
the general economic organisation of social life. Hence ‘instituted rules must appear 
either as functional or as really or logically implied by functional rules’.812 This 
functional-economic rationality denies that institutions have an important symbolic 
dimension. This is what Castoriadis means when he says that institutions are 
‘impossible outside a second-order symbolism; for each institution constitutes a 
particular symbolic network’.813 This symbolic aspect of institutions is what explains 
that they can lead to social realities that did not exist before the institution was in 
place.814 The functional–economic conception, on the other hand, assumes that 
symbolism is neutral or irrelevant. This means that the functional institution embodies 
a previously existing reality (to which it is functional as a mere instrument). Therefore, 
functionalism would imply that there is ‘a substance which would be preconstituted in 




811. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 116. [Emphasis in the original].
812. ibid, 123. [Emphasis added]. Giorgio Agamben develops a similar idea but in politico theological 
terms when he says that an oikonomia is a ‘plan that requires an activity of realization and 
revelation’. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 50.
813. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 117.
814. vid also, González, Teología de la Praxis Evangélica. Ensayo de una teología fundamental, passim.
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relation to institutions’.815 But Castoriadis is right when he says that ‘the “real social 
relations” concerned here are always instituted, not because they wear legal garb […], 
but because they have been posited as universal, symbolised and sanctioned ways of 
doing things’.816 So institutions operate in a world that has already been instituted in 
the sense that there is already meaning and a ‘way of doing things’. It is in this very 
important sense that there is a crucial difference between the teleological conception 
of institutions that I am advocating for in this chapter and the functional reading of 
institutions. The teleological conception of institutions, as said before, rests on a 
previously instituted practice (to use Castoriadis’ terminology) that provides its telos. 
On the contrary, functional institutions become progressively more autonomous and 
therefore more oppressive because they ‘predominate’ ‘with respect to society’.817 I will 
come back to this particular idea when discussing about functional conceptions of the 
law below.
This brings us to a second problem of the functional approach. This second 
problem is again captured by Castoriadis:
A society can exist only if a series of functions are constantly 
performed (production, child-bear ing and education, 
administrating the collectivity, resolving disputes and so forth), 
but it is not reduced to this, nor are its ways of dealing with its 
problems dictated to it once and for all by its ‘nature’. It invents 
and defines for itself new ways of responding to its needs as well 
as it comes up with new needs.818
According to Castoriadis, reducing a society to certain functions, as much as they are 
needed, impoverishes the possibilities (the ‘new ways of responding’ to its ‘new needs’, 
in Castoriadis’ words) that the society can come to a set up according to the project of 
radical democracy. I call this problem the ‘petrification of society’ problem. This 
problem precisely implies a petrification process of an organic society and its 
institutions. Hence, functionalism implies forgetting that a society is committed to 
achieving mutual recognition and doing whatever is required for that purpose. 
815. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 124.
816. ibid.
817. ibid, 132. In this I also follow Atria, for whom, ‘institutions have two faces: one emancipatory and 
the other oppressive’, vid, “Living under dead ideas: Law as the will of the people”, 119ff. The 
emancipatory face aims at recognition, the oppressive face leaves space for manipulation or permits 
to ‘behave instrumentally towards the other’.
818. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 116–117.
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Functionalism, on the other hand, cannot explain that new possibilities can be created 
to obtain mutual recognition; it assumes that what society is and needs is defined ‘once 
and for all by its “nature”.’ It is interesting here to note the terms Castoriadis uses to 
refer to the kind of society that is presupposed by functionalism; they are exactly the 
same that Rawls uses to refer to the status of his principles of justice. According to 
Rawls, individuals under the veil of ignorance in the original position ‘must decide 
once and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust’.819 This choice 
determines the principles of justice that will apply to the basic structure of society. 
That the two principles of justice are given this status by Rawls is important then, 
because it gives further arguments to sustain that liberals (including liberal egalitarians) 
adopt the functional approach to institutions. This further elaborates the argument I 
developed before in chapter three, according to which liberal egalitarians consider 
institutions, in general, and taxation and tax law in particular, as mere instruments for 
redistribution.
4.1.2. Two functional conceptions of law: Moore and Dworkin
The petrification of society as a problem derived from functionalism is especially 
relevant when functional conceptions of the law are scrutinised. In this section I will 
argue that Michael S. Moore and Ronald Dworkin’s conceptions of law suffer from 
petrification. I focus on these two conceptions of law because they are two widely 
accepted functional conceptions of law.
Functional conceptions of law conceive of themselves as alternatives to 
positivist conceptions of law. More precisely, they are the distilled from several 
critiques to which the two most important positivists theories of the mid-twentieth 
century, those of H. L. A. Hart and Hans Kelsen,820 were subject. I do not have space 
here to analyse in detail that debate. Suffice to say that functionalist conceptions of law 
try to overcome two central elements of Hart and Kelsen’s positivism. The first is the 
strict separation of law and morals. The second, the thesis that law is a system of rules.
Michael S. Moore’s analysis of natural law as a functional conception of law is a 
good example of an attempt to overcome the strict separation of law and morals.821 
819. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11. [Emphasis added].
820. Hart, The Concept of Law; Kelsen, Teoría Pura del Derecho; Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State.
821. Moore, “Law as a Functional Kind”.
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The kind of natural law he defends is one that rests on moral realism;822 at the same 
time he affirms that there is ‘some necessary connection between law and morality’.823 
Moore argues that the necessary connection of law and morality rests on the kind of 
thing that the law is and not on analytical or contingent necessity.824 For this purpose, 
Moore distinguishes three different kinds of things that may exist: natural, nominal or 
functional.
‘A natural kind is a thing that exists in nature as a kind without human 
contrivance’.825 Things that belong to this kind have a nature that is completely 
independent of men. They are the things that are independent of what we think about 
them or even if we do not know that they exist. Examples of things that belong to this 
kind are ‘gold’, ‘tiger’ or ‘H20’. ‘A nominal kind, by contrast, does not exist as a kind in 
nature, although its particular specimens may exist.’826 Things that belong to these 
kinds of thing exist only because of the label that brings them together. Different 
specimens that belong to the category may not have anything in common except that 
they are conventionally put together. Men characteristically create nominal kinds. 
Moore gives an example of a thing that belongs to this kind: Figueroa Street in Los 
Angeles. Finally, Moore defines things that belong to functional kinds as those that 
‘[u]nlike nominal kinds […] have a nature that they share that is richer than the 
“nature” of merely sharing a common name in some language. [And that] [u]nlike 
natural kinds the nature that such items share is a function and not a structure’.827 As 
an example of a functional kind Moore mentions the stomach. According to his 
example, the stomach is a functional kind because, distinctively, the thing able to 
perform the first-stage processing of nutrients is a stomach.828
According to Moore, a functionalist jurisprudence claims that law’s essence is 
identified with law’s final goal and not with any structural feature. Only those 







828. For Moore’s summary of this analysis, vid Moore, Placing Blame. A General Theory of the Criminal 
Law, 18ff.
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the law. The goal of law according to which its essence is identified should be a good 
only achievable through law.829 Which is that good is open to argument. Here we can 
complement Moore’s conception of a general theory of law with the arguments he 
provides for distinguishing between particular areas of law. Because for him the ‘law 
itself has [no] essential structural features’, particular areas of law can hardly have any 
structural essential feature in themselves.830 So, for example, there is not much 
structural difference between tax law and criminal law (one of Moore’s recurrent 
example).831 According to Moore, particular areas of law would be either nominal (as 
he suggests that administrative law is so) or functional (as he advocates that criminal 
law is so). For Moore, the task of determining of which kind an area of law might be 
is ontological. Only once that ontology is defined can the individuation problem be 
answered. This means that any law that corresponds to the ontological category 
ascribed to a particular area of law will be part of that area of law. For example, if an 
area of law is ontologically functional, any norm able to fulfil that function will be 
part of that area of the law.832
I would like to put forward two critiques to Moore’s functionalist approach. 
Both critiques derive from the dependency of his functional conception of law on a 
conception of natural law based on moral realism. Remember that, according to 
Moore, there is a necessary connection between law and morality. This necessary 
connection determines the ontological nature of the kind of thing that area of law is. 
At the same time he advocates for moral realism. Hence, according to Moore’s theory, 
law is functional to moral realism. The first critique derives from the controversial 
philosophical standing of moral realism. If moral realism proves to be wrong, does it 
mean that there would be no necessary connection between law and morality? 
Alasdair MacIntyre criticised Moore on this point so I will not develop the argument 
829. Moore, “Law as a Functional Kind”, 218 and 223.
830. Moore, Placing Blame. A General Theory of the Criminal Law, 22.
831. vid, Hart, The Concept of Law; Kelsen, Teoría Pura del Derecho; and, Feinberg, “The expressive 
function of punishment”. However, part of the problem I am dealing with in this thesis is the 
assumption that there is not any structural difference between these particular areas of law. So 
rather than referring to structural differences (precisely because they are relevant) I would rather 
say that areas of law are not much different because they all end up in a sanction. Hence, particular 
areas of law are phenomenologically, rather than structurally, similar.
832. Moore, Placing Blame. A General Theory of the Criminal Law, 22–23.
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here.833 For the second critique I want to put forward we could assume that Moore is 
right about moral realism; that is, that law in some way is functional to the moral good 
that exists ‘out there’.834 But when we bring together this connection between law 
and morality with functionalism, a problem appears. If the law is functional to moral 
reality, who is to decide the content of law and morality? How are we to discover that 
content? If we have to give an account of moral concepts that are real and exist in the 
world, law would only be an account of that pre–existing world. The problem is that it 
becomes progressively more difficult to escape from heteronomy and oppression.835 An 
alternative would be to say that that moral content could be determined according to 
the best possible argument of the content of that practice, but this would be rejected 
by Moore as some kind of conventionalism.836
Can we solve the problems of Moore’s functional conception of law if we 
adopt a non-naturalist approach to law? That is, can we still argue that law is a 
functional kind even if we replace Moore’s metaphysical commitments? A good 
alternative might be found in Ronald Dworkin’s conception of the law. I am not 
going to give a detailed account of Dworkin’s theory of law here as it would lead me 
far from the point I am trying to make. That account would require showing how 
Dworkin’s argument evolved from the first critique to Hart’s conception of law as a 
system of rules,837 to his interpretive alternative.838 What interest me here are the 
underlying assumptions of his argument. This became an easier task after Dworkin 
fully stated the basis of his argument, that is, the interpretive approach to moral values, 
in his latest statement of these issues in Justice for Hedgehogs.
833. vid, MacIntyre, “Theories of natural law in the culture of advanced modernity”, 102–104.
834. This is a requirement deriving from realism theory of truth as correspondence. For the other 
requirements that realism should satisfy, according to Moore, vid Educating Oneself in Public. Critical 
Essays in Jurisprudence, 248. These requirements are: that classical logic applies to moral propositions; 
that the meaning of those propositions will depend on them being true according to the 
correspondence thesis; and that the ‘meaning of words like “justice” is guided by the nature of the 
thing (justice) to which the word refers’. ibid, 250.
835. In the same terms I referred to MacIntyre’s skepticism and the problems of functionalism, vid supra, 
220ff.
836. Moore, Educating Oneself in Public. Critical Essays in Jurisprudence, Ch8.
837. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch1 and Ch2.
838. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Actually Dworkin did this job in, Dworkin, Justice In Robes, Chs6-8.
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Dworkin argues for ‘a conception of law that takes it to be not a rival system of 
rules that might conflict with morality but as itself a branch of morality’.839 Morality 
for Dworkin has a tree structure: the central branch is concerned with a theory of 
what it is to live well, from which a branch of personal morality derives. From this last 
branch, in turn, the branch of political morality derives and from political morality, 
finally, the legal branch.840 Hence political concepts are relevant for law;841 a branch of 
political morality law is meshed with political concepts. So to grasp fully Dworkin’s 
conception of law we need to know what he means by political concepts.
For Dworkin, political concepts express political values. He argues that all 
political concepts are interpretive. We share a concept when we are able to identify 
instances or examples of those concepts, even if we are not in complete agreement 
about all those instances and even if we have not reached an agreement on the criteria 
something has to meet to have the concept appropriately applied to it. According to 
Dworkin, some political concepts ‘function for us as interpretive concepts’. This means 
that ‘[w]e share them because we share social practices and experiences in which these 
concepts figure’.842 Disagreements about the content of those practices are, therefore, 
disagreements about political values. For a liberal such as Isaiah Berlin this conflict of 
values is irresolvable.843 Dworkin, on the other hand, argues for what can be called the 
‘unity of political value’. For Dworkin, conflicts of value rest or draw on values that go 
beyond themselves. Because of this dependency, he argues that values should be 
integrated rather than stand in opposition. So any defence of a political value (that is, 
any interpretation of a political value) needs to show how that conception ‘fits with 
and into appealing conceptions of the others’.844 Or as Dworkin puts it, ‘[m]oral 
concepts are […] interpretive concepts: their correct use is a matter of interpretation, 
and people who use them disagree about what the best interpretation is’.845 This 
839. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 5 and 405.
840. ibid, 5.
841. To use Castoriadis ideas about functionality: Dworkin’s conception of law is functional but instead 
of the economic order, he is guided by a moral order, that is, as I argue below, the two principles of 
justice: equal concern and respect.
842. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 6. vid also, 50–51. On political concepts, vid Dworkin, Justice In Robes, 
145–162.
843. Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, 212–217.
844. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 7.
845. ibid, 120.
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theoretical relationship between political concepts, interpretation, and value, provides 
substance to Dworkin’s historical claim that liberty and equality are not conflicting 
concepts but two concepts that come together as equal liberty.846
What about Dworkin’s famous claim about the right answer in law?847 How 
can it be justified when there are conflicting interpretations of political concepts and 
values? The answers to these questions are to be found in Dworkin’s conception of 
moral objectivity. Moral objectivity in Dworkin’s theory is a requirement of the 
importance we assign to politics and to the justification of coercion. According to 
Dworkin, it would be ‘irresponsible’ to defend a theory of justice without at the same 
time assuming moral objectivity. But Dworkin’s moral objectivity does not have any 
metaphysical commitments. So Dworkin would not accept any correspondence theory 
of truth regarding political values. Moral objectivity depends, for him, on how strong 
the argument is for the particular interpretation of the political value advocated for, ‘of 
the substantive case that can be made for them’. The moral realm is not a realm of 
brute or raw facts, but of argument.848 This explains that for Dworkin, ‘moral 
judgments are made true, when they are true, by an adequate moral argument for their 
truth’.849 In this sense, moral ontology can only be found within morality because the 
argument for it is also a moral argument.850 So good reasons are those that are good 
on moral grounds.851
But is Dworkin a functionalist? Dworkin does not explicitly argue that his is a 
functional theory. But there are good reasons to say that his theory is in fact so. First, 
take his theory of interpretation. Interpretation for Dworkin consists of determining 
the point of the practice in question, ‘we interpret […] by attributing […] what we 
take to be its proper purpose – the value that it does and ought to provide’.852 So 
‘interpretation is therefore interpretive […]. A particular interpretation succeeds – it 
achieves the truth about some object’s meaning – when it best realises, for that object, 
the purposes properly assigned to the interpretive practice properly identified as 
846. vid, Dworkin, “Sovereign Virtue revisited”.
847. vid, Dworkin, “Is there really no right answer in hard cases?”.
848. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 11. For Dworkin’s ideas about interpretation, vid ibid Ch6.
849. ibid, 37.




pertinent’.853 By establishing the criterion for successful interpretation as one in which 
the interpreter best realises the purpose assigned to the practice, Dworkin’s interpretive 
theory is, according to what I said earlier, equivalent to saying that interpretive 
practices are functional: they are assigned a purpose even if the definition of that 
purpose is ‘interpretive’. So the right interpretation has to give an account of that 
purpose. What in Dworkin’s terms is the purpose or point of the practice, for Wright 
would be its conscious or designed functions.854
This interpretation is reinforced when we recall that Dworkin said that 
‘concepts serve different kinds of functions in the thought and discourse of people 
who share and use them’.855 Dworkin distinguishes three kinds of concepts: 
‘criterial’ (like the concept of a bachelor, in his example); ‘natural concepts’ (like the 
concept of a tiger, also in his example); and, finally, ‘interpretive concepts’ (under 
which he includes justice and democracy).856 Dworkin argues that different 
conceptions of law follow depending on which kind of concept the law is considered 
to be. In his reading the law cannot but be interpretive. He argues that law can be 
neither the kind of concept determined by shared criteria of application (as if it was a 
‘criterial’ concept) nor can it be a ‘natural’ kind.857 This is predominantly so because 
there are different interpretations of the political values on which the law is based. 
Dworkin argues that his interpretation of the law as an ‘interpretive concept’ is better 
than other alternatives that also consider – what he calls – the ‘doctrinal concept’ of 
law to be interpretive, such as legal pragmatism and a certain kind of conventional 
legal positivism.858
853. ibid.
854. vid supra, 228 and 230.
855. Dworkin, Justice In Robes, 223.
856. ibid, 223–224 and 9–12. vid also, Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 158–160.
857. Dworkin, Justice In Robes, 225–226.
858. ibid, 226. Dworkin distinguishes four possible concepts of law: doctrinal, sociological, taxonomic 
and aspirational. Doctrinal concepts of law, ‘explore the concept of “the law” of some place or 
entity being to a particular effect’. Sociological concepts of law are those according to which law is 
used ‘to name a particular type of institutional social structure’. The taxonomical concept of law 
‘supposes that any political community that has law in the sociological sense also has a collection 
of discrete rules and other kinds of standards that are legal standards as opposed to moral or 
customary or some other kind of standards’. Finally, the aspirational concept of law is the one ‘we 
often refer to as the ideal of legality or the rule of law […] an aspirational concept [that] is a 
contested concept’. vid, ibid, 2–5. The doctrinal concept of law is concerned with the truth 
conditions of legal propositions and is relevant because ‘[w]e reflect on the character of law to 
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Dworkin’s argument seems better equipped to respond successfully to the two 
objections made above to Moore’s functionalism. First, Dworkin does not have to deal 
with problems derived from moral realism because he rests on his interpretive theory 
of political values and his theory of truth. Second, it seems as if Dworkin is immune to 
the petrification objection. This means that his functionalism is not constrained by a 
certain order of the world or morality of which it has to give an account. Even more, 
he argues that there is ‘no causal interaction between moral truth and moral 
opinion’.859 This would be reinforced by Dworkin’s affirmation that only scientific 
explanations are based on causality and that political concepts are interpretive concepts 
open to the best possible interpretation because they are contested concepts. Or, as he 
puts it, concepts such as, 
liberty, democracy, and the rest function in ordinary thought and 
speech as interpretive concepts of value: their descriptive sense is 
contested, and the contest turns out on which assignment of a 
descriptive sense best captures or realizes that value.860
However, he is not free from petrification. If we consider the basis of what Dworkin 
calls the anatomy of a general theory of law, his interpretive concepts turn out to be 
fully functional concepts to one particular political conception of the good: political 
liberalism. Let me briefly develop this idea. 
According to Dworkin, the anatomy of a general theory of law has four stages: 
the ‘semantic’, the ‘jurisprudential’, the ‘doctrinal’, and the ‘adjudicative’.861 Because he 
accepts that law as a practice has a value, he has to justify which value it is. His general 
theory of law ‘rests on moral and ethical judgments and convictions’.862 Hence, the 
interpretivist concept of law advocated by Dworkin requires that those moral values 
that are part of the law be identified and followed transitively in the four stages of legal 
theory. It is particularly important in legal reasoning so that it can include, according 
to Dworkin, the moral principles on which the law is founded. Consequently, a 
particular legal decision must express the political values in which the law is best 
justified as a practice. Under this reading of the law, when law and morality are 
know what we must do’. ibid, 229.
859. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 70.




integrated, the role of lawyers and judges changes, as they are ‘working political 
philosophers of a democratic state’.863 All this is perfectly coherent with Dworkin’s 
claim that law is a department or branch of morality.864
It is not self-evident how the petrification problem affects Dworkin’s 
conception of the law. If we accept it at face value, his theory of law allows for changes 
and new interpretations of the law whenever a particular case needs it. He is neither 
an originalist nor a positivist giving discretion to judges.865 Dworkin requires judges to 
apply the law. But when we analyse holistically his theory the problem becomes a bit 
clearer. How are judges to determine what the law requires in a particular case? 
According to Dworkin, when adjudicating, judges are to give an account of the best 
possible reading of the law according to the moral or political principles that justify it 
as a practice.866 In their more abstract formulation these are, according to Dworkin, 
the principles of human dignity. The first is the principle of ‘intrinsic value’, according 
to which ‘each human life has a special kind of objective value’.867 The second 
principle is that of ‘personal responsibility’, defined as that according to which ‘each 
person has a special responsibility for realising the success of his own life’.868 These 
principles, Dworkin argues, are at the base of American liberalism and any other 
political community which values democracy. So Dworkin’s functionalism is at the 
service of this political conception of democracy. His functionalism petrifies not at the 
particular level but at a general level what turns out to be a very particular reading of 
what is the best way to serve American liberalism. He argues that this is the best 
possible reading under which Americans can still have a democracy according to the 
863. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 414.
864. Dworkin, Justice In Robes, 34.
865. vid, his arguments in Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously and Law's Empire, passim.
866. This cannot but be a vague assertion, as it will depend to which level we refer. However, Dworkin 
gives different formulations for these principles depending on the level of abstractness he is 
interested in arguing. It would take a different thesis to offer a detailed account of Dworkin’s 
formulation of these principles and their evolution.
867. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a new political debate, 9. In Sovereign Virtue, this 
principle was named the ‘principle of equal importance’, 5. vid also, Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 
202ff.
868. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a new political debate, 10. In Sovereign Virtue this 
principle was named the ‘principle of special responsibility’, 5. vid also, Dworkin, Justice for 
Hedgehogs, 202ff.
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political project of the founding fathers.869 The problem with this argument is that it 
does not take seriously the political, as that sphere of conflict where collective 
decisions are taken, because it puts a condition to that debate by restricting the 
possible moral grounds of the political.870 In other words, by fusing law to morality he 
conditions political decisions and the law (as an institution) to a liberal conception of 
the good life. So he does not take institutional arrangements and the way they change 
our lives seriously. As a consequence, Dworkin’s claim that institutions are not merely 
instrumental is difficult to sustain even if he has a particular substantive reading of 
politics.871 When he claims that institutionalisation is required to bring political 
concepts to the legal realm, he is not really concerned with the way in which 
institutions have a life of their own. He assumes that institutions can change reality as 
any instrument would, that is, at will.872 Dworkin’s general theory of law lacks a 
theory of institutions like the teleological conception I have been arguing for in this 
chapter, one that makes possible political autonomy.
4.1.3. Teleological institutions as sacraments
After the analysis developed in the previous sections we can conclude that the 
functional conceptions of institutions are not able to match the task performed by 
teleological institutions. This conclusion, however, seems to leave my argument with a 
problem; how can I argue that our institutions, as we know them, are teleological? To 
express the point differently: If institutions are conceived as teleological, we need some 
conceptual and intellectual resources. Those resources need to be embedded in at least 
one tradition of rational reflection that conceives institutions as teleological. Is there an 
available tradition that conceives of institutions teleologically in the way I 
characterised teleological institutions? If that tradition is available, we would be able to 
conceive of an institution as teleological, thus being able to ‘transplant’ the 
understanding of one tradition to another. In that ‘transplant’ certain aspects of the 
concept might become clearer than they would have been if the concept is directly 
applied or created ex nihilo to contemporary law and politics, because that other 
869. Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a new political debate, passim.
870. Here I follow the conception of the political I argued for in supra, 168ff.
871. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 405.
872. vid supra, 230 and Ch3, 130ff.
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tradition might already have developed the concept more thoroughly than we would 
be able to do in the conditions of contemporary law and politics.
These questions open a search for a different political tradition, one in which 
institutions are open to the transcendental possibilities which political ideals invite into 
our political lives rather than being conceived simply instrumentally in relation to 
those ideals. The available alternative is to look to political theology.873 I interpret Carl 
Schmitt’s famous statement that ‘[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the 
state are secularised theological concepts’874 as providing an answer to the problem 
posed in the previous paragraph. 
Schmitt described three alternatives according to which political theology 
could explain modern political concepts: as a historical analysis of the evolution from 
teological concepts to the political, as an analogy, or as a sociology of juridical 
concepts.875 Schmitt opts for the last alternative and offers it as a method for studying 
political concepts. Political theology as a sociology of juridical concepts is a thesis 
about the correlation between a society’s metaphysical image and its political 
organisation.876 I cannot develop here a fully detailed account and critique of Schmitt’s 
political theology or the discussions it has generated.877 Suffice to say that Schmitt’s 
sociology of juridical concepts rests on a poor theology that comes back as a poor 
political philosophy and also that political theology should not be understood as a 
873. The reason I have to refer to political theology is different from the one given by Kahn, Political 
Theology. Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Kahn argues that political theology ‘as a 
form of inquiry is compelling only to the degree that it helps us recognise that our political 
practices remain embedded in forms of belief and practice that touch upon the sacred’ (3). So for 
him political theology ‘is a project of descriptive analysis […] to identify and describe the presence 
of the sacred, wherever it appears’ (25). This is an approach that has more to do with secularisation 
than with political theology. I do not think this is a good reason to look for insights in political 
theology; by merely describing the presence of the sacred it leaves things as they are. Such an 
enterprise does not bring any insights either to political philosophy or to theology. I understand 
that Habermas makes the same point when he says that secular and religious citizens stand in 
complementary relation in the public sphere, vid Habermas, ““The Political”: The Rational 
Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology”. For a proposal of a “radical” 
approach, vid Crockett, Radical Political Theology. Religion and Politics After Liberalism. For an 
interesting intent to extend the application of religious concepts to political concepts, vid Critchley, 
The Faith of the Faithless. Experiments in Political Theology.
874. Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 36.
875. ibid, Ch3.
876. vid, Schmitt, Political Theology II. The Myth of the Closure of any Political Theology, editor’s introduction, 
5–7.
877. Those interested in this topic should read Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt. Four Chapters on the 
Distinction Between Political Theology and Political Philosophy.
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mere analogy with political philosophy. The reason why political theology is important 
is that we can find insights, concepts and problems that are similar, if not identical, to 
those that we find in the political realm. That is the best light with which to look at 
Schmitt’s argument about sovereignty.878 Another example of the sort of use of 
political theology I have in mind is Fernando Atria’s use of Aquinas’ ideas about 
imperfect meaning and negative theology in order to study the political concept of the 
people.879 Atria argues that political theology, in the relevant sense, ‘is not a thesis about 
the genealogy of political concepts, but about their meaning […]’.880 In this vein, I 
believe that a brief analysis of the theology of sacraments will shed light to the 
teleological conception of institutions I am advocating for in this chapter.
In the Christian tradition the sacraments express the mediation between 
immanence and transcendence, they are part of a ‘pre-Kingdom era’ as in them ‘the 
gospel seeks to be at home in a transitional world’.881 Sacraments are a very important 
part of what Christian identity is. According to Louis-Marie Chauvet, the sacraments, 
the scriptures and ethical conduct are the elements that show the ‘marks of the 
reign’.882 According to Herbert McCabe, the centrality of the sacraments in Christian 
theology relates to its purpose of making Christians part of the new creation that the 
resurrection of Christ made possible. The sacraments are ‘the signs which reveal to us 
the new reality’.883 This explains why McCabe asserts that ‘a sacrament is a symbol 
which makes real what it symbolises’.884 This implies that the sacraments are not mere 
symbols because they do not give account of a previously existing reality or a meaning 
that exists independent of the symbol. The sacraments make possible meaning by 
changing reality.885 Two characteristics of the sacraments explain the way in which 
they operate: (i) they bring together past, present and future, and (ii) they have a 
878. Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.
879. vid, Atria, “Living under dead ideas: Law as the will of the people”.
880. ibid, 111.
881. McCabe, God Matters, 175. [Emphasis in the original].
882. Chauvet, The Sacraments. The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body, 29ff.
883. McCabe, God Still Matters, 116.
884. McCabe, The New Creation, 26.
885. This is what in the literature is called ‘sacramental ontology’. vid, Boersma, Heavenly Participation. 
The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry, 19–26 and Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament. A Sacramental 
Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, part one.
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special kind of language. These characteristics are what make the sacraments different 
from purely secular conceptions of politics and their characteristic functional logics.886
By bringing together past, present and future the sacraments make us part of a 
community of meaning that goes beyond us as individuals. Past, present and future 
come together in the sacraments allowing us to become part of a real community 
through which we are no longer alienated. Sacraments are neither the symbol for 
something that existed previously nor are they ‘simply looking forward to something 
which is not yet, they symbolise something actually present’.887 This idea is also 
expressed in the different realities that coexist in the sacraments. According to 
McCabe, there are three different realities in the sacraments: the rite, the sacramental 
reality and the final reality. Of these the ‘central difficulty […] is the notion of 
sacramental reality’. The sacramental reality is difficult to grasp because it is that in 
which meaning changes reality. This reality is ‘an object of faith, hidden from the 
unbeliever who sees merely the outward sign of it, but it is not the final object of faith. 
It is itself a symbol leading the believer on to a greater depth of mystery’.888 The 
sacraments are objects of faith precisely because they belong to an intermediate era 
such as ours.889 This is very important for a proper understanding of the sacraments. 
The sacraments are not purely a future. They are ‘not merely a mental reaching out to 
what is to come; rather we make contact with what is really present now’.890 This 
means that the sacraments change what we do here and now. So they are not mere 
symbols, they are connected with reality but in a different way; they contact the 
mystery with the real, with what we are doing now. Rowan Williams has put this idea 
into very clear words:
‘There is another world, but it is the same as this one’. All sign-
making is the action of hope, the hope that this world may 
become other and that its experienced fragmentariness can be 
worked into sense.891
886. Williams, On Christian Theology, 209.




891. Williams, On Christian Theology, 207.
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As I understand Williams, sacraments work in the world that we know, but they bring 
a new light and a new meaning to it. The sacraments are not mere symbols or 
reminders of something that happened or hoping for the world to change. They 
change the world as we know it by providing a new meaning for it. They do not 
‘create’ something that was not there before (only God could do that), but they 
connect us with the deep meaning of what we do. This brings us to the second 
characteristic of sacraments: their special language.
Sacraments stand within this world and aim to transcend it. However, they 
cannot do this with the existing language. This language refers to reality as it is; it 
shows us the limits of the world. But language is also open to transformation. To 
overcome the alienation of this world the sacraments have to refer to a sacramental 
language.892 Using Wittgenstein’s ideas concerning language, McCabe claims that the 
sacraments become part of a language of the future; they talk about things that we do 
not know yet: ‘The kind of shift that takes place here is not one of translation but of 
translinguification, it is not that we must look for an obscure meaning, but that we are 
looking in the wrong language’.893 So the way in which the sacraments change the 
world is not by ‘magically’ changing the nature (the ‘substance’ or ‘essence’, to use 
Aristotelian or Thomistic language) of things or persons. Indeed, this cannot be 
different since the sacraments ‘[point] towards and partially [realise] a third level of 
meaning, the ultimate mystery that is signified-and-not-a-sign of anything deeper’.894 
According to McCabe, this third level of meaning is agape, caritas. The consequence of 
this understanding of the sacraments is that the Church and its sacraments are, in 
themselves, ‘sacramental sign[s] and realisation[s] of our life in the Kingdom’.895
These two characteristics bring the sacraments very close together with the 
conception of teleological institutions that I advocate. Both sacraments and 
teleological institutions (a) should be understood as performing a role in an inevitably 
alienated world, (b) do not operate within functional logic, (c) they try to change this 
world as it is pointing to the future, (d) as human creations they have meaning, and, 
crucially, (e) they change the world and how we understand each other within it. Both 
892. McCabe, God Matters, 175.
893. ibid, 178–179.
894. McCabe, God Still Matters, 134.
895. ibid, 135.
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of them, importantly, also share the notion of human beings as dependent and 
vulnerable. Finally, and most importantly of all, they share the ideal of human 
realisation as a community of interests (even if they receive different names, that is, 
solidarity, fraternity and love). At the same time, these characteristics differentiate 
sacraments and teleological institutions from the merely instrumental and the 
functional conceptions of institutions.
With this in place, let me now show how teleological institutions and the 
sacraments allows us to unlock the deeper meaning of taxation and tax law. I argue in 
this thesis that taxation and tax law possess an intrinsic good.896 This argument 
concludes that taxation and private property are co-original because they are two faces 
of the same coin. They are intrinsically connected if we aspire to mutual recognition. 
Sacramental language can shed further light on this idea. Using sacramental language 
we can say that taxation is private property transubstantiated. What does this mean? 
Transubstantiation is an important concept in the Eucharist, a crucial Christian 
sacrament. In this sacrament the consecrated host and wine are the body and blood of 
Christ. How this happens has historically been a matter of theological dispute. Is it a 
real transformation of the substance of the host and wine to flesh and blood? It is 
clearly not so in a literal interpretation. But in a sacramental way that host and wine is 
Christ’s flesh and blood. This sense is what makes that practice sacramental by 
providing a new meaning for it. The first meaning is the significance of this alienated 
world, that is, eating is part of our human rituals of friendship. At the second level of 
meaning, the Eucharist is a token meal of the love of God for us. It is the expression of 
Jesus accepting the word of God as an expression of love for us, according to which he 
became the first proper human being truly open to the vulnerability of love. Finally, at 
the third level of meaning the sacraments show us what is to come: our life in the 
kingdom in which there is no alienation but where we live in love.897 In McCabe’s 
words, ‘The notion of transubstantiation depends on the idea that there can be a kind 
of transformation in what it means to exist which is not simply a change in what it is 
that exists’.898
896. vid supra, previous sections of this chapter and Chs3, 123ff, and Ch4, 167ff.
897. McCabe, God Still Matters, 134–135.
898. McCabe, God Matters, 150. [Emphasis in the original].
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How is it that taxes are transubstantiated private property? As a rite taxes are an 
institutional arrangement according to which we have to fulfil a legal duty. As a 
sacramental reality taxes show our dependency and vulnerability; how private property 
depends on mutual recognition and the political importance we assign to private 
property as an aspect of autonomy. As a final reality taxes bring solidarity or fraternity 
(the kind of love that will wither taxation, tax law and private property).899 Also, if we 
adopt the idea that the sacraments bring together past, present and future, then we 
better grasp how taxation is part of the allocation of property; that there is no such 
thing as an original distribution of property and the subsequent redistribution that 
needs to be justified. The point is that the distribution of property always already 
contains within it redistribution.
4.2. Legal reasoning in law as a teleological institution
In this section I want to deal with an important aspect of law as a teleological 
institution. Someone might raise an objection saying that, following this conception of 
law, those who apply it may appropriate it as they please. If there are no 
epistemological certainties on which the law is based (Dworkin’s principles of justice, 
for example), the critique might continue, I would have to embrace either a certain 
scepticism about the law (as legal realism or positivism’s judicial discretion),900 or 
subject the law to certain kinds of moral reason,901 or to whatever is determined in a 
political procedure.902 Such an argument would mean that the conception of law as a 
teleological institution would be a sham because that sort of legal reasoning is not fit 
for this kind of institution (it is proper of merely instrumental or functional 
institutions). However, teleological institutions are compatible with giving a privileged 
status to certain reasons, that is, the reasons that explain the institution, and to a certain 
procedure, that is, that by which the law becomes the will of the people. So we need a 
theory of legal reasoning that could go hand in hand with the theory of law as a 
899. For the way in which these three levels of reality are involved in baptism, the Eucharist, and 
marriage, vid McCabe, The New Creation, 114–115.
900. For legal realism in its American variant, vid Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essays on American 
Legal Realism and Naturalism in Philosophy, Chs1–3. For judicial discretion as the positivist way to 
solve interpretive problems, vid Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch7, and Kelsen, General Theory of Law 
and State, 145–153.
901. cfr, Raz famously advocates that legal rules are exclusionary reasons, vid Raz, Practical Reasons and 
Norms.
902. cfr, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms and Waldron, Law and Disagreement.
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teleological institution is included. An outline of this conception could be provided 
starting with Neil MacCormick’s conception of ‘legalism’903 and Zenon Bankowski’s 
‘law’s aspiration’ or ‘legality’.904 These notions show the importance of rules while at 
the same time they allow a space in legal decision-making to consider why and under 
which conditions rules should be adapted according to the particularities of the case at 
hand.
MacCormick’s legalism is a defence of the political value underlying legal 
regulation; that is, the value of conducting life under general and clear predetermined 
rules. Legalism is the value according to which morality is excluded from the law but 
not from legal reasoning.905 In MacCormick’s words, ‘[i]t is the morality according to 
which the moral substance of an issue or type of issue has first to be argued out both 
in abstract terms and in terms of what is concretely practicable in a legal-institutional 
setting’.906 The adjudicator must show that her decision can be explained within valid 
law, precisely because they are adjudicating and not legislating. MacCormick 
summarises his position, saying that legalism ‘demands a suspension of abstract moral 
beliefs for the purpose of resolving legal questions. But this it does as a matter of moral 
belief. So the suspension must never be absolute or unconditional’.907 Moral 
arguments should be at the service of the law whenever they are required.
Bankowski advocates for a similar value, which he calls ‘legality’. For 
Bankowski, this value ‘stands in the middle’ between formalism and pure contingency. 
Because we cannot live our lives constantly open to contingency, legality allows us to 
rest on what has been decided and instituted in rules, while at the same time being 
open to an encounter with the particular. Legality, therefore, requires a certain attitude 
from us. We should be open to the encounter with the particular and the way in 
which this encounter can change us. According to Bankowski, reasoning with rules 
cannot avoid the particular without running the risk of becoming formalistic. This 
903. MacCormick, “The ethics of legalism”.
904. Bankowski, Living Lawfully. Love in Law and Law in Love.
905. This does not mean that we have to accept Dworkin’s characterisation of this as part of the 
canonical idea that law and morality are two different systems. The point is that there is moral 
value in legality and that it accepts morality in legal reasoning. vid, Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 
400–403.
906. MacCormick, “The ethics of legalism”, 186.
907. ibid, 192.
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shows us, therefore, that we cannot decide without the risk of being wrong, and at the 
same time we cannot avoid making a decision. This explains why Bankowski advocates 
for an ethical approach to legal reasoning, what he calls ‘living lawfully’.908 Drawing on 
Lon Fuller’s distinction of a morality of aspiration and a morality of duty,909 
Bankowski explains that complying with the law requires from us ‘to look at the rule 
of duty within the context of the practice of aspiration of which it is a part’.910
To summarise, MacCormick and Bankowski show us the importance of rules, 
but at the same time they do not limit law to rules. How do these ideas apply to tax 
avoidance? In tax avoidance the master of the rules – the tax lawyer – follows the rules 
in order to (creatively) break the law. Avoiding taxes is so easy because tax law is 
interpreted as a set of rules that are the product of a binary understanding of the law 
and thus derivative of the identification of the law with rules. The problem with tax 
avoidance is that by following rules the tax avoider redefines the content of tax law in 
its application. So, for those of us who consider tax avoidance to be a problem, we 
have a case in which the meaning of rules cannot depend exclusively on its application 
to a particular case. What we require here is a standard external to the rule according 
to which we share the meaning of the rule. This is precisely what the understanding of 
the law as the will of the people defended above achieves. We share the meaning of the 
rule because it is part of an institution, the content of which has been determined 
through a political process. In applying this approach to tax avoidance we would have 
to provide an understanding of tax rules within a political decision concerning the 
definition of the right to private property, which at the same time redefines the way in 
which tax is determined to make it independent of the will of any individual.
Bankowski could answer that he provides a solution to this problem when he 
introduces the distinction between formal and substantive justice. He would agree that 
from the perspective of formal justice we cannot grasp tax avoidance and we can only 
see tax evasion, as we are either within or outside of the law.911 It might be argued that 
the solution to tax avoidance could be found by introducing substantive considerations 
908. vid, Bankowski, Living Lawfully. Love in Law and Law in Love, Ch7. For a discussion of Bankowski’s 
argument, vid Saffie, “Fulfilling the law by breaking it? Formalism within legality”.
909. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 5ff.
910. Bankowski, Living Lawfully. Love in Law and Law in Love, 72.
911. ibid, 139ff.
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to overcome the dichotomous character of formal law. But then, who will determine 
the substantive content of the law? Should we assume a liberal, neoliberal or socialist 
reading of tax law? As I argue extensively in this thesis, it seems to me that the only 
way we can overcome this problem, without risking autonomy, requires a reading of 
tax law as able to bring into it its institutional and political aspects.
Tax law should be explained as part of the autonomous decisions taken by a 
political society. Its legal aspect is an expression of the will of the people and its 
substantive content should be determined according to that will. That content should 
show in some way that the political project is connected with the general interest or 
mutual recognition. There should not be room for an instrumental use of the law, 
either by individuals or by any political group, because that would imply using the law 
for the interests of a faction or individual in society, thus making the law 
heteronomous and oppressive. I expect to have provided enough arguments in this 
thesis to show that the best understanding of taxation is as a practice in which mutual 
recognition is its internal good and that tax law is the teleological institution that 
secures the persistence of that practice.
5. CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER FIVE
In this chapter I provide an argument to consider how tax law can be the 
institutionalisation of taxation as a practice with an internal good. The argument 
develops at a general and a particular level. At the general level, I propose an 
understanding of law as a teleological institution; at the particular level, I try to show 
the way in which tax law is an instantiation of that general conception of law. The 
teleological conception of law (as genus) and tax law (as species) I advocate for 
explains how institutions embody and make stable the internal good of practices. This 
is possible if the external good of institutions (in this case, tax law’s consistent and 
comprehensive allocation and reallocation of private property) is able to embody the 
internal good of practices (in this case, taxation’s solidarity) as means for a telos, that is, 
something further that is itself good (law’s mutual recognition).
The teleological conception of law explains how law mediates between 
political ideals (the transcendent) and political action (the immanent). I argue that this 
understanding of law is better than functional conceptions of law. Functional 
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conceptions of law are not able to explain the complex relation between political 
ideals and institutions because they assume that institutions are technological devices 
to implement political values that were defined ‘once and for all’. The teleological 
conception of law, on the contrary, provides a better explanation of the way in which 
political and social changes and the ideas that shape our social world combine in 
history. In this sense, the teleological conception of law is a better understanding of the 
way in which the symbolic dimension of institutions opens new possibilities of action, 
redefining political ideals. As an institution, law embodies the good of two political 
practices: individual autonomy as a collective political project and representation as 
collective autonomy. This is what it means that the law is the will of the people or that 
it represents the general will. Hence, I argue that the good of law as a teleological 
institution is mutual recognition.
As an instantiation of the teleological conception of law in general, tax law’s 
external good (its consistent and comprehensive allocation and reallocation of private 
property) makes stable the internal good of the practice of taxation (solidarity). But for 
this relation between practice and institution to work, tax law should be understood as 
a means to the good of law in general, that is, mutual recognition. Therefore, tax law 
makes possible solidarity as an aspect of mutual recognition. As I argue in the chapter, 
these ideas have two implications: (i) they establish a criterion against which to 
evaluate tax policy, and (ii) they set the criteria for the substantive interpretation of tax 
law. The latter is important for legal reasoning in tax law because it sets the substantive 
criterion for legal decision making. This substantive criterion would make possible to 
identify those conducts that represent a violation of tax law. But this is not enough. It 
is also necessary to offer an structure of tax law able to embody these ideas (or a 
dogmatics of tax law), that is, the details of the general theory of tax law. I have not 
been able to do that here. However, if sound, the argument of this thesis lays the 
groundwork for that task.
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CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, I present a summary of the main arguments that I develop in the 
thesis and how they are connected in each chapter.
1. Tax avoidance is a legal (not a moral) problem (Ch1, s2.2).
1.1. Legal alternatives have not succeeded in providing a solution to avoidance 
(Ch1, ss.2.2.3 – 2.2.4.3 and Ch2, s4.4ff).
1.2. The reason why possible legal alternatives have not succeeded so far is due 
to the classical paradigm and the contemporary general theory of tax law 
(Ch2, s3).
1.3. An inquiry into the substantive content of tax law is needed (Ch2, 
s.4.4.2).
2. Liberal egalitarian and luck egalitarian theories of justice cannot provide this 
substantive content because they take as given the classical paradigm and the 
contemporary general theory of tax law (Ch3).
2.1. They can only provide a moral argument for redistribution (Ch3, ss.2.2.1, 
2.2.2 and 2.2.4.1).
2.2. They cannot justify taxation and tax law per se but only instrumentally 
(Ch3, s2.2.4).
3. A political rather than an economic conception of distributive justice provides 
a better grounding for understanding taxation (Ch4, s3).
3.1. Equality is a political ideal and not a value (Ch4, s2).
4. The substantive content (and not merely instrumental justification) of an 
institution depends on the underlying practice (Ch4, s4).
4.1. Taxation is a practice with an internal good (Ch4, s5).
4.2. The internal good of taxation is mutual recognition in the sphere of 
solidarity (Ch4, s5).
4.3. Tax avoidance shows a lack of recognition for those with whom we share 
an ‘ethical life’ in the state (Ch4, s5).
5. The right to private property is part of recognition in its dimension of self-
respect (Ch4, s6).
5.1. As such it is a general right (Ch4, s6).
5.2. As a general right it has an intrinsic limit: the recognition of private 
property for others (Ch4, s6).
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5.3. The internal good of taxation is mutual recognition in the sphere of 
solidarity (Ch4, s5).
5.4. Taxation and private property are co-original (Ch4, s6).
5.5. The duty to pay taxes depends on the recognition of private property and 
not on the justification of redistribution (Ch4, s6).
6. Taxation is a practice with an internal good (Ch4, s5).
6.1. Its institutionalisation requires a kind of institution that makes possible the 
persistence of the practice (Ch5, s3).
6.2. Teleological institutions are the kind of institutions that can fulfil that task 
(Ch5, s3).
6.3. Law is a teleological institution (Ch5, s4).
6.4. Tax law as a teleological institution aims at securing the persistence of 
taxation as a practice with an internal good (Ch5, s4).
6.5. Reasoning and adjudicating in tax law are determined according to 6.4. 
(Ch5, s4.2).
6.6. No one can legally endanger the telos in tax law, hence there is not any 
space for tax avoidance (Ch5, s4.2).
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